Jolanta Gul
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Gul J., America First Again: The Resurgence of Republican Isolationism in Modern U.S. Politics, “Polish Journal of Political Science”, 2024, Vol. 10, Issue 3, pp. 4–35, DOI: 10.58183/pjps.01032024.
ABSTRACT
The resurgence of Republican isolationism in the United States, characterized by calls for reduced foreign involvement, represents a continuation of a historical trend in American political discourse. Rooted in the interwar period and epitomized by the “America First” slogan, this sentiment has re-emerged in recent years, notably through the rhetoric of former President Donald Trump. The modern iteration reflects a response to the perceived overreach of American foreign policy in recent decades, advocating for a more restrained and selective approach to international engagement. While this stance prioritizes national interests and domestic issues, it does not signify a complete withdrawal from global affairs. Instead, it underscores a nuanced and calculated approach to foreign policy, balancing national priorities with the complexities of an interconnected world. This work explores the historical context, contemporary resurgence, and implications of Republican isolationism in American politics.
Keywords: isolationism, foreign policy, Donald Trump, Republican Party, America First
Introduction
The resurgence of isolationist sentiment within the Republican Party represents a significant shift in American foreign policy discourse. This renewed emphasis on non-interventionism and national prioritization is not a novel phenomenon but a revival of historical rhetoric that has periodically surfaced in American politics. The party’s current stance,[1] advocating for limited involvement in certain parts of the world, echoes a sentiment deeply rooted in the nation’s history, particularly during the interwar period. Understanding this resurgence requires a closer look at its historical antecedents and contemporary implications.
The concept of isolationism in American politics is most notably associated with the interwar period, particularly the 1920s and 1930s. Following the immense human and economic costs of World War I, a significant portion of the American populace and their political representatives became wary of foreign entanglements.[2] This sentiment was encapsulated in the slogan “America First,” which gained traction as a call to prioritize domestic concerns over international ones. It reflected a desire to avoid the political and military commitments that had drawn the United States into the Great War.
The “America First” slogan has experienced a contemporary revival, most prominently through the rhetoric of former President Donald Trump. His use of the slogan during the 2016 presidential campaign and throughout his presidency symbolized a return to prioritizing American interests over international commitments. Trump’s speeches often framed foreign engagements as costly endeavors that diverted resources from pressing domestic issues. This rhetoric resonated with a significant portion of the American electorate, particularly those disillusioned by prolonged military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq and skeptical of international agreements perceived to undermine national sovereignty.
The modern resurgence of Republican isolationism reflects a broader trend of nationalism and skepticism toward international institutions. This trend is not limited to the United States but is part of a global wave of populism that prioritizes national interests and questions the benefits of globalization. Within the Republican Party, this has manifested as a clear and vocal assertion that the United States should not involve itself in certain parts of the world unless strictly necessary.
To explore the resurgence of isolationism in U.S. foreign policy under Donald Trump’s administration, a mixed-methods approach will be employed.[3] This research will involve content analysis of Trump’s speeches to identify key themes and rhetoric that reflect isolationist principles. Additionally, historical comparative analysis will be used to draw parallels between Trump’s policies and earlier periods of American isolationism, particularly the interwar period and the influence of Patrick Buchanan’s isolationist stance in the early 1990s. This study aims to offer a robust understanding of the nuances and impacts of contemporary American isolationism.
Existing literature on Trump’s foreign policy highlights a significant departure from traditional U.S. internationalism. Many studies provide varied perspectives on this shift, reflecting on the implications of Trump’s “America First” doctrine and its roots in historical isolationism.
Scholars such as Walter Russell Mead and Fareed Zakaria argue that Trump’s “America First” doctrine represents a neo-isolationist approach, prioritizing national interests and reducing international commitments. Mead argues that this approach is grounded in Jacksonian populism and suggests that Trump’s focus on national sovereignty and skepticism toward international institutions marks a return to a more isolationist stance in U.S. foreign policy.[4] But Zakaria discusses Trump’s isolationism within the broader context of global trends. He contends that Trump’s withdrawal from international agreements and organizations signifies a retreat from the U.S.’s traditional role as a global leader, emphasizing a unilateral approach over multilateral cooperation.[5]
On the other hand, Peter Navarro and William Hyland provide a detailed analysis of specific policies, such as trade tariffs and military withdrawals, framing them within a historical context of isolationism. Navarro, an economic advisor in the Trump administration, provides an insider perspective and presents an analysis, which focuses on trade policies, highlighting the administration’s protectionist measures and their alignment with isolationist economic principles.[6] The impact of Trump’s policies on NATO and transatlantic relations was examined by Hyland. He argues that Trump’s criticism of NATO and calls for increased burden-sharing among allies resonate with historical isolationist sentiments, reflecting a reluctance to commit to international alliances.[7]
However, there is a noticeable gap in the literature regarding the direct influences on Trump’s isolationist rhetoric, particularly the potential impact of Patrick Buchanan’s political ideology. Buchanan, a prominent political commentator and presidential candidate, articulated a form of conservative isolationism that bears striking similarities to Trump’s “America First” rhetoric. While John Mearsheimer and Barry Posen touch on the broader strategic implications, they do not delve into the intertextual connections between Buchanan’s and Trump’s policy frameworks. Mearsheimer, a prominent realist scholar, suggests that Trump’s isolationist tendencies are a response to perceived overreach and the failures of liberal internationalism, advocating for a more restrained U.S. role in global affairs. Posen’s argument for a more restrained U.S. foreign policy aligns with some of Trump’s actions, such as reducing military commitments abroad and prioritizing domestic issues.
This research aims to fill this gap by explicitly linking Trump’s isolationist policies to Buchanan’s earlier advocacy, thereby enriching the understanding of contemporary isolationism’s roots and evolution. Additionally, this study will incorporate Robert O’Brien’s assertions that Trump’s policies do not constitute isolationism, providing a more nuanced and comprehensive analysis. O’Brien, Trump’s National Security Advisor, provides an alternative perspective. In various statements and writings, he has contended that Trump’s policies do not amount to isolationism. He argues that Trump’s foreign policy is characterized by selective engagement rather than a complete retreat from international affairs. This distinction is crucial in understanding the nuances of Trump’s approach and challenges the notion that his policies represent a straightforward return to isolationism.
By examining Buchanan’s influence on Trump’s rhetoric and policy decisions, and juxtaposing this with O’Brien’s claims, this study will provide a more nuanced understanding of the ideological continuity and transformation within Republican isolationism.
Modern Trump’s foreign policy is significantly influenced by isolationist ideology, as evidenced by his “America First” rhetoric, withdrawal from international agreements, and emphasis on national sovereignty over multilateral cooperation. This study hypothesizes that Trump’s policy framework aligns with historical isolationist principles, particularly those articulated by figures such as Patrick Buchanan in the early 1990s, despite assertions from some contemporaries that Trump’s approach represents selective engagement rather than true isolationism.
Trump’s NATO Rhetoric
At a rally in South Carolina, former President Donald Trump shared an anecdote involving a European leader. One of the presidents of a large country inquired, “Sir, if we don’t pay and we’re attacked by Russia, will you protect us?” Trump reportedly responded, “You didn’t pay. I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You got to pay, you got to pay your bills.”[8]
Trump further asserted that NATO was dysfunctional before his tenure, implying that the alliance was only revitalized under his leadership. His comments were made in the context of NATO funding, suggesting that he either misunderstands or misrepresents NATO’s operational framework. Trump conveyed that NATO members must financially contribute to their defense; otherwise, the United States would withhold protection.[9]
In actuality, while Trump’s statements have a semblance of truth, they oversimplify and misinterpret the situation. The 2014 commitment by NATO members to allocate 2% of their GDP to defense is a voluntary pledge, not a treaty obligation. NATO membership does not depend on meeting this financial target. Nonetheless, Trump claims the U.S. is unfairly burdened within NATO, accusing other members of insufficient contributions and threatening to withhold American defense support as a result.
The issue is not about a common fund to which members contribute inadequately, requiring the U.S. to compensate. While there is a budget for administrative functions, including NATO headquarters, these are minor expenditures. The crux of the matter is the disparity in military capabilities, with the U.S. possessing the strongest forces in NATO. Although defense spending by NATO countries has increased in recent years, most still fall short of the 2% GDP target. In 2024, 18 out of 31 countries are expected to meet this benchmark.[10]
Donald Trump has long asserted that his leadership revitalized NATO, suggesting that member states began taking defense seriously under his watch. However, this narrative overlooks the fact that defense spending by European nations had been increasing significantly prior to his presidency, particularly in response to Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine during the tenures of Barack Obama and Joe Biden. Trump’s statements on NATO funding have generated debate, despite similar calls from previous U.S. presidents, that initially faced resistance from European allies. Trump’s approach does not represent a departure in American policy but rather emphasizes his rhetorical style.
It is crucial to clarify that defense expenditures do not influence NATO treaties. Concerns have emerged regarding Trump’s potential withdrawal from NATO; however, bipartisan legislation passed by the U.S. Congress late last year requires a two-thirds Senate majority to approve any such decision, indicating congressional hesitancy about unilateral NATO withdrawal. Despite media dismissals of Trump’s rhetoric, many lawmakers reassure that Trump’s statements should not be interpreted as a serious threat to NATO membership. However, the congressional action suggests concern among American legislators, such as Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, who clarified that Trump’s rhetoric should not raise alarm; at the same time, he is also one of the sponsors of this legislation.
As previously mentioned, Donald Trump has long considered NATO outdated and unnecessary, accusing it of exploiting American goodwill. According to many of Trump’s current and former associates, he reportedly sought to withdraw from NATO as early as 2018 but was dissuaded by his closest foreign policy advisors.[11] They managed to prevent Trump from pulling the United States out of NATO. The question remains whether Trump fully understood the implications of withdrawing from NATO. However, it is undeniable that few topics see Trump as consistent as his repeated assertions that NATO is not entirely necessary and that the United States is being deceived, among other criticisms. This stance may indeed represent one of Donald Trump’s most authentic beliefs. Trump’s isolationist stance is perhaps the only issue in which he has remained consistent for decades, as he expressed similar sentiments in the 1980s, claiming that America’s allies, not only Europeans but also the Japanese, were taking advantage of the protection provided by the United States. During his presidency, he even referred to the European Union as an adversary, alleging that Europeans were exploiting Americans.
These statements have sparked widespread debate about the resurgence of isolationism in the United States. This discourse extends beyond Trump’s comments on NATO to encompass current domestic issues related to the approval of aid packages, particularly financial and military assistance aimed predominantly at defense purposes and aid for Ukraine.
Initially, aid for Ukraine was swiftly approved with bipartisan backing. However, subsequent Republican support for additional aid packages dwindled, leading to their failure to pass. The primary opposition to these packages came from Republicans who initially sought to link the new Ukrainian aid package with funding for bolstering border security. Yet, when a bipartisan initiative was crafted, former President Donald Trump intervened, expressing opposition to this linkage. Consequently, a Senate-approved aid package for Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel passed without the border security provision. After a prolonged period of intense internal conflict regarding the allocation of further financial assistance for Ukraine, Mike Johnson, the Speaker in the House of Representatives finally managed to secure the passage of foreign aid.[12]
This action could potentially weaken the isolationist doctrine advocated by Donald Trump and other proponents, emphasizing instead the importance of international cooperation and support for global allies. However, isolationist tendencies in modern U.S. politics remain strongly visible.
From Political Detachment to Economic Seclusion
When discussing American isolationism, it can be categorized into three distinct types: mythical isolationism, political isolationism, and populist isolationism.[13] These categories represent distinct and different concepts.
First, let’s address mythical isolationism, which might also be referred to as historical isolationism. According to encyclopedic definitions, American isolationism has influenced U.S. policy since the very inception of the American state.[14] Throughout its history, the United States has recurrently debated its role in the world and whether it should be more closed off or open to international engagement.
The second significant aspect is political isolationism. In the American public sphere, some politicians have genuinely advocated for this type of isolationism. Notably, Donald Trump is often included in this category. However, some believe that the United States has already contributed sufficiently to global affairs and should instead leverage its exceptionally secure position – flanked by oceans on both sides, a safe border with Canada, and a less secure but manageable border with Mexico. These proponents argue that the United States should focus on its own security, particularly on issues like immigration at the Mexican border, prioritizing its own safety and prosperity over involvement in distant regions.
Such views have emerged in the American public sphere and are espoused by some politicians who perceive electoral advantages in these positions. Many voters are inclined to support such politicians. However, it is important to note that these politicians, typically from the Republican Party, do not constitute a majority within the party. While they do not shape policy directly, they can influence it indirectly, such as by hindering aid to Ukraine when the opportunity arises.
The third type is populist isolationism, whose sentiments do indeed arise within a segment of American society. This phenomenon can be attributed to the vast expanse of the United States, a country where many residents have never traveled abroad due to the considerable distance to international borders. Consequently, individuals living in central states often lack a global perspective, focusing instead on issues within their own state, such as economic and social problems.
These isolationist views have been exacerbated by the aftermath of the two unsuccessful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a perception that the United States has overextended itself globally, sacrificing too many resources and lives while many domestic issues remain unresolved. This has created fertile ground for the spread of isolationist ideas, providing electoral success to politicians and visibility to political commentators who advocate such positions.
The Evolution of American Isolationism
The roots of American isolationism can be traced back to George Washington’s Farewell Address, which was never delivered as a speech but was published in “Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser.”
In this address, Washington warned his compatriots against entangling themselves in European affairs, cautioning that the young American state might not withstand such conflicts. He argued that involvement in these conflicts could be highly detrimental to America and might even lead to the downfall of the newly formed nation. He stated, “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world.”[15] These words are frequently cited as the wisdom of a Founding Father that should be heeded.
Advocates of isolationism often refer to Washington, suggesting that Americans should withdraw from international affairs. However, it is essential to note that Americans have never been entirely isolationist. Therefore, using the term “isolationism” can be an oversimplification, as the United States has always maintained some level of international relations, trade, and involvement in military conflicts.
A prime example of the United States’ early engagement in global affairs is the Monroe Doctrine, formulated by the fifth President of the United States, James Monroe, in 1823. This doctrine declared that the United States would respect existing European colonial territories in the Americas but would not tolerate further colonization of the continent. It asserted that newly emerging nations, particularly in South America, had the right to exist and be sovereign.[16] Consequently, the United States extended its protection over the entire Western Hemisphere, indicating that it would not tolerate European encroachment in the region.
This doctrine contradicts the idea of isolationism, as it demonstrates America’s willingness to be active in the world, even within a specific region. For many years, the Monroe Doctrine remained rather a statement of American aspirations than a reflection of its actual capabilities. According to this doctrine, America was meant to be isolationist until the end of the 19th century.
Over time, the Monroe Doctrine was expanded by President Theodore Roosevelt, who added a corollary asserting that the United States would intervene in the affairs of Western Hemisphere nations if it had significant interests at stake.[17] This demonstrated that while the U.S. practiced isolationism to some extent, it exercised considerable influence over its hemisphere.
As American power grew towards the end of the 19th century, so did its global influence and engagement. A prime example of this is the Spanish-American War in 1898, when the United States supported Cuba’s struggle for independence from Spain. As a result of this war, the United States acquired territories from Spain, including the Philippines and Puerto Rico, further indicating its departure from strict isolationism.
However, it is important to note that the United States’ involvement in the war against Spain is often seen as the symbolic end of the first phase of American isolationism, which nevertheless resurfaced in the 20th century. The fundamental problem with this definition is that even the documents embedded within the definition of isolationism do not advocate for the United States to completely separate or isolate itself and refrain from any foreign policy. For instance, Washington’s Farewell Address primarily emphasizes that the United States should not involve itself in European affairs or take on obligations that could overburden it.
Similarly, the Monroe Doctrine does not suggest that the United States isolates itself from foreign policy. Instead, it highlights that the United States maintains an active foreign policy within the scope of its then-current capabilities. In fact, this document even anticipated future capabilities. Until the end of the 19th century, the United States largely refrained from engaging in conflicts with European countries, aside from the early 19th-century war with Great Britain. This restraint can be attributed not only to doctrinal isolationism but also to the United States’ incapacity to engage in such conflicts, particularly on the European continent.
At that time, the United States faced numerous internal issues related to its own development, including territorial expansion, acquiring new territories through purchases, and wars such as the Mexican-American War in the mid-19th century. Additionally, the U.S. encountered challenges in managing these newly acquired lands, which were inhabited by indigenous populations, as well as dealing with internal conflicts primarily centered around the issue of slavery. This ultimately led to the devastating Civil War and the subsequent period of Reconstruction. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine the United States, grappling with numerous internal challenges, engaging in European politics during the turbulent 19th century.
However, once the United States felt capable of participating in such conflicts, it quickly became involved. The Spanish-American War over Cuba is an excellent example of this shift. This war, significantly driven by public sentiment inflamed by tabloids and sensationalist publications, underscores the notion that Americans did not remain in isolationism for an extended period.
A notable example is the construction of the Panama Canal. When Theodore Roosevelt aimed to build the canal, Colombia posed some resistance. Consequently, the province of Panama, then part of Colombia, suddenly declared its independence, allowing the canal to be constructed without significant obstacles. This incident illustrates the frequent interventions in Latin America, a distinct topic in itself, demonstrating that American interventionism and isolationism never extended to this region.
Roosevelt himself exemplifies broader global engagement. He was the first American president to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded for his role in negotiating the peace treaty between Russia and Japan after the 1905 war, known as the Treaty of Portsmouth.[18]
The term “isolationism” began to gain prominence in the 20th century, particularly in response to World War I. There was significant debate over whether the United States should become involved in the European conflict. Many Americans at the time believed it was not worthwhile. In 1916, President Woodrow Wilson campaigned for re-election by assuring the public that the United States would not enter the war, a promise that ultimately proved untenable.
Historically, Republicans have generally been wary of entangling the United States in global affairs. A prime example is the aftermath of World War I. President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, championed the League of Nations, which the United States ultimately did not join. After negotiating the Treaty of Versailles and proposing the League of Nations, Wilson faced staunch opposition from the Republican-controlled Senate. Despite his efforts to garner public support through a nationwide tour, Wilson’s health deteriorated, and the treaty was never ratified. Consequently, the United States did not join the League of Nations.
Wilson’s presidency illustrates the tensions between isolationism and the desire for international engagement. Wilson campaigned for the presidency by promising Americans that he would keep the country out of World War I, reflecting the prevailing lack of willingness for involvement in the conflict. Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency may be an exception, but it is important to remember that the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries was also a period of mass immigration to the United States. One reaction among the public was fear and reluctance towards immigrants, leading to a desire to close off from the world and its influences. This sentiment contributed to the reluctance to engage in World War I. Wilson’s proposal to create an international organization to ensure lasting peace did not align with the prevailing sentiments in American society, particularly among lawmakers and the general public.
The interwar period was characterized by American withdrawal and isolation. Republicans were wary of becoming entangled in global affairs, fearing that the League of Nations could undermine U.S. sovereignty. Most Republican politicians, including Theodore Roosevelt, expressed opposition to the League.[19] Some scholars suggest that Roosevelt’s opposition may have been motivated by personal animosity toward Wilson, as he had previously expressed support for the idea of a league but changed his stance once it became Wilson’s proposal.[20]
In the 1930s, isolationism became a prominent stance, a period often referred to when discussing the concept today. This era, directly preceding World War II, saw rising tensions that could potentially draw American soldiers into conflict and compel the U.S. government to intervene. This prompted a wave of protests under the slogan “America First,” advocating for the United States to avoid war, focus on domestic issues, and leverage the geographical advantage provided by the oceans separating America from conflicts in Europe and Asia. Images from these protests are often juxtaposed with modern isolationist sentiments in the American electorate, highlighting this historical reference point.
During the 1930s, isolationism significantly influenced American politics. However, it is crucial to note that this was not an inherent or perpetual stance of the United States from its inception. Instead, it was a reaction to the substantial losses the U.S. suffered during World War I. While these losses were significantly smaller than those of European nations, they were the most severe for the U.S. since the Civil War, leaving a profound impact.
This sense of being exploited during World War I, coupled with the perception that the U.S. gained little from its involvement, fueled the conviction among many citizens and politicians that the United States should continue to distance itself from European affairs.
During the early 20th century, a period dominated by Republican presidents, isolationism was a prominent feature of U.S. foreign policy. Presidents Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover were notably reluctant to enter into international alliances and chose to adopt policies that closed the United States off from the world. Politically, they avoided international commitments, and domestically, they tightened immigration laws and raised import tariffs, effectively closing the doors to many immigrants.
Despite this inward focus, complete isolation was not feasible. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the United States had global interests that necessitated engagement in international affairs, even during the interwar period. For instance, the U.S. participated in discussions about disarmament and global peace, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which aimed to prevent war through diplomatic means. The general belief was that disarmament could help avoid future conflicts. At this time, the United States was not yet a dominant global power, and the isolationist sentiment was, in part, a reaction to global events, particularly those unfolding in Europe.[21]
In the 1930s, as Europe steadily marched toward another conflict, Americans were determined to avoid a repeat of their involvement in World War I. Under the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Congress passed a series of laws collectively known as the Neutrality Acts. On August 31, 1935, Congress passed the first Neutrality Act, which prohibited the export of arms, ammunition, and war implements from the United States to countries at war. The intention was to limit the possibility of supporting any side in the conflict. This law was later extended. The second Neutrality Act, passed on February 26, 1936, added a ban on the sale of war materials and prohibited loans to belligerent nations. Consequently, the United States did not assist Ethiopia in its defense against Italy or the Spanish Republic in its fight against Franco. The third Neutrality Act, enacted on May 1, 1937, prohibited American citizens from traveling on ships of belligerent nations and introduced the “cash and carry” principle. This principle required countries purchasing non-embargoed goods from the United States to pay in cash and transport the goods on their own ships. The law equated civil wars with international conflicts, further limiting U.S. involvement.[22]
In addition, there was a strong opposition to arms trade stemmed from a prevalent theory that gained traction after World War I. According to this theory, the U.S. entry into the war was not driven by political or security concerns but was the result of a conspiracy by big business, banks, and arms manufacturers seeking to profit from the European conflict.
In response to these suspicions, the Senate established a special committee to investigate the profits of the banking and arms sectors. This committee, chaired by Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota, operated from 1934 to 1936. The Nye Committee’s report, published in 1936, provided significant support to isolationists by ostensibly proving that the United States had been manipulated into joining the war.[23] The report bolstered the argument against any future involvement in foreign wars, particularly through the sale of arms to belligerent nations.
However, this widespread resistance to arms trading had complex consequences. While the United States refrained from aiding countries at war, Nazi Germany faced no such restrictions and actively supported Franco’s forces in Spain. Consequently, while the U.S. maintained its official stance of neutrality and abstained from arms trade, the geopolitical landscape in Europe continued to evolve, eventually challenging the foundations of American isolationism.
Gallup polls indicated that just before the outbreak of World War II, Americans overwhelmingly preferred to stay out of the conflict. A specific survey conducted from September 1-6, 1939, highlighted these isolationist sentiments. When asked whether the U.S. should send food supplies or aid to the warring nations, 74% of respondents supported this idea, while 27% opposed it. However, when the question shifted to sending aircraft and other war materials to England and France, only 58% were in favor, and 42% were against it. The most striking result came from the question of whether the U.S. should send its army or navy to fight against Germany; only 16% supported this, while 84% opposed it.[24]
This data clearly shows that Americans did not want to get involved, even as Hitler broke multiple promises and agreements. Despite the annexation of Austria, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and Poland’s defense efforts, Americans remained distant from the conflict.
It is essential to note that, from the American perspective, the events of 1939 did not mark the beginning of World War II. For them, it was still a European war, a conflict they believed they should avoid.
The year 1940 marked a pivotal moment in American isolationism. Following the fall of France, American anxieties increased, as reflected in public opinion polls. This period saw a gradual erosion of isolationist sentiment, with growing support for rearmament – primarily for the defense of the United States itself. Concurrently, there was a slow shift towards the idea of aiding the Allied nations, although the existing Neutrality Acts imposed restrictions.[25]
However, the Neutrality Acts underwent modifications in 1939, influenced by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Despite the formal stance of neutrality, Roosevelt’s administration facilitated some forms of support to the Allies. The fourth Neutrality Act, passed on November 4, 1939, allowed belligerent nations, notably the United Kingdom and France, to purchase American arms and ammunition on a “cash and carry” basis, meaning they had to pay upfront and transport the goods on their own ships. This adjustment displeased isolationists, who viewed any engagement as perilous, but it signaled a shifting stance in U.S. foreign policy.
The 1940 presidential election year was extraordinary as Roosevelt announced his intention to seek a third term, unprecedented at the time, since the two-term limit was a customary, not legally mandated, practice. Roosevelt justified his candidacy by asserting that the international situation necessitated his leadership to keep the U.S. out of the war. His Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie, also campaigned on a platform of non-intervention, despite his support for aiding Britain. Both candidates reassured the electorate that they would keep the nation out of war.
During the prelude to U.S. involvement in World War II, there was significant resistance within American society to direct engagement in the conflict. This opposition was epitomized by the formation of the America First Committee (AFC) in September 1940, just before the presidential campaign. The AFC played a pivotal role in promoting isolationist sentiments, advocating for America’s focus on its own defense and maintaining neutrality to ensure the survival of democracy within its borders.[26]
At its zenith, the America First Committee boasted 800,000 paying members, with a broader base of support. Prominent figures involved included industrialist Henry Ford, aviator Charles Lindbergh, future President Gerald Ford (then a student), and a young John F. Kennedy. Politicians such as Senator Gerald Nye and Senator Burton Wheeler from Montana were also notable supporters.
The slogan “America First” was not an invention of Donald Trump but a historical reference to the AFC, highlighting a continuity in isolationist rhetoric. The AFC was not a pacifist organization; it recognized the necessity of armament but insisted that the United States should arm itself solely for its defense. The Committee argued that sending military aid to the Allies risked entangling America in the war. Their stance was that American democracy could only be preserved through strict neutrality and self-sufficiency in defense.
The America First Committee was not a movement confined to a particular political ideology. It was eclectic, encompassing members from across the political spectrum, including both Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, as well as figures from the far left and the far right. This diversity[27] reflected the genuine fear many Americans had about becoming involved in another global conflict. Although the AFC was a coalition of progressive and conservative elements, it was also exploited by some to promote antisemitic sentiments.
Not all members of the AFC held antisemitic views or were aligned with the far right. However, antisemitic rhetoric did surface within the organization. For instance, Henry Ford, a known antisemitic figure who was awarded the Order of the German Eagle by Hitler, was a prominent supporter. Charles Lindbergh, another key figure, made statements suggesting that Jewish influence was pushing the United States towards war, despite claiming that most ordinary Americans opposed it. Senator Gerald Nye, who had previously led investigations into the profits of the arms industry, also propagated antisemitic conspiracy theories, particularly regarding Hollywood’s alleged role in advocating for war, which he attributed to Jewish influence.
On the fringes of the AFC was Father Charles Coughlin, a radio preacher whose broadcasts reached millions of Americans and openly promoted antisemitic views. Although he was not a member of the AFC due to his extremist reputation, his rhetoric nonetheless paralleled some of the more extreme isolationist sentiments within the organization. Coughlin suggested that the U.S. should consider aligning with Hitler and praised fascism for its opposition to communism.
Lindbergh became significantly involved with the AFC after the 1940 elections, which President Franklin D. Roosevelt won decisively. Following the signing of the Lend-Lease Act, Lindbergh traveled across the country, speaking against what he described as “isolationism,” preferring to frame the discussion around American independence and destiny. He argued that supporting Britain would effectively mean defeating Germany, which he claimed was not in America’s best interest.[28]
Nevertheless, this isolationism was ultimately overcome, initially through President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s policies and later due to the attack on Pearl Harbor, which made it clear that the United States had to engage in the war. The U.S. first joined the war in the Pacific and subsequently in Europe to ensure an Allied victory. The America First Committee, which had been an intense but short-lived movement, effectively ended on December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Following this, the committee supported the war effort, arguing that had their advice been heeded, the U.S. might have avoided the conflict altogether. However, they conceded that since the war had started, they would support the fight.
The reality set in that even if one believes that war can be avoided, it can still reach and affect you. After World War II, the United States faced a similar dilemma as it did after World War I: whether to withdraw and return to isolationism or remain engaged to prevent the resurgence of adversaries and the outbreak of new conflicts. Learning from the interwar period, the decision was made to stay involved internationally. This led to the United States’ long-term commitment to building a global order, making any return to isolationism untenable.
The first step in building post-war involvement in world affairs was Anglosphere cooperation, which has played a crucial role in shaping modern international relations, particularly among the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Rooted in shared history, language, and cultural values, these countries forged deep bonds that have influenced global diplomacy, military alliances, and intelligence sharing. The “Special Relationship” between the U.S. and the U.K. emerged strongly during World War II and continued throughout the Cold War, forming the backbone of this cooperation. New security arrangements like the AUKUS pact have underscored the importance of this partnership, particularly in addressing modern strategic challenges such as China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific. Anglosphere cooperation has remained a vital force in global politics for centuries, rooted in a commitment to democracy, collective security, and mutual economic interests.[29]
Additionally, the best expression of U.S. post-war engagement was undoubtedly the Marshall Plan, which allocated substantial funds to the reconstruction of Europe. These funds were distributed in a way that allowed European countries considerable freedom in how they spent the money to rebuild their economies, aiming to prevent them from falling prey to communism. The rise of Soviet power was another critical factor that motivated the United States to maintain its involvement. It quickly became apparent that long-term cooperation with the Soviet Union would not be feasible.[30]
In February 1946, the most famous telegram in U.S. history, sent by American diplomat George Kennan from Moscow, laid the foundation for the U.S. foreign policy doctrine of containment. This doctrine aimed to limit Soviet expansion and influence worldwide. President Truman articulated this in one of his speeches, stating that the world had been divided into two blocks: one of freedom and one of tyranny.[31] The United States committed to aiding countries striving for freedom.
Another factor compelling the U.S. to remain engaged globally was the decline of European colonial powers. Devastated by the war, European countries could no longer sustain their international commitments, creating a vacuum that the Soviet Union could fill. This provided further justification for the U.S. to stay involved in global affairs.
Then, a comprehensive global security system was established, comprising institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States, under a bipartisan consensus, joined these institutions and took on a leading role. However, Republican isolationism, particularly prominent before World War II, did not completely vanish. A notable figure representing these isolationist tendencies was Senator Robert Taft from Ohio, the son of President William Taft. Elected a senator in the 1930s, he was initially reluctant for the U.S. to enter the war in 1941. He warned against joining the war, arguing that it would compel the U.S. to stay in Europe afterwards, which he believed the country could not afford and was not America’s destiny or goal. Despite the overwhelming public support for the war following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Taft maintained his isolationist stance. After the war, he voted against U.S. membership in the UN, the World Bank, and NATO. Taft argued that such actions would provoke the Soviet Union, which he did not see as a direct threat to the U.S., given America’s advantageous geographic position and possession of the atomic bomb, which he believed was a sufficient guarantor of security.[32]
It is worth noting that similar views regarding NATO’s expansion resurfaced in the 1990s when the alliance was enlarging. There were arguments that NATO’s creation would provoke Russia. During the 1990s, discussions about NATO’s expansion to include Eastern European countries like Poland were accompanied by concerns that this would provoke Russia. These arguments re-emerged just before the aggression against Ukraine. Notably, both American right-wing and left-wing commentators have surprisingly agreed that Putin attacked Ukraine because NATO expanded to include Poland, which made him feel threatened.[33] In Putin’s ultimatum presented in December 2021, there was a demand to effectively revert NATO to its 1997 borders, ensuring that no NATO troops or infrastructure could be stationed in countries that had joined the alliance after the 1990s.[34]
However, Republican isolationism in the 1950s did not gain widespread support. Senator Robert Taft, a prominent isolationist, narrowly missed becoming the Republican presidential candidate. The turning point came when one man strongly opposed Taft’s stance, insisting that the United States must remain engaged internationally. This man was General Dwight Eisenhower, the first Supreme Commander of NATO and a renowned World War II commander. Eisenhower’s entry into the presidential race dramatically shifted its course. Reportedly, Eisenhower informed Taft that if he changed his position on U.S. global engagement and support for NATO, Eisenhower would not run in the Republican primaries. This would have virtually guaranteed Taft’s nomination, and possibly his victory. However, Taft did not alter his stance, Eisenhower ran, and he became president.
This shift marked a significant transformation for the Republican Party, steering it away from isolationism. Additionally, Taft’s death in 1953 removed a pivotal figure of the isolationist faction within the party, leading to its eventual dissolution. On the other hand, Eisenhower’s presidency reinforced a robust international engagement policy. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the United States maintained extensive involvement in global affairs, with mixed results.
It is important to note that some Democrats were also members of America First. However, the most notable instance of Democratic isolationism emerged during the 1970s in response to the Vietnam War. For example, George McGovern, the Democratic presidential candidate in 1972, campaigned with the slogan “Come Home America.” This slogan not only called for the return of American soldiers from Vietnam but also broadly suggested that America should focus on its own domestic issues, criticizing the war as a foolish imperialist endeavor that served big business rather than ordinary people.[35] McGovern’s campaign ultimately failed, as he was soundly defeated by Richard Nixon.
This inward turn of the Democratic Party led to a reaction from some Democrats who were disillusioned with the party’s lack of commitment to international engagement. This disillusionment contributed to the rise of the neoconservative movement. Many prominent neoconservatives, particularly those later associated with George W. Bush’s administration, were former Democrats. These individuals, particularly intellectuals, felt the Democratic Party was insufficiently internationalist and not adequately engaged in global affairs. However, this isolationist phase was only a brief episode for the Democratic Party. Subsequent administrations, such as Bill Clinton’s, were actively involved in international affairs. Therefore, it seemed that both major parties, despite internal debates, generally agreed that America is strongest when it is engaged globally. The scope and nature of this engagement have been subjects of debate, but there has been a broad consensus against retreating into isolationism.
The isolationism of the Republican and Democratic Parties, or the left and right, can be succinctly characterized as follows: the left believes that the United States should not engage globally because it causes harm and is not fit to lead in world affairs. In contrast, the right believes that the United States is too exceptional to involve itself in global issues and that such engagement would degrade its deals, culture, and greatness. This is a simplified but interesting distinction that captures a significant aspect of each stance.[36]
However, this perspective only applies to the left-wing of the Democratic Party, not to the entire party. For example, figures like Oliver Stone argue that wherever America has intervened, it has brought only death and destruction. This aligns with the left-wing view that America is not good enough for the world.
On the other hand, the view that the world is not worthy of America is no longer an extremist or fringe belief within the Republican Party. This notion has increasingly taken hold of the party as a whole. It is based on the belief that global engagement harms America and that the world does not deserve its leadership. This ideology underpinned the isolationism of the 1930s and continues to shape much of contemporary Republican isolationism.
But this isolationism is always accompanied by numerous caveats and is never entirely straightforward or genuine upon closer inspection. For instance, the isolationism during Roosevelt’s era was ostensibly about not engaging globally, but there was no hesitation to intervene in Panama or Haiti when deemed necessary. Similarly, today’s Republican isolationism has no qualms about the idea of invading Mexico to combat drug cartels, a proposal put forward by Florida Governor Ron DeSantis. Moreover, Senator Lindsey Graham from South Carolina advocates for bombing Iran and criticizes Biden for not doing so, while simultaneously arguing against NATO engagement in Europe, claiming it is not in America’s interest.
Republican isolationism notably does not apply to China. There is a consensus that a firm and relentless stance must be taken against China. For example, the president of the Heritage Foundation, a right-wing think tank that once supported Reagan-era American engagement in global affairs, now argues for retrenchment because the United States is not as wealthy or powerful as it once was. The stance is that America cannot afford to be involved in every conflict. However, certain allies are considered too important to abandon. Notably, Republicans are unanimous in their support for Israel and assert that the U.S. will always support it. Another key ally is the United Kingdom, which the U.S. will not forsake, according to the Heritage Foundation.[37]
Therefore, isolationism is not truly about complete withdrawal but rather a strategic repositioning, particularly away from Europe. This stance has been consistent in the Republican Party for nearly a century, harking back even to George Washington’s warnings against entangling alliances. Essentially, it is not genuine isolationism but a belief that American interests do not lie in Europe and that European matters are not America’s concern.
Moreover, this perspective entails a different approach to international relations, favoring bilateral over multilateral engagements. The idea is that, as a powerful nation, the United States can more effectively influence countries like Poland, Slovenia, or the Czech Republic through direct, bilateral relations rather than through large international alliances like NATO. This preference is rooted in skepticism towards these organizations and a belief in the efficacy of direct, bilateral negotiations, where the U.S. can leverage its power more effectively.
This mindset was prevalent during the interwar period in America, where large multilateral agreements were seen as constraints that brought more harm than benefit. Bilateral relations, on the other hand, allow for a more forceful imposition of American will. This approach resonates with Donald Trump’s worldview, which favors business-like negotiations where each side aims to maximize its own gains, often at the expense of the other. This business-oriented thinking aligns with a long-standing Republican ethos that prioritizes bilateral engagements and shuns multilateral constraints.
The Doctrine of Isolationism as an Inspiration for Donald Trump’s Policy
The transition from interwar isolationism shortly after World War II was marked by Robert Taft. Presently, a resurgence of this isolationism is observed in the policies and rhetoric of Donald Trump. It has been posited that Trump’s approach draws inspiration from interwar isolationism. Additionally, there was another politician who attempted to realign the Republican Party towards isolationism, although he did not succeed due to timing. Analysis of his statements reveals significant similarities to Trump’s rhetoric. This raises the question of whether Trump’s slogans originate directly from the interwar period or if they are influenced by Patrick Buchanan, a Republican candidate in the 1992 primaries.
One of Buchanan’s quotes states: “I think God made all people good. But if we had to take a million immigrants in, say Zulus, next year, or Englishmen, and put them in Virginia, which group would be easier to assimilate and would cause less problems for the people of Virginia?”[38] This is comparable to the sentiments expressed by Donald Trump today: “Why are we having all these people from shithole countries come here? We should have more people from Norway.”[39] Another quote from Buchanan asserts: “When we take America back, we are going to make America great again. Because there is nothing wrong with putting America first.”[40]
It is evident that Trump, in his more controversial style, essentially repeats what Buchanan once said. However, unlike Buchanan, Trump has better aligned his message with current society, making these ideas more resonant. Trump has successfully tapped into the prevailing sentiments, much like the Democratic Party did with the “Come Home, America” slogan after the Vietnam War, or as Trump has done post-Iraq War. This period saw significant public fatigue with global engagement, immense human and financial costs, and a narrative of fighting abroad while facing economic issues at home. Trump made this sentiment a cornerstone of his 2016 campaign.
Buchanan lacked the contextual backdrop for his ideas, as the timing was not conducive. In contrast, Trump has demonstrated an undeniable talent for sensing societal moods. His ability to recognize and capitalize on anti-immigration sentiments and isolationist feelings was noteworthy. Although Trump had previously echoed these ideas without much traction, he strategically withdrew his 2000 presidential bid when he realized the timing was off. When he observed a shift in public sentiment, he seized the opportunity and ran in the election.
Trump’s isolationist and anti-immigration stances are among his most genuine beliefs, not merely political opportunism. These views, along with his belief in his own abilities, underscore his undeniable genius.
Consideration must be given to what this reveals about the current Republican Party. It is essential to recognize that the Republican Party of Ronald Reagan and John McCain differs significantly from today’s party. This distinction is crucial for understanding the contemporary international situation, regional dynamics, and global context. The notion that Trump’s rhetoric is merely stylistic and that the Republican Party remains fundamentally the party of Reagan and McCain is a misconception often repeated by various commentators and experts.
While the Republican Party still includes politicians such as Mitt Romney and Mitch McConnell who uphold traditional Republican policies, these figures are aging and gradually losing their influence within the party or withdrawing from it altogether. A new wave of politicians, including J.D. Vance, Tom Cotton, Tucker Carlson, and Josh Hawley, represents the emerging leadership. These younger politicians are characterized by their isolationist views. This is not a superficial change but a lasting transformation within the Republican Party that is already underway.
Recently, an article in “Politico” highlighted that this movement represents a form of Christian nationalism.[41] This group differs not only in its approach to international engagement but also in its view of the state’s role. They are no longer proponents of a minimal state but see the state as an instrument for social change. This represents a new development emerging within the Republican Party.
An article in “The Nation” aptly summarized this shift, stating that the current Republican Party is no longer the party of one’s father; it is the party of one’s grandfather.[42] For a significant portion of its history, the Republican Party was isolationist, and it appears to be returning to that stance. Political dynamics may change if a dramatic event occurs, but absent such an event, the current Republican politicians will naturally be replaced by new leaders. These new leaders will chair committees and run for the presidency, and they are predominantly isolationists. In the best-case scenario, they argue that there is no viable strategy for victory in Ukraine and that negotiations with Russia are in the United States’ best interest. In the worst-case scenario, figures like Tucker Carlson claim that Ukraine is a corrupt country not worth concern, and that Russia is not inherently bad. Carlson, for example, in his video praised aspects of life in Moscow, such as beautiful metro stations and affordable shopping, while downplaying serious issues like political assassinations and military aggression.[43] This reflects a broader trend within the party toward a more isolationist and, in some cases, a more favorable view of Russia.
Does this, however, mean that the moment has already arrived? When Donald Trump becomes president after the November elections, will the United States once again move towards isolationism? What directions in foreign policy will this new administration truly adopt? Of course, no one knows this with full certainty at this point. There are various scattered and sometimes somewhat chaotic statements from Donald Trump. However, recently, an interesting interpretation of how Republican foreign policy might look in Trump’s second term has emerged. The author of this interpretation is Robert O’Brien, who was Donald Trump’s National Security Advisor at the end of his first term, succeeding John Bolton. Robert O’Brien wrote a lengthy article for “Foreign Affairs” titled “The Return of Peace Through Strength: Making the Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy,” outlining how the foreign policy of the new administration might look.[44]
Naturally, the question arises as to how much Robert O’Brien can truly know and what can be inferred from his text. Some believe it is a programmatic statement, a preview of how the administration will operate, assuming that Robert O’Brien, having held a high position at the end of Trump’s first term, might receive a similarly high position in his second term. This is why he is seen as having the right to comment on what this policy might look like. Others believe that O’Brien still cannot be certain about anything and is therefore trying to position himself among those who today are giving Trump good advice, demonstrating that they have good ideas and solutions for the problems the president will face. In reality, O’Brien wrote his article not for the general public but for Donald Trump to show that he is still active in the political sphere.
Regardless, it is worth taking a closer look at O’Brien’s text. It is important to keep in mind that this text is written somewhat on behalf of the future administration of Donald Trump, whether or not O’Brien will be part of it or simply wishes to be. Therefore, according to him, everything that failed over the past few years is Joe Biden’s fault, and everything that succeeded or could have succeeded is a triumph of Donald Trump. This perspective should not be forgotten while reading, but it remains a very interesting read.
Robert O’Brien begins by reminding that since Roman times, states that desire peace prepare for war. He sees this as a key characteristic of President Trump’s administration, which could also benefit America in the future. According to the author, the United States should present itself as strong, determined, ready to use force, and willing to engage in unconventional actions. Only then will America’s rivals take it seriously and fear what the United States might do. On the other hand, allied or cooperating countries will also see America as a valuable partner worth considering. Moreover, according to O’Brien, the Biden administration did not do any of this. In his view, this has been the cause of the troubles in which the United States currently finds itself.
Most of all, O’Brien argues from the outset that Donald Trump has an excellent record. During his tenure, the United States did not get involved in new wars and achieved significant successes in stabilizing the global situation, such as the Abraham Accords in the Middle East, which normalized relations between Israel and selected Arab states, and the resolution of the ISIS problem. Therefore, it can be argued that Donald Trump was indeed a peace-promoting president.
At the same time, he was a president without a grand doctrine. American presidents often have doctrines named after them by political scientists. According to O’Brien, there was no Trump Doctrine, and this is a positive aspect, as it stems from Donald Trump’s pragmatism; he did not want to bind himself to any dogmatic assumptions. He primarily wanted to be effective.
O’Brien further writes that although Donald Trump advocated “America First,” he did not advocate “America Alone,” contrary to what his critics claim. O’Brien states that Donald Trump did not want to turn away from allies and focus solely on the United States, but rather, that “Trump recognizes that a successful foreign policy requires joining forces with friendly governments and people elsewhere.” O’Brien revisits this notion of partnership later in the text.
The author outlines a series of threats, starting with China, which he views, along with others, as the greatest challenge to the United States at present. He also discusses Iran, Russia, and issues occurring to the south of the United States, in Mexico and Venezuela. According to him, a Trumpian response is needed; Trump’s approach is seen as a reaction to the failures and shortcomings of neoliberal institutionalism, which is the belief that by building international institutions and basing foreign policy on higher values, order can be established in the world. In O’Brien’s view, this has not succeeded, and Trump represents a response to this problem.
A key aspect of O’Brien’s analysis is that Joe Biden, on many levels, has shown weakness to the most important rivals of the United States, namely China, Russia, and Iran (“the new Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis”) leading to negative consequences. For example, attempts to negotiate with the Chinese, virtual meetings, and sending American diplomats to China were perceived as signs of weakness. Americans, O’Brien argues, should definitely not allow this.
The Chinese pose a threat to America not only in terms of military potential but also economically. O’Brien writes about the mass production of electric cars by the Chinese, which could threaten the American automotive industry. He calls for new tariffs, specifically referencing Donald Trump’s campaign proposal to impose 60% tariffs on Chinese products.
The administration must also make it clear to U.S. allies in the region that if they want American assistance for their security, they should spend even more on defense and expand their armies, especially Taiwan. This rhetoric is not new, as Donald Trump emphasized in his 2016 campaign, urging U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea to increase their defense expenditures.
According to O’Brien, Biden also demonstrated weakness in the Middle East. This weakness was manifested, firstly, through the criticism of Saudi Arabia, which, in O’Brien’s opinion, led to nothing and only resulted in a perceived image of Biden’s weakness. Biden initially criticized Saudi Arabia but later was forced to cooperate with it. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, were the attempts to renegotiate the nuclear deal with Iran. These attempts led nowhere and, according to O’Brien, were accompanied by a weakening of sanctions enforcement on Iran, allowing Iran to become wealthier and sponsor its proxies throughout the Middle East. This, O’Brien claims, may have even contributed to the current conflict in the Gaza Strip. O’Brien views the cessation of the maximum pressure campaign on Iran, which was conducted by Donald Trump, as a cardinal mistake by the United States. The cessation allowed Iran to regain strength and instigate the current turmoil in the region.
O’Brien also outlines an interesting aspect of the future U.S. policy he envisions. He argues that the United States should not involve itself in resolving the situation in the Gaza Strip, nor should it pressure Israel to enter negotiations or agree to a two-state solution. According to O’Brien, this is not a matter for the United States. Instead, the U.S. should support its partners, such as the Arab states, Israel, and possibly Egypt, in resolving this issue. He asserts that the resolution of the Gaza situation is not in America’s interest. To help the region, the U.S. should focus on Iran and exert maximum pressure on it. Notably, in O’Brien’s vision, the concerns of Palestine and the Palestinians are completely absent.
Naturally, the text also addresses the situation in Ukraine and the current events between Russia and Ukraine. O’Brien presents a broad perspective, suggesting that the problem with the current situation in Ukraine actually began in 2011. This was when Biden, following what Donald Trump had previously initiated, withdrew American troops from Afghanistan. O’Brien emphasizes that if Trump had conducted the withdrawal, it would not have resulted in the chaos that ensued. He argues that the weakness shown by the Americans during the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, the subsequent fall of Afghanistan, and its takeover by the Taliban, actually pushed Vladimir Putin to decide to invade Ukraine. This aligns with Trump’s often-stated claim that if he were president, the war in Ukraine would never have occurred, and a peaceful solution would not need to be sought now.
But now that the situation has occurred, the question is what O’Brien believes Trump might want to do regarding the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. He outlines the following perspective: Trump would want to initiate negotiations, as he has often mentioned, to halt the destruction and stop the ongoing loss of life. However, this does not mean that the United States would suddenly withdraw its support. On the contrary, it will continue to arm Ukraine, possibly even more extensively, to exert pressure on Russia and demonstrate that America’s actions in this area will not be entirely predictable.
O’Brien recognizes the value of Trump’s unpredictability, which was evident during his first term and caused problems for U.S. adversaries such as Russia and North Korea, who could not fully anticipate his actions. According to O’Brien, this unpredictability is an asset that America should leverage once again.
Finally, O’Brien discusses that NATO should significantly shift its forces to Poland, closer to the Russian border. He argues that such a move would make the pressure from NATO palpable to Russia and demonstrate that NATO, including the United States, is determined to defend the territories of all its allies. He presents this as obvious. At the same time, O’Brien makes a proposal that had not previously been articulated by Trump. While Trump has repeatedly stated that he will help European countries provided they first increase their own defense spending, he does not reiterate this point here. However, this sentiment is a recurring theme in Trump’s rhetoric. He has long argued that some European countries underinvest in their own defense and therefore, owe a debt to the United States. Consequently, Trump has issued statements suggesting that, should they fail to pay their fair share, he might allow Putin to do whatever he wants in Europe. This has been a part of Trump’s rhetoric for years.
O’Brien’s discourse also introduces something new: he asserts that the U.S. Senate should exert maximum pressure on the European Union to admit Ukraine immediately. This would show Russia that Europe is highly determined on this issue. This should happen by bypassing the usual lengthy bureaucratic procedure. This is a rather far-reaching proposal from a former National Security Advisor.
O’Brien goes on to dedicate an extensive portion of his text to analyzing the weaknesses of the American military, which, he argues, must be immediately addressed. The most controversial and widely discussed proposal in other newspapers and on various portals is O’Brien’s suggestion to resume nuclear testing and expand the nuclear arsenal, given that Russia is modernizing its arsenal and China is expanding its own. This could potentially lead to a renewed nuclear arms race. American commentators have questioned whether O’Brien genuinely believes in this proposal or if he made it to provoke mainstream commentators and draw Donald Trump’s attention to his text. Such elements of strategic positioning around this text should not be entirely dismissed.
The text also includes several other noteworthy points. For instance, O’Brien criticizes Biden for, on the one hand, advocating for the unification of democratic countries against authoritarian states, while, on the other hand, criticizing democratically elected leaders whose views differ from those supported by Democrats. He cites examples such as Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, Viktor Orbán of Hungary, and Andrzej Duda of Poland. O’Brien argues that these are leaders whom America should support today. Regardless of whether their governance aligns with American preferences, they were democratically elected and are generally favorable to American interests, and America should not overlook this.
Finally, O’Brien addresses the recurring question of American hypocrisy. On one hand, America aims to be the defender of values, criticizing countries like Russia, China, or Iran, while on the other hand, it supports countries that, from liberal perspective, might also be problematic, such as certain Arab states. According to O’Brien, what differentiates these countries’ varying treatment from the United States is their capacity for change. He argues that, for instance, Arab states have evolved significantly over the past decades in ways that align with are desirable from the perspective of the United States. In contrast, countries like China and Russia, if they have changed, have moved in the opposite direction, becoming even more aggressive on the international stage and increasingly repressive toward their own citizens. Therefore, these changes do not align with what would be interesting or favorable for the United States.
Conclusion
The resurgence of Republican isolationism is a significant development in American foreign policy, reflecting a deep-seated historical tradition. Advocating for limited foreign involvement, particularly in regions perceived as less critical to national interests, it stops short of calling for a complete withdrawal from global affairs. Instead, it represents a selective approach to international engagement – one that seeks to balance national priorities with the realities of an interconnected world. This nuanced perspective underscores the complexities of contemporary American political discourse and the evolving nature of its foreign policy.[45]
By revisiting historical isolationism and adapting it to modern contexts, the Republican Party continues to shape the debate on America’s role in the world, challenging established assumptions and redefining the parameters of U.S. foreign policy.
A great example of this point of view is Robert O’Brien’s text. In his opinion and possibly in the broader thinking within the Trump administration – the United States, faced with numerous global challenges, should primarily focus on the “axis of evil,” comprising Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran. This strategy includes exerting economic and geopolitical pressure on these countries. For instance, regarding China, O’Brien writes that economic decoupling between the United States and China is desirable and should be pursued without hindrance. He asserts that in this rivalry, allies will be essential for the United States. However, the United States should clearly articulate its demands, which must be met before providing assistance. These demands include developing their own military capabilities, increasing defense expenditures, and, for example, accelerating the European Union’s acceptance of Ukraine.
On the other hand, O’Brien indicate, that the United States does not intend to engage deeply in specific issues, such as stabilizing the situation in Gaza. Instead, allies should handle certain matters independently. The United States should influence the region on a macro scale, weakening the threat from Iran without getting entangled in issues that further consume American resources and time. This suggests an American policy that will be more decisive, unafraid to use forceful arguments, focusing on a very short list of priorities while paying less attention to detailed events in various regions of the world. Finally, American policy will rely on partnership and cooperation with allies. O’Brien firmly rejects the accusations that Trump is an isolationist, as his policy is often perceived.
It is important to emphasize that this perspective reflects the views of the former National Security Advisor during Trump’s first term. It does not necessarily dictate how Trump’s foreign policy will unfold. However, it is noteworthy that O’Brien’s text, regardless of his future position, has nonetheless generated significant interest among conservative thinkers on American foreign policy, including those close to Trump.
The isolationist trend among Republicans is clear, and these sentiments may intensify in the future. At least some of the ideas from O’Brien’s text, if not all, could form the basis of the actions of a future Trump administration.
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