Polish Journal of Political Science

Volume 4 Issue 1 (2018)

(this page is intentionally left blank)

Polish Journal of Political Science

Volume 4 Issue 1

eISSN 2391-3991
Original version: e-book
Visit our site: **www.pjps.pl**
Submit your paper: **pjps@inop.edu.pl**

(this page is intentionally left blank)

Table of Contents

Articles

He Wei

Bridge builders of one belt one road 'Why, what and How' of the AIIB and SRF ..... *p. 7*

Anna Tido

One Belt, One Road initiative and China-Russia relations – deep partnership or tactical alliance? ..... *p. 31*

Melike Selcen Emiroglu

The importance of the One Belt One Road Initiative for Central and West Asia ..... *p. 49*

Tomasz Rubaj, Andrzej Tuz

China's military potential – evolution, trends and challenges *p. 137*

Feng Ping

Chinese migrations in Poland ..... *p. 161*

Tomasz Rubaj
Andrzej Tuz

China's military potential – evolution, trends and challenges

Abstract

The paper seeks to determine how China's armed forces try to create a favorable strategic posture with more emphasis on the employment of military forces and means, and provide a solid security guarantee for the country's peaceful development, in response to the new requirement of safeguarding national security and development interests. Potential, evolution, and trends of basic Services: Army; Air Force; Navy and the most crucial aspects of nuclear potential has been presented. Problems related to the cyber space domain, as the new era of information warfare are discussed by the view of building unique capabilities. PRC openly identifying information assets as a key to winning contemporary wars. Particularly, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), aiming at building modern forces and winning an informationalized war, deepens its reform, dedicates itself to innovation, improves its quality and actively pushes forward the revolution in military affairs.

Chinese strategy, operational art and doctrine reflect the desire and need for a holistic approach to national security, utilizing the entirety of national resources. Multidimensional coordination, a PLA principle of warfare, illustrates this holistic approach by stressing that military and nonmilitary entities should work in concert towards common objectives. Multidimensional coordination occurs at and between all levels of war, includes strategic resources and instruments of power and efforts to shape the environment. The paper underlines also shift from joint operations

to integrated joint operations. Chinese military experts perceive it as the basic approach in order to meet the requirements of confrontation between war systems in modern warfare. Integrated joint operations are designed to bring the operational strengths of different Services and arms into full play, combine offensive operations with defensive ones, and give priority to the flexible application of strategies and tactics.

Keywords: Chinese military, potential, strategy, operations, tactics.

Foreword

The current structure of the Chinese Armed Forces really needs reforms because it does not allow for full control over the actions of the military authorities. In order to fully understand overall context of changes, trend and challenges, status of Command and Control of the Chinese Armed Forces is needed to be analyze. In 2015 the new body of command and strategic direction has been introduced – the Central Military Commission. The Central Military Commission currently operates through four central departments: Joint Staff, Logistic Directorate, Political Directorate and Arms and Development Directorate.

Artillery, Air Force and Navy are subject to these bodies, but as separate organizations. It should be remembered that the army is not subordinate government, but under the party authorities (CCP). Current Situation of the Armed Forces of the PRC:

- Outdated structure of command.
- Lack of sufficient experience in corps of officers in conducting Joint Operations.
- The shortage of qualified and experienced staff members and outdated C2 system.
- Low level of realism in conducted exercises.
- Land Forces domination, Air and Naval Forces as a secondary role.
- Low wages.
- Outdated logistics.
- Limited Air Lift capabilities and special purpose machines in the Air Force.
- Limited air defense and anti submarine capabilities.
- Corruption in the army.

China's military leadership

The PLA is the armed instrument of the CCP and organizationally is part of the Party apparatus. Officer careers are depended on CCP members. Major decisions at all levels are made by CCP committees, which are led by the political officers and military commanders.

China's military leaders are influential in defense and foreign policy due to the Central Military Commission's (CMC) special bureaucratic status and the PLA's near-monopoly on military expertise. The military's highest decision-making body, the CMC, is technically a department of the CCP Central Committee, but is staffed almost exclusively by military officers. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as the General Secretary of the CCP and President of China. Prior to the reorganization of the PLA high command announced in January 2016, the ex officio membership of the CMC included several vice chairmen, the minister of national defense a position functionally unlike the U.S. Secretary of Defense the three service commanders, and the directors of the four general headquarters departments. The officers who held those positions prior to the January 2016 announcement still serve on the CMC, but the CMC's composition may change as a result of the PLA's ongoing structural reforms.

Members of the CCP Central Military Commission

Chairman Xi Jinping's appointed as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 2012, and his selection as a President in the spring of 2013, was the first simultaneous transfer of all three of China's top positions to an incoming leader in recent decades. Prior to becoming CMC Chairman, Xi served as

the CMC's only civilian Vice Chairman. Xi's father was an important military person during China's communist revolution and was a Politburo member in the 1980s. The younger Xi served as secretary to a defense minister early in his career and would have had opportunities to interact with the PLA as a provincial Party official. In meetings with U.S. officials, Xi has emphasized improving military-to-military relations between China and the United States.

Vice Chairman Fan Changlong in 2012 became China's top officer. He formerly commanded the Jinan Military Region (MR), a test bed for new operational concepts and technology that has been at the forefront of the PLA's joint training efforts in recent years. Fan was the longest serving of China's seven MR commanders at the time of his appointment, but unlike previous CMC vice chairmen, Fan had never previously served on the CMC. He also spent 35 years in the Shenyang MR, adjacent to North Korea and Russia.

Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang - the first career as an air force officer promoted to CMC Vice Chairman - previously served on the CMC as PLAAF commander where he oversaw rapid force modernization and expanded the air force's foreign engagement. He vocally advocated for increasing the PLAAF's role within the larger PLA, including arguing in 2009 that the PLAAF should lead the development of offensive space capabilities. Xu may have crossed paths with Xi Jinping earlier in their careers when both men served in Fujian Province. Xu was the first PLAAF officer to serve as deputy chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) since the Cultural Revolution period, and at 54 years of age the youngest in PLA history.

Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan was appointed at the National People's Congress in March 2013. The Minister of National Defense is the PLA's third most senior officer

and manages its relationship with state bureaucracies and foreign militaries. Chang previously oversaw the PLA's weapons development and space portfolio as head of the General Armament Department. He played a role in China's border skirmishes with Vietnam and has held top posts across three military regions.

Joint Staff Department Chief Fang Fenghui oversees PLA operations, training, and intelligence, responsibilities that are similar to those of his role as head of the former General Staff Department (GSD). In his previous position as Beijing MR commander, he was "commander-in-chief" of China's 60th anniversary military parade in 2009 and oversaw security for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Fang is the first former Beijing MR commander to move directly to Chief of the GSD. He was the PLA's youngest military region commander when he was promoted to lead the Beijing MR in 2007.

Political Work Department Director Zhang Yang oversees the PLA's political work including propaganda, discipline, and education missions inherited from the former General Political Department. Unusually for a CMC member, Zhang spent his entire career in a single MR, the Guangzhou MR bordering Vietnam and the South China Sea, where he ultimately became the MR's Political Commissar at a relatively young age. Zhang also participated in China's border conflict with Vietnam and supported disaster relief efforts following a January 2008 snowstorm in southern China.

Logistics Support Department Director Zhao Keshi, previously as a head of the former General Logistics Department between 2012 and 2015, was responsible for overseeing PLA support functions including supply, transportation, military finances, facilities management, and infrastructure construction. Before his appointment to the CMC in 2012, Zhao spent

his entire career in Nanjing MR responsible for a Taiwan contingency and most recently served as its commander. He was also reportedly an exercise commander in the large military drills that induced the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Zhao has written on defense mobilization and reserve unit construction.

Equipment Development Department Director Zhang Youxia's previous position as Director of the former General Armaments Department gave him oversight of the military's weapons development and space programs. He gained rare experience as a combat commander during China's brief war with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang formerly commanded the Shenyang MR, which shares a border with North Korea and Russia. Zhang is one of China's military "princelings." His father, a well-known military person in China, served with Xi Jinping's father at the close of China's Civil War in 1949.

PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli has served as head of the PLAN since 2006 and on the CMC since 2007. Under Wu, the PLAN has increased its out-of-area exercises, multinational patrols, and foreign naval exchanges, and initiated its first deployment to the Gulf of Aden. The first career PLAN officer to serve as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Wu also held leadership positions in two of the PLAN's three fleets, spending most of his career in the East Sea Fleet.

PLA Air Force Commander Ma Xiaotian previously oversaw the PLA's foreign military engagement activities as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Ma led the PLA side in key military-to-military exchanges with the United States, including the Defense Consultative Talks and the Strategic Security Dialogue component of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Ma has significant experience as a pilot and as a staff officer in multiple military regions.

Command structure of Chinese Armed - 2020 r.

The reform of the command system will consist in the fact that all types of forces (land, air and sea) will be directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission (CMC). The People's Armed Police, militia and reserve forces are also subject to it - that is, all the state power organs. Combined Armed Forces Command will be established, including Naval, Air and Land Forces (previously commanded by the General Staff). This solution aims to simplify (shorten) the chain of command by the Central Military Commission, under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's Political Bureau. The president of the CMC is the president of the state - Xi Jinping.

The introduction of command at state and regional level will provide a centralized command structure to replace the existing seven regional headquarters. In their place five strategic zones will be created, corresponding to the operational directions. The new command structure will be four-chambered: CMC - Combined Armed Forces Command - Armed Police - Reserve Units. In addition, a new Disciplinary Inspection Commission will be set up at CMC (similar institutions will also be created at the lower levels of command). At the CMC will also be created Audit Office and Political Policy Committee. Unchanged structure will maintain military justice (independent courts and prosecutors).

The reform seeks to enable commanding combined operations. The logistics will be excluded from the system for which a separate management model will be developed. Automation of command systems and computerization are also more important. It also assumes higher military capabilities - by increasing the full-time maritime and air forces and strengthening special units, marines, airmen, cybernetic defense and

strategic components (2nd Corps of Artillery). It is assumed that the changes will strengthen the position of defense minister. Subordinated to it will be the logistics and armaments department. In addition, the minister will be subject to the military education system and military research institutions.

Theaters of Interest

Chengdu West Command, the largest territory, includes three autonomous regions, including Tibet and Sinciang-Ujgur, whose natives show no satisfaction with being Chinese citizens. The command also responsible for the border of India, which political relations are under suspicion. The cause is unregulated border dispute and close political-military relations between Beijing and the old rival of India - Pakistan. The headquarters will be one-third of ground troops, but at the same time as the only one with no access to the sea, and thus Naval. Cities separated - Chongqing - Provinces - Gansu, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan. Autonomous Regions - Ningxia Hui, Sinciang-Ujgur, Tibet

Kanton Southern Command includes borders with the countries of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. Beijing is struggling here, among others with Vietnam and the Philippines about islands in the South China Sea. Provinces: Guangdong, Hainan, Hunan, Yunnan, Guizhou. Special administrative regions: Hong Kong, Macau.

Nankin East Command will oversee areas among others, the East China Sea islands for which China is arguing with Japan. What is more, the border between the two basins lies in Taiwan, treated by the Chinese communists as a rebellious province. Cities separated - Shanghai Provinces - Anhui, Fujian, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Zhejiang

The Northern Command has in its area of responsibility borders with North Korea and Russia and Mongolia where there are no conflicts at present.

The Central Command includes the capital of Beijing, the waters of the East China Sea and Yellow, and several inner provinces of Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Shanxi, Shantung and Tianjin.

Land Forces

The new land force will be responsible for the management of five military zones that will replace the seven existing military regions.

Commentators point to the high dynamics of the modernization processes of the PRC forces. This also applies to Land Forces, where saturation is increased not only with increasingly advanced combat vehicles, but also with digital command systems.

Maritime Forces

The changes in the command system of the Chinese Armed Forces also concern the upgrading of the Navy and Aviation as a sign of equal treatment of these types of forces with land forces.

Tasks of the Maritime Forces of the PRC:

- Detection, combat of submarines.
- Providing strategic security to submarine striking groups and naval forces, ports, coastal infrastructure, and land forces in the coastal strip against hostile air strikes.
- Provide fire and logistical support for combat forces in coastal areas (especially for maritime missions)
- Setting and closing minefields.

Air Force

Air force deployed in five strategic zones, and their main task is to maintain an adequate level of control and, if necessary, to defend the airspace of the country. They function within the National Defense System.

Air Force from the beginning of their existence were equipped with Soviet machines and later their copies produced in China, now counting more than 2,000 aircraft.

Basic equipment of the air force is:

- J-10A – multi-purpose fighter.
- Su-27UBK.
- KJ-2000 – early warning aircraft.
- J-8II – fighter interceptor.
- JH-7A – assault fighter.
- Z-9 - multi-tasking helicopter.
- Z-8KH - heavy transport helicopter.

Developments in nuclear deterrence

China continues to modernize its nuclear forces across the PLA. In 2015, China maintained nuclear-capable delivery systems in its missile forces and navy, giving it a dispersed and more-survivable capability:

- The PLA Rocket Force's (PLARF) arsenal contains 75-100 ICBMs. The PLARF is modernizing these airframes, including through the development of a new road-mobile ICBM capable of carrying multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China has also tested a hypersonic glide vehicle, although official statements make no reference to its intended mission or potential capability to carry a nuclear warhead.

- The PLAN continues to produce the JIN-class SSBM, with four commissioned and at least one under construction. The JIN class and its SLBMs will give China its first reliable long-range, sea-based nuclear capability.

In 2015, China also continued to develop long-range bombers, including some Chinese military analysts have described as "capable of performing strategic deterrence" a mission reportedly assigned to the PLA Air Force in 2012. There have also been Chinese publications indicating China intends to build a long-range "strategic" stealth bomber. These media reports and Chinse writings suggest China might eventually develop a nuclear bomber capability. If it does, China would develop a "triad" of nuclear delivery systems dispersed across land, sea, and air a posture considered since the Cold War to improve survivability and strategic deterrence.

Missile Forces of the PRC

Rocket forces are the fourth type of armed forces whose main task is the role of deterrence. They consist of six armies.

Currently China has been working intensively on modernizing its strategic forces. The new generation of mobile missiles, the MARV system and the MIRV battlefields, and the network of underground tunnels are designed to ensure the viability of China's strategic deterrence against the main actors of the nuclear club. China's modernization of nuclear forces is primarily due to the global development of military technology, including the introduction of new types of nuclear warheads and missile defense systems. It must be borne in mind that China is still technically lagging behind other states, so the modernization of its own armed forces, including

the nuclear arsenal, is a natural act both in terms of security and interests of Beijing. Since the first nuclear test, China has adopted the no-first-use principle, and has increasingly become involved in programs aimed at reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in recent years. At the same time, they are developing a program to build a new generation of Jin ships and JL-2 ballistic missiles to effectively balance the American military presence in the Pacific.

Precision Strike

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) (less than 1,000 km). The PLA Rocket Force, formerly called the PLASAF, had approximately 1,200 SRBMs at the end of 2015. The force fields advanced variants with improved ranges and accuracy in addition to more sophisticated payloads, while gradually replacing earlier generations that do not possess true precision strike capability.

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) (1,000-3,000 km). The PLA is fielding conventional MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships operating far from China's shores out to the first island chain.

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) (3,000-5,500 km). The PLA is developing a nuclear and conventional road-mobile IRBM, which increases its capability for near-precision strike out to the "second island chain." The PLAN also is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with sky wave and surface wave over the horizon (OTH) radars, which can be used in conjunction with reconnaissance satellites to locate targets at great distances from China, thereby supporting long-range precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs.

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). The PLA continues to field air- and ground-launched LACMs for standoff precision strikes. Air-launched cruise missiles include the YJ-63, KD-88, and the CJ-20 (the air-launched version of the CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missile still fielded in the PLASAF). China recently adapted the KD-88 LACM, with an advertised range of more than 100 km, and may be testing a longer-range version. China also is developing the CM-802AKG LACM, an export system that can strike both land and ship targets from fighters or bombers.

Ground Attack Munitions. The PLAAF has a small number of tactical air-to-surface unguided munitions (ASUGM) as well as precision-guided munitions including all-weather, gps-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and laser-guided bombs. China is developing smaller-sized munitions such as the AR-1, HJ-10 anti-tank, Blue Arrow 7 laser-guided, and KD-2 missiles in conjunction with its increasing development of UAVs. Additionally, China is also adapting to UAVs GPS-guided munitions such as the FT-5 and LS-6 that are similar to the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). The PLAN is deploying a wide range of advanced ASCMs. The most capable include the domestically produced ship-launched YJ-62 ASCM and the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on China's SOVREMENNY-class DDGs acquired from Russia. China's submarine force is also increasing its ASCM capability, with the long-range YJ-18 ASCM replacing the older YJ-82 on the SONG, YUAN, and SHANG classes. The YJ-18 is similar to the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER ASCM, which is capable of supersonic terminal sprint and is fielded on eight of China's 12 Russian-built KILO SS. In addition, PLAN Aviation employs the 200 km range YJ-83K ASCM on its JH-7

and H-6G aircraft. China has also developed the YJ-12 ASCM for the PLAN. The new missile provides an increased threat to naval assets, due to its long range and supersonic speeds. It is capable of being launched from H-6 bombers.

Anti-Radiation Weapons. China is starting to integrate an indigenous version of the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17), known as the YJ-91, into its fighter-bomber force. The PLA imported Israeli-made HARPY UAVs and Russian-made anti-radiation missiles during the 1990s.

Artillery Based PGMs. The PLA is developing and deploying artillery systems with the range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait, including the PHL-03 300 mm multiple-rocket launcher (MRL) (greater than 100 km range) and the longer-range AR-3 dual-caliber MRL (out to 220 km range).

Strategic Support Forces – January 2016

The Strategic Support Forces will be responsible for:

- tracking objects,
- jamming and destroying satellites,
- operating in cyberspace,
- protecting the financial system from attack,
- jamming and disarming radar equipment.

Role of Electronic Warfare in a Future Conflicts

The PLA identifies electronic warfare (EW) as a way to reduce or eliminate U.S. technological advantages, and considers it an integral component of warfare. The PLA's EW doctrine emphasizes using electromagnetic spectrum weapons to suppress or to deceive enemy electronic equipment.

The PLA's strategy focuses on radio, radar, optical, infrared, and microwave frequencies, in addition to adversarial computer and information systems.

China's strategy stresses that EW is a vital fourth dimension to combat, and should be considered equal to traditional ground, sea, and air forces. Effective EW is seen as a decisive aid during military operations and consequently the key to determining the outcome of war. The PLA sees EW as an important force multiplier, and would likely employ it in support of all combat arms and services during a conflict.

The PLA's EW units have conducted jamming and anti-jamming operations, testing the military's understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and performance. This helped improve the military's confidence in conducting force-on-force, real-equipment confrontation operations in simulated EW environments. Advances in research and deployment of EW weapons are being tested in these exercises and have proven effective. These EW weapons include jamming equipment against multiple communication and radar systems and GPS satellite systems. EW systems are also being deployed with other sea- and air-based platforms intended for both offensive and defensive operations.

Development directions of the Armed Forces

1. Ensuring internal security and stabilizing the country.
2. Works on command support system in combined air, maritime and land operations.
3. Streamlining communication, computing and cyber war.
4. Preparation for possible conflicts with Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines or South Korea.

5. Defending China's interests in the East and South China seas.

PLA Power Projection Expanding Outward

PLA modernization and development trends over the last decade reflect an expansion in the PLA's capabilities to address regional and global security objectives. PLA ground, air, naval, and missile forces are increasingly able to project power during peacetime and to contest U.S. military superiority in the event of a regional conflict. The PLA's growing ability to project power also augments China's globally-oriented objectives to be viewed as a stakeholder in ensuring stability and a regional power.

The PLA will maintain a primary emphasis on developing capabilities for a potential Taiwan contingency but is steadily expanding the force's operational flexibility to be able to meet regionally and globally focused missions. The PLA's missile and air forces remain a critical component in extending China's defensive perimeter. This frees up and enables other military assets to focus on conducting offensive missions, such as blockades, sovereignty enforcement, and/or A2/AD, farther from China's shores. China also is focused on enhancing the PLA's ISR capabilities, which will enable improved targeting and timely responses to perceived threats.

The expansion of naval operations beyond China's immediate region will facilitate non-war uses of military force and provide China with a diverse set of capabilities for striking targets across the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Improving "blue water" capabilities will extend China's maritime security buffer to protect China's near and far seas interests more effectively.

China's modern naval platforms include advanced missile and technological capabilities that will strengthen the force's core warfighting competencies and enable credible combat operations beyond the reaches of land-based defenses. Moreover, China's current aircraft carrier and planned follow-on carriers will extend air defense umbrellas beyond the range of coastal systems and help enable task group operations in "far seas." Sea-based land attack probably is an emerging requirement for the PLAN. Chinese military experts argue that in order to pursue a defensive strategy in far seas, the Navy must improve its ability to control land from the sea through long-range LACM development.

Military budget

The military budget of the PRC does not include expenditure on Strategic Forces, Special Services, Cyber Security, foreign missions, research and development of weapons systems and Chinese Paramilitary Forces (People's Militia). The official military budget of the PRC does not take into account the revenues generated by military-owned commercial enterprises that significantly influence its shape. This causes that, in fact, defense spending is higher than the data presented.

The dynamics of the double-digit increase in military spending started in 2011. Has been steadily decelerated (in 2016 the increase was 7.6% compared to the previous year, 7,6%; 2015-10,1%; 2014-12,2%, 2013-10,7%; 2012-11,6%; 2011-11,2%).

Strategy, Operational Art and Tactics trends and development

China's national strategic goal is to complete the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021

when the CPC celebrates its centenary; and the building of a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious by 2049 when the People's Republic of China (PRC) marks its centenary.[1]

China's armed forces take their goal making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream. Without a strong military, a country can be neither safe nor strong. In the new historical period, aiming at the CPC's goal of building a strong military in the new situation, China's armed forces will unswervingly adhere to the principle of the CPC's absolute leadership, uphold combat effectiveness as the sole and fundamental standard, carry on their glorious traditions, and work to build themselves into a people's military that follows the CPC's commands, can fight and win, and boasts a fine style of work.[2]

China's armed forces mainly shoulder the following strategic tasks[3]:

- To deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China's territorial land, air and sea;
- To resolutely safeguard the unification of the motherland;
- To safeguard China's security and interests in new domains;
- To safeguard the security of China's overseas interests;
- To maintain strategic deterrence and carry out nuclear counterattack;

---

1 *China's Military Strategy Voltaire Network*, Beijing (China), 26 May 2015 http://www.voltairenet.org/article187730.html, [acessed: 04.05.2017.]

2 Ibidem.

3 Ibidem.

- To participate in regional and international security co-operation and maintain regional and world peace;
- To strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China's political security and social stability; and
- To perform such tasks as emergency rescue and disaster relief, rights and interests protection, guard duties, and support for national economic and social development.

As far as operational art and tactics are concerned, we are fully sharing point of view expressed by Major Matthew J.P. Castillo from United States Air Force, in his Monograph "Chinese operational art: understanding the present through the lens of the past".[4] Author in his monograph:

> "seeks to determine if China's military has a "uniquely Chinese" flavor of operational art when compared to the United States. The study asserts the importance of history, specifically relating to China's unique philosophical and military tradition, as a lens through which an increased understanding of modern People's Liberation Army (PLA) operational art is achieved. The philosophical ideas present in Confucianism and Taoism bring clarity to contemporary PLA doctrine and activities. The study examines Chinese philosophical and military tradition, national strategy, and PLA doctrine in comparison to Western philosophy and US Joint doctrine to reveal uniquely Chinese concepts. Case studies then analyze PLA participation in United Nations Peacekeeping, PLA Navy anti-piracy operations and cyber activities to characterize operational art in practice. The study concludes that a unique Chinese

[4] M. J. P. Castillo, *United States Air Force, Chinese operational art: understanding the present through the lens of the past*, a Monograph by School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2013-01.

flavor of operational art does in fact exist, and demonstrates the continuing influence of China's philosophical and military tradition. Chinese operational art includes the creative combination of unconventional means (*ho*), the ability to alter relative positions between opposites (*yin* and *yang*), and the flexible application of forces within a situation (*wu wei*). These concepts underpin the asymmetric employment of task-organized combinations to bring about a position of advantage (*shi*). Contemporary and future PLA operations are likely to demonstrate a preference for an indirect approach, and include patience in decision-making and tempo as PLA leaders pursue a holistic understanding of the situation, self, and enemy, and as they allow the situation to develop into favorable conditions".

Summary

The Jiang Zimin's (2002) guidelines issued for the People's Liberation Army to obtain rapid and decisive victory in "computerized combat operations" began the process of aggressive modernization of the Chinese Armed Forces. For this reason there is a new concept for local wars led by elite, joint troops that strike first and strive for rapid victory.

In our opinion, Chinese leaders realized that neutralization of essential forces of the enemy is no longer possible by simply increasing the number of troops, planes, tanks and artillery. They also regard that future operations will be fast and limited, led by highly skilled, professional military formations representing different, huge and unique capabilities.

Latest Operational Art and Tactic`s analysis reflecting to detailed directions of development of PLA indicate shift in all discussed above services and formations and in Armed Forces as a whole: form mechanization to informatization; from

defense pattern of operations to active defense with more and more offensive aspects – meaning shift to offensive pattern of operations; from the war of damage (total destruction) to dynamic, quick, short-lasting and decisive wars (Figure 1.)



Figure 1. Transformation of the Chinese Armed Forces
Source: own arrangement.

References

M. J. P. Castillo, *Chinese operational art: understanding the present through the lens of the past*, a Monograph by School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

China's National Defense in 2008, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, January 2009, Beijing.

China's Military Strategy Voltaire Network, 26 May 2015. Beijing (China) http://www.voltairenet.org/article187730.html, [acess: 04.05.2017]

Develop a New Situation in National Defense and Army Modernization Guided by the 17th Party Congress Spirit, Jiefangjun Bao, 01 January 2008

J. S. Bajwa, *Modernisation of the PLA: Gauging its Latent Future Potential* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2002).

G. Kanwal, M. Chansoria, *Red Dragon Rising: China's White Paper Emphasises Offensive Defence*, "Issue Brief", No. 10, June 2009 (New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies).

M. S. Chase, E. Medeiros, *China's Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernization and Doctrinal Debate*" in: J. Mulvenon, D. Finklestein, *Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, (Washington D.C.: Beaver Press, 2005).

S. Kondapalli, *China's Military Capabilities in 2000-2010*, in: K. Santhanam, S. Kondapalli, *Asian Security and China: 2000-2010*, (New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2004,).