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Generational Specificity of Socio-Political Transformation in Georgia: Between Tradition and Modernity

Abstract

The purpose of the article was to analyze the generational transformation and outline the characteristics of individual generations. Moreover, the concept of V. Papava with the concept pointing to general generational trends was juxtaposed. This analysis allowed me to characterize the young generation of Georgians in relation to other generations. To analyze this research problem, I used a number of research methods based in part on secondary sources. The basic research methods used in the article are the method of analyzing existing data and the comparative method, which allowed for juxtaposing the division into generations proposed by V. Papava with the general characteristics of global generation trends. Secondary statistical data studies from the Caucasus Research Resource Center completed the above-mentioned methods, allowing for a more in-depth analysis of the generations. This article is a snapshot of studies on the generational transformation of Georgian society and is part of the series of articles on the young generation of Georgians and their opinions about democracy and democratization.

Keywords: transformation, Georgia, generation, young people, democratization, democracy

Specyfika pokoleniowa transformacji społeczno-politycznej w Gruzji: między tradycją a nowoczesnością

Abstrakt

Celem artykułu była analiza przemian pokoleniowych oraz zarysowanie cech poszczególnych pokoleń w społeczeństwie gruzińskim. Ponadto, w artykule zestawiono również koncepcję pokoleń V. Papavy z koncepcją wskazującą na ogólne trendy pokoleniowe. Analiza ta pozwoliła autorce scharakteryzować młode pokolenie Gruzinów na tle innych pokoleń. Do analizy tego problemu badawczego wykorzystano szereg metod badawczych opartych częściowo na źródłach wtórnych. Podstawowymi metodami badawczymi zastosowanymi w artykule są metoda analizy danych zastanych oraz metoda porównawcza, które pozwoliły na dokonanie podziału na pokolenia zaproponowane przez V. Papava z ogólną charakterystyką światowych trendów generacyjnych, oraz pozwoliły na zestawienie różnic i podobieństw w kontekście tych koncepcji. Badania wtórnych danych statystycznych z Kaukaskiego Centrum Zasobów Badawczych (Caucasus Research Resource Center) uzupełniły wyżej wymienione metody, pozwalając na dogłębną analizę wskazanych pokoleń. Artykuł ten stanowi przyczynek do dalszych badań nad przemianami pokoleniowymi społeczeństwa gruzińskiego i jest częścią cyklu artykułów o młodym pokoleniu Gruzinów i jego opiniach na temat demokracji i demokratyzacji.

Słowa kluczowe: transformacja, Gruzja, pokolenie, młodzi, demokratyzacja, demokracja

1. Preliminary Remarks

The concept of “transformation” means a complete change—in the case of a systemic transformation it means drastic changes in the political system of a state. This profound restructuring of power affects not only political life but also society itself in terms of values and identity¹. The essence of the transformation in the post-Soviet area was the transition from the authoritarian (communist) regime imposed from the outside to building a democracy. Two generations participated in this transformation in Georgia in 1991. As a result, the present-day Georgian society, made up of four generations, has adopted certain values and patterns of behavior from previous generations and new values promoted from the outside as part of democratization. According to G. Godlewski, the present generations living in the world: “(...) have their own dictionaries and symbols, cognitive categories and patterns of feelings, forms of communication and models of friendship, myths, and projects of the future. It is not just different environments or social strata—they are different cultures” [translation]². The situation is similar in the case of Georgian society. This article is a snapshot of studies on the generational transformation of Georgian society.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the generational transformation and outline the characteristics of individual generations. Moreover, I juxtaposed the concept of V. Papava (which can be considered quite controversial, yet in my opinion it is adequate to the situation of Georgia) with the concept pointing to general generational trends. This analysis will

¹ Turska (1994).

² Godlewski (2002): 60.

allow me to characterize the young generation of Georgians in relation to other generations. The issue studied is particularly important: Firstly, due to the specific type of transformation that took place in the post-Soviet states, the transformation taking place not only within political structures, but also in society. Secondly, it is the systemic transformation and the current democratization of Georgia that is driven by the generations that currently function and operate within this system. However, this analysis focuses mainly on the identification of the young generation that will constitute the new elite of Georgian society in the near future. It is this generation that constitutes the core for further research on the perception of democracy and democratization in Georgia. The objective of this paper indicates, firstly, a comparison of the generations of Georgian society with the global characteristics of generations, and secondly, it indicates a young generation that is internally conflicted.

To analyze this research problem, I used a number of research methods based in part on secondary sources. The basic research methods used in the article are the method of analyzing existing data and the comparative method, which allowed for juxtaposing the division into generations proposed by V. Papava with the general characteristics of global generation trends. Secondary statistical data studies from the Caucasus Research Resource Center completed the above-mentioned methods, allowing for a more in-depth analysis of the generations.

The article is part of the series of articles on the young generation of Georgians and their opinions about democracy and democratization.

2. Generational Transformation: General Thoughts

Over the years, the communist system evoked a certain sense of security in post-Soviet societies, dominating most spheres of life. Currently, in many countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus, societies expect a change in the styles and forms of governance, without having a clear vision of the opportunities and threats that will accompany such transformations at the social level.

According to the adopted definition of “transformation,” I have divided the transformations in Georgia into two. The first socio-political transformation was the systemic transformation of 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which took place in the context of the beginning of the transition from socialism to democracy, and at the same time from a centrally planned economy to capitalism. This change can be described as imitative and as a “West-oriented” transformation. J. Tatum emphasizes that there have been two waves of social change in Georgia. The first was the struggle for independence and the spurring of nationalism in 1991, and the second was the correction of the mistakes of the first wave, the Rose Revolution. Under this second wave, democratization, Europeanization, and westernization were particularly strong³. The main goal of the Rose Revolution was to eliminate Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime in order to enable Georgia to transform into a modern and democratic state⁴.


The above changes were related to the transformation of generations. According to V. Papava, the specificity of such

³ Tatum (2009): 156–171.

⁴ Lavert (2008): 143–161.

a transformation in the post-Soviet area was the transformation from *homo sovieticus* into *homo transformativus* and *homo oeconomicus*⁵. In my opinion, one more transformation is taking place within Georgian society—into a paradoxical generation, i.e., the youngest generation born after 2000 (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Generational Transformation in Georgia Since 1930.



Source: Own study.

*The red lines show the two transformations (1991 transformation and the Rose Revolution)

3. Transformation from *Homo Sovieticus* to *Homo Transformativus*

According to V. Papava, the *homo sovieticus* generation, born in 1930–1945,⁶ are people who lived during the Soviet

⁵ Papava (2005).

⁶ In other words, “Silent Generation” according to the general standards of research on generations and generations. The term was first used by the Times in 1951 to refer to people born in 1928–1945, people who were afraid to “speak out.” According to the Pew Research Center, these are people born 1928–1945, according

rule and were not familiar with the first version of democratic Georgia (1918–1921). Similarly, *The Moscow Times* defines *homo sovieticus* as “(...) the archetype of a person born and shaped by a totalitarian regime [translation]”. The concept of the *homo sovieticus* generation by V. Papava can be compared with the term “Silent Generation.” It is recognized that this generation is characterized by traditionalism, a great sense of duty, and the need for security. Due to the characteristics of the silent generation according to the universal values of Sh. Schwartz⁷, I recognized that the *homo sovieticus* generation is its Georgian / post-Soviet counterpart (Table 1).

Table 1. Characteristics of the Generations from 1930 to the Present

(see pages 80–85)

Source: Own study based on the literature on the subject.

to the Resolution Foundation 1926–1945, Strauss and Howe 1925–1941 for Canadian society; URL = https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233466490_Profiling_the_Silent_Generation

⁷ Schwartz (2012).

Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Veterans/ Silent Generation/ <i>Homo sovieticus</i>	1930–1945 (74–89 years old)			<p>Family of the sovieticus type - a Soviet consumer and authoritarian family whose members have state-guaranteed employment and a decent standard of living, a retirement pension. The state budget provides funding for social welfare, health care, and education.</p> <p>His / her main source of income are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Salaries, pensions, and social aid from public funds. 2) In small towns and villages, he / she has his / her own subsidiary farm, from which he / she consumes part of the proceeds from the product in kind and receives part of the proceeds from the sale of the part (since the latter was largely unregistered by the state, this was reflected in the family income as hidden income). 3) The socioeconomic strata (types) of family members were represented as: servants, workers, and peasants. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Openness to changes: little open to changes; 2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life; "Whatever God gives;" 3. Conservation (tradition, sense of security and conformity): very important for each generation, but especially for this one (as much as 97% of respondents!); 	This generation would definitely not like to have a homosexual person (as much as 91%) or a person of a different faith (42%) as a neighbor; other races (36%); another language (26%), immigrants (37%).

Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Baby Boomers/ <i>Homo transformativus</i>	1946–1969 (50–73 years old)		A homo transformativus who is partially developed, based on privatization and mainly on newly formed private structures. Such people are still afraid of the state. They still try to maintain dependence on the state and expect its help. They gradually adjust to the rules of the market economy.	The transformativus family - a kind of family moving from a socialist farm to a market economy. Types of members of the transformativus family (according to the sociological survey of 1997) can be summarized as follows: 1) New Georgians; 2) optimist"; 3) socialists; 4) Traditionals 5) Conservatives; 6) Europeans; 7) Pioneers	1. Openness to changes: little open to changes; 2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life; "Whatever God gives;" 3. Conservation (tradition, sense of security and conformism): very important for each generation, but especially for this one (as much as 97% of respondents!);	This generation would definitely not want to have a homosexual person (as much as 91%) or a person of a different faith (37%) as a neighbor; other races (36%); another language (23%), immigrants (35%).

Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimer Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Generation X <i>/Homo transformativus</i>	1970–1980 (40–49 years old)/1970–1990 (29–40 years old)				<p>1. Openness to changes: open to changes;</p> <p>2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life; “Whatever God gives;”</p> <p>3. Conservation (traditions, security and conformity): very important for each generation</p>	This generation would definitely not like to have homosexuals (as many as 86%) or people of another faith (34%) as a neighbor; other races (32%); another language (20%), immigrants (34%).

Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
Generation Y (Millennials, <i>Homo economicus</i>)	1990–2000 (19–29 years old)	Portrait of the young generation (14-29 years old): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 85% believers • 47% after high school • 70% live with their parents • 62% financially dependent on parents • 55% get along with their parents • 34% do not work • 42% would prefer to work in the public sector • 87% have their own business 			1. Openness to change: very open to change; 2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life; 3. Conservation (traditions, sense of security and conformism): very important for each generation.	This generation shows a similar attitude as the older generations, but the trend is definitely declining: homosexuals (79%, 18-25 years old and 89% 26-35 years old).

Generation	Years of birth	(FES) South Caucasus Regional Office (2017)	V. Papava's concept	Problems of demography and sociology] Avtandil Sulaberidze, Vladimir Sulaberidze	According to Sh. Schwartz's concept	Tolerance towards minorities (WVS 2014)
<i>Generation Z / Homo economicus</i> (V. Papava); Paradoxical generation (K. Skiert-Andrzejuk)	After 2000 (19 and younger)	<p>Portrait of the young generation (14-29 years old):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 85% believers • 47% after high school • 70% live with their parents • 62% financially dependent on parents • 55% get along with their parents • 34% do not work • 42% would prefer to work in the public sector • 87% have their own business • 94% do not attend any social gatherings • 94% are not socially and politically active online • 46% are not interested in the development of other countries • 81% trust only God • 42% believe abortion should be prohibited • 46% do not trust LGBT people • 43% would like to get married 			<p>1. Openness to change: very open to change;</p> <p>2. Self-enhancement (achievement and power): likewise, in all generations, money and luxury are not important, it is important to have a quiet life;</p> <p>3. Conservation (traditions, security and conformism): very important for each generation</p>	

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1% of women had more than 1 sexual partner • 56% feel Georgian, 20% individuals, 19% world citizens. • 57% of men have had more than 1 sexual partner 1% of women have had more than 1 sexual partner 				
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V. Papava characterizes this generation in terms of changes in some family's traditional functions. In Soviet times, against the will of the family, the state took over the responsibility to satisfy all its needs. There was an undesirable transformation of the family from being independent of the state to dependent on the state. Due to the limitation of economic independence, the family lost the ability to increase income, and the state entered its household. Ignorance of the independence of the family violated the "partnership relations" between the state and family, so that the family did not fully fulfill its traditional functions and the state failed to fulfill its obligations. The result was a conflict between the family and state, which was reflected in the destabilization of some family functions⁸.

According to the research of Sh. Schwartz, people from the Silent Generation are not open to changes, do not need to develop professionally, they only need a peaceful life in line with religious beliefs⁹. Surveys conducted by the Levada Center and the Pew Research Center in 2017 and 2018 in the post-Soviet space showed that former Soviet citizens still feel apathy, disappointment, uncertainty about their identity and a combination of longing for communist times on the one hand and the need to protect religious values on the other¹⁰. Moreover, by disrupting the "partnership relations" between the state and family, this generation continues to build its relations with state institutions on suspicion and distrust, while pessimism about the future continues

⁸ Papava (2005).

⁹ Schwartz (2012).

¹⁰ Levada Center 2017; Pew Research Center 2017. Public opinion survey: Residents of Georgia, URL = http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-5-29_georgia_poll_presentation.pdf.

to affect the daily behavior of this generation¹¹. In the context of special values at the social and cultural levels, the *homo sovieticus* generation considers kinship as very important bonds—bonds to family and friends are considered a priority, especially in the hierarchy of values, they are placed before obligations towards the state and the entire society¹².

The Georgian systemic transformation has had a multi-dimensional impact on society. The changes in the political, economic, and social life primarily influenced the family structure, which was previously dependent on the state, and the roles of gender in the family and society. According to V. Papava, the generation born in the years 1970–1990 is referred to as *homo transformaticus*—which means people who are not able to completely get rid of the fear of the state and thus slowly begin to pursue their own private interests and benefit from it. The attempt to transfer Western individualism to the place on which *homo sovieticus* was formed, and to replace the identity of this generation with individualism in the context of *homo transformaticus* ended in failure, or rather in the creation of a hybrid between the Soviet man and the *oeconomicus* man¹³.

The economic reforms that followed 1991 were shaped on a ground unprepared for these changes, and their consequences were unfair privatization, corruption, the expansion of the shadow economy and hyperinflation. These negative results of the reforms also influenced the direction of some *homo transformaticus*. On the one hand, people of this generation focused on social justice (the example of the Rose Revolution), ensuring material security for every member

¹¹ Merheim-Eyre (2018).

¹² Sumbadze, Tarkhan-Mouravi (2003).

¹³ Papava (2005).

of society, in opposition to the free market economy. On the other hand, some headed towards *homo deformaticus*, interpreting the free market economy as being particularly oriented towards the needs of an individual at the expense of society and the economic development of the state. Similarly to the concept of *homo adapticus* by Y.A. Levada, a person from the *homo transformaticus* generation can be described as one who gradually gets used to the principles of the market economy and democratization, interpreting these principles through the prism of the values professed by *homo sovieticus*¹⁴. Moreover, the analogically terms “Baby Boomers” and “Generation X” coincide with the author’s assumption. According to B. Hysa, the Baby Boomers generation grew up in the period of socio-political transformations and economic development based on the free market economy, which were a barrier for this generation¹⁵. However, this generation is already referred to as the transition generation, the generation of individualists, people who value independent work, with a recognition of authorities and the need for support in making any changes, inherited from the previous generation. In the literature on the subject, the Generation X is referred to as Stability Seekers.

In the context of social and cultural changes, the transformation of the family and its functions took place through the transformation of individual factors: religious, psychological, and traditional ones. *Homo transformaticus*, like *homo sovieticus*, prioritizes ties with family and friends¹⁶. The *homo transformaticus* generation, however, are people who value commitment also at the level of public life.

¹⁴ Levada (1999).

¹⁵ Hysa (2016).

¹⁶ Sumbadze, Tarkhan-Mouravi (2003).

Representatives of this generation started the second transformation, that is, the Rose Revolution—they held protests in Tbilisi. M. Saakashvili, a leader of the protests, later the president, was 35 years old during the dissents (generation of Baby Boomers, *homo transformativus*). Moreover, the Revolution was a combination of many different political and independent forces, one of which was the Kmara [Eng. “Enough”] youth group, significant to some extent in mobilizing the population. Thus, an important difference between the Soviet generation and the *homo transformativus* generation is political activity. The Rose Revolution promoted the creation of a “new man,” and in Georgia this man obeys the law, is incorruptible, i.e., the antithesis of *homo sovieticus*. According to revolutionaries, only radical capitalism was a means that could deconstruct *homo sovieticus* into modern *homo oeconomicus*.

Among the *homo sovieticus* and *homo transformativus* one can also distinguish the Jeans Generation. It was a small transitional subculture of people born in 1945–1955, from middle-class or upper-class families, united under the influence of Western culture and music. They were characterized by a love of the American way of life, music and art, and a rebellious attitude towards the USSR. Few representatives of this subculture went down in history, because in 1983 a group of seven young people tried to hijack a plane (Aeroflot Flight 6833) from Tbilisi in order to escape to the “West.” The pilot of the plane resisted the hijacking and eventually returned the plane to Tbilisi. After the Soviet special forces stormed the plane to the ground, the four remaining members of the group were arrested and finally tried (three hijackers, three crew members and two passengers died in a fire on board). This generation of late socialism became

symbolically associated with freedom, music, art, and Western style of clothing (jeans fashionable at the time) only ten years after the fall of the Iron Curtain¹⁷.

4. Transformation from *Homo Transformativus* to *Homo Oeconomicus*

The democratization currently taking place in Georgia has affected not only political but also social structures. The transformation of a generation from *homo transformativus* to *homo oeconomicus* is a gulf in the context of attitudes towards the political, economic, and social spheres. *Homo oeconomicus* in general terminology functions as Generation Y, which grew up in the age of computerization and the development of the Internet. According to B. Hysa, they are people open to the world without socio-political limitations, with the possibility of career development and economic emigration. People from this generation need independence, but they are looking for their mentors. They invest in themselves, showing reluctance to make long-term commitments¹⁸. And the generation born in 2000 is Generation Z, that is, the Connected Generation—connected to the network, the Internet¹⁹. They cannot function without new media as it is part of their everyday life. They are mobile people, open to other cultures, and open to changes. In my opinion, Generation Z, or Paradoxical Generation in Georgia, is an internally conflicted generation, placed between tradition (the values of previous generations) and modernization (values flowing from the “West”). In Western societies, attachment to tradition is not

¹⁷ Gozalishvili (2018).

¹⁸ Hysa (2016).

¹⁹ Turner (2015).

such a key element as it is in Georgia. Older generations and the *homo oeconomicus* generation itself, despite different values, share those associated with traditions in the context of family structure and attachment to the national culture. However, the external values related to democratization, free market economy and, above all, the Western lifestyle focused on egocentrism and personal development put the youngest generation at a crossroads in choosing a path of life. When analyzing this generation, it is worth paying attention to the concept of the paradoxical man. According to this concept, a transitional society produces such a unique and surprising phenomenon as individuals who focus on mutually exclusive values while seeking to achieve conflicting goals at the same time. In the minds and behavior of the same individual, opposite, and sometimes simply mutually exclusive judgments, attitudes, orientations and intentions coexist, which creates an image of paradoxical behavior²⁰.

In the consciousness of the paradoxical generation, under the influence of external and internal factors, cardinal changes occur, the result of which is the paradoxicality of thinking and cognition, and evaluation of phenomena and processes surrounding a representative of the generation. It is characterized by the existence of a specific type of contradiction that increases as a result of changes in economic and political relations, the breakdown of the image and lifestyle, the violation of stereotypes and national mentality²¹.

²⁰ Toshchenko (2008).

²¹ Toshchenko (2006).

5. Summary and Conclusions


According to M. Mnacakanyan, this paradoxical character of people's consciousness and behavior rapidly increases in times of crises and deformation of social bonds, i.e., in the conditions of creating and deepening the "atomic" state of society²². There is an internal connection between the paradoxicality of consciousness and the behavior of people with various forms of deviation. In fact, we are faced with a specific class of public life phenomena which, in the most general form, can be characterized as "incompatibility."

According to T. Khoshtaria's research based on Schwarz's theory regarding basic values of generations with the 2014 World Values Survey data, the older and younger generations do not differ much. Quantitative data analysis suggests that the values, in accordance with Schwarz's theory, such as "security" (which includes the core values of "conformity," and "tradition") and "self-direction" (which includes the basic values of "benevolence" and "universalism") are very important for people of all ages in Georgia. Over 70% in all age groups rated the people described in verbal portraits representing these five basic values as "very similar to them" or "like them" (Figure 1). On the other hand, there are some values that have been assessed completely differently by people in different age groups. Within the values of "self-direction," "stimulation," and "hedonism" (representing a higher ordered value of "openness to change"), there are differences depending on the age group. Compared to older generations, a greater percentage of young people identify with someone for whom it is important to come up with new ideas,

²² Mnatsakanyan (2006).

take risks and have a good time. Likewise, the core values of “achievement” and “power” (representing a higher value of “self-improvement”) were assessed differently by young people and the elderly. While success is important to 66% of young people, this percentage is lower among older people (Figure 2)²³.


Figure 1. Question: “I will briefly describe a person. Could you please tell me whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, a little like you, a little like you, not like you, or not at all like you?” [by age, in 2014]



Source: Social Science in the Caucasus, CRRC, <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2018/01/>

²³ Khoshtaria (2018).

Figure 2. Question: "I will briefly describe a person. Could you please tell me whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, a little like you, a little like you, not like you, not like you, or not at all like you?" [by age, in 2014]



Source: Social Science in the Caucasus, CRRC, <http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2018/01/>

In a nutshell, the transformation in 1991 changed both the political system and society itself. The theoretical division into generations has also become a reality, where the division into older and younger generations is visible, within which we can distinguish the *homo sovieticus*, *homo transformativus*, *homo oeconomicus*, and the paradoxical generation. Each of these generations creates its own values and has its own political awareness, but with common elements that bind all generations—such values are family, religion, and traditions. They differ mainly in their approach to government, openness to the world and the resulting globalization and westernization. However, the youngest generation is specific and peculiar, as the name used by me indicates, stuck between the clashes of tradition and modernization.

Observation of the generations, the changing trends in the values of the young generation, the influence of the older generation on the younger, inconstant generational dialogue, and above all, the new socio-political reality related to democratization and the search for new variants and forms of democracy and economic development will push young people to specific actions in the future. The questions remain, what values related to the political and national tradition of Georgians will remain passed on by this generation, which will constitute the new political elite? Will they become a hybrid between the new and the old? Will the next transformation take place, observing changes in public sentiment and the visible polarization of opinions about the transformation itself and the current governments? An attempt to answer these questions will contribute to further research on the place of young people in the socio-political space.

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