

Polish Journal of Political Science

Volume 3 Issue 4 (2017)



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Polish Journal of Political Science

Volume 3 Issue 4

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eISSN 2391-3991

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Greed and piety

– political reason in the philosophy of John Locke

Abstract

John Locke's political philosophy is to this day an important inspiration for the discourse oscillating around the issues of civil rights, the role and scope of political power and the relationship between property and ethics. However, this discourse is dominated by the one-sided and strongly impoverishing perception of the English philosopher's thought whose sources lie in Leo Strauss's interpretation. This article is a polemic with Strauss's interpretive standpoint, based on a comprehensive reading of Locke's philosophy. The aim of the text is both to demystify the secular nature of his thought, and to point out its unique coherence and conceptual precision which make it impossible, against Strauss and his followers' standpoint, to reduce Locke's philosophy to only a more radical, at the same time less coherent, version of Thomas Hobbes's political thought.

Keywords: natural law, property, reason, politics, society, greed, piety

This article is a polemic with Leo Strauss's interpretation of John Locke's philosophy. The critical reference to the above-mentioned interpretation is obviously significant not so much because of Strauss himself, as due to the fact that countless contemporary interpretations are largely based on his standpoint. It can be summarised in three main points, which will be elaborated on later in the text. Firstly, Locke created a theory of politics based on secular humanism and liberal individualism; secondly, the liberal theory of property rights is central to his political philosophy; and thirdly, Locke's philosophy of morality and philosophical anthropology of a clearly Christian character are only an attempt to hide the revolutionary character of property theory from the eyes of potential critics or the result of Locke's blind attachment to certain beliefs, largely obsolete due to his own philosophy. The refutation of the above conclusions is, contrary to appearances, not difficult if Locke's texts are taken into consideration, however under two basic conditions: firstly, reaching beyond *Treatises of Government*, and secondly, reading them without Strauss's interpretative bias, which for some, probably significant and objective reasons, has now become a means of widespread misinterpretation of Locke's thoughts.

The great and Chief and therefore, of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and puting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property. To which in the state of Nature there are many things waiting (...) an establish'd, settled, known Law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of Right and Wrong (...) a known and indifferent Judge, with Authority to determine all differences according to the established Law (...) Power to back and suport the Sentence when right, and

*give it due Execution.*¹ The above thought, taken from *Two Treatises of Government*, indicates what constitutes the essence of Leo Strauss's interpretation – firstly, the fact that the state has been established for the preservation and multiplication of worldly possessions, and secondly, that the positive law arises on the basis of universal consent, agreement, at the same time constituting a criterion based on the authority that allows to resolve internal conflicts in society. Hence, at first glance, this is a theory of secular authority legitimised on the basis of practical functions it is to perform towards society, i.e. securing secular values, such as personal freedom, bodily inviolability, the right to grow rich, etc.

What is equally important, in the light of Strauss's interpretation, human nature is conceived as one-dimensional, as only lustful, egoistic, and the human being as an entity that ultimately only has obligations towards oneself. Strauss writes directly that *Through the shift of emphasis from natural duties or obligations to natural rights, the individual, the ego, had become the center and origin of the moral world, since man – as distinguished from man's and – had become that center or origin. Locke's doctrine of property is still more advanced expression of this radical change than was the political philosophy of Hobbes. According to Locke, man and not nature, the work of man and not gift from nature, is the origin of almost everything valuable: man owes almost everything valuable to his own efforts. (...) Locke is a hedonist: That is properly good or bad, is nothing but merely pleasure or pain. But his is a peculiar hedonism: The greatest happiness consists not in enjoying*

¹ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, Cambridge 1960, p. 368-369.

*the greatest pleasures but in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasures.*² It is the understanding of human nature as primarily lustful and the recognition of private property as the supreme principle of social existence in Locke's theory that allows Strauss to say that Locke's doctrine of property, which is almost literally the central part of his political teaching, is certainly its most characteristic part.³

Locke, like Thomas Hobbes, assumes at the starting point of his deliberations that *to understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State are Men are naturally in (...)*, but at the same time he rejects and negates the Hobbesian notion of a natural state saying that *it is (...) a State of perfect Freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.*⁴ The right to preserve life, freedom and property is connected with the right to punish criminals, that is, those who go against the law of nature, thus limiting the rights of others. This entitlement, because of non-existence in the state of nature of the authority being able to settle disputes and having the power necessary to enforce judgments, rests in the hands of the aggrieved, or in any case of a person who considers oneself the aggrieved. Enforcing the right to punish an aggressor and compensate losses suffered, at the same time introduces both sides of the conflict into a state of war, a state of mutual hostility and willingness to retaliate. Because of the human desire to retaliate and revenge, Locke admits

² L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, Chicago & London 1953, p. 248-249.

³ Ibidem, p. 234.

⁴ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 285.

that the state of war, once it has occurred, continues, and to avoid this state of War is one great reason of Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the State of Nature⁵.

In Locke's theory, the state of nature is undoubtedly the rudiment and point of reference for the dynamic, historical development of interpersonal relationships, based on work and the necessity to preserve its fruits. This development, presented by Locke in the chapter entitled *Of property*, from *Second Treatise of Government* (the most comprehensive chapter, which is not so just by accident, as Strauss suggests), allows to understand the dynamic process of transforming of the proper state of nature into a state of war. Property in the proper state of nature is not yet property in the literal sense – it is the property of everyone, and therefore, only potentially private property.⁶ Work, as an act of absorbing, humanisation of nature, as a tool securing the self-preservation of the human being through the transforming of nature, becomes at the same time a tool for updating private property only potential at the starting point. A part of what previously belonged to common property, i.e. nature, is attached to the work, which is the first property of the human being, as its effect. And, as Strauss rightly points out, *the natural right to property is a corollary of the fundamental right of self-preservation; it is not derivative from compact, from any action of society. If everyone has the natural right to preserve himself, he necessarily has the right to everything that is necessary for his self-preservation*⁷. It should not, however, lead to a conclusion that this necessarily causes a state of universal war for property, or for what property can

⁵ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 300.

⁶ Ibidem, p. 304-305.

⁷ L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, p. 235.

be made of – natural wealth. However, the preservation of private property of a human being is not ultimately guaranteed by the law of nature prohibiting the restriction of the natural rights of another person, because in the state of nature there is no political society that can guard these rights. It is guaranteed by the real conditions of human life in the state of nature: huge, untapped natural potential, as well as the lack of the possibility of collecting goods over the ability to use them. It is the primitive stage of civilisation development that protects private property, which is limited to what is not worth appropriating against the law of nature, and not because of it, but because it is easier to take away the same good from nature than from another person.⁸

The situation, however, changes dramatically along with the proportional, in relation to the enlargement of the human population, decrease in natural goods that do not constitute anybody's property – *The same Rule of Property, that every Man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the World, without straining any body, since there is Land enough in the World to suffice the Inhabitants had not the Invention of Money, and the tacit Agreement of Men to put a value on it, introduced larger Possessions, and the Right to them*⁹. The invention of money has revolutionised both relationships between people and between people and nature. From that moment, it became possible to accumulate unlimited quantities of goods in a form in which they were not subject to spoiling. At the same time, however, the appropriation of someone else's goods, the desire or the need to seize them became a real threat to the institution of

⁸ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 311.

⁹ Ibidem.

property – *If Man in the State of Nature be so free (...); If he be absolute Lord of his own Person and Possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no Body, why will he part with his Freedom? (...) To which 'tis obvious to Answer, that though in hte State of Nature he hath such a right, yrt the Enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasion of others*¹⁰. Thus, it can be seen that while the concept of the state of war allows Locke to draw attention to the necessity of a civic society aimed to safeguard the natural rights of a human being to possess (also material) property in the situation of a high degree of civilisation development, the model of the proper state of nature, due to the character of the living conditions of the human being in it, within which the rights are preserved in a universal and conflict-free way, allows to determine the character of these rights. Therefore, Strauss rightly emphasises that in Locke's concept *Men own property prior to civil socjety; they enter civil society in order to preserve ot protect the property which they acquired in the state of nature*¹¹, i.e. the proper state of nature, as opposed to the state of war.

Strauss, however, primarily exploits the notion of property, as material property when he interprets Locke's socialisation theory. He sees private property as the source of social development. Let us, than, take a look at what arguments in favour of his own interpretation Strauss quotes: *Since there is no longer enough and as good left in common for everyone, equity would seem to demand that man's nature right to appropriate as much as he can use should be restricted to the right to appropriate as much as he needs, lest*

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 368.

¹¹ L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, p. 235.

*the poor be straitened. And, since gold and silver are now immensely valuable, equity would seem to demand that man should lose the natural right to accumulate as much money as he pleases. Yet Locke teaches exactly the opposite: the right to appropriate is much more restricted in the state of nature than in civil society. One privilege enjoyed by man in the state of nature is indeed denied to man living in civil society: labor no longer creates a sufficient title to property. But this loss is only a part of the enormous gain which the right of appropriation makes after the first ages.*¹² What gains does, in Strauss's opinion, Locke find? *He justifies the emancipation of acquisitiveness in the only way in which it can be defended: he shows that it is conducive to the common good, to public happiness or the temporal prosperity of society.*¹³

The real capability of accumulating an unlimited number of goods provokes unfailingly a psychological mechanism of competition between proprietors, which has little to do with the necessity of biological survival. Locke admits that *the uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the idea of Delight with it, is that we call Desire.*¹⁴ *Envy is an uneasiness of Mind, caused by the consideration of a Good we desire, obtained by one, we think should not have had it before us.*¹⁵ Like in the case of the Hobbesian model of socialisation, it can be noticed here that *covetousness and concupiscence, far from being essentially evil or foolish, are, if*

¹² Ibidem, p. 240.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 242.

¹⁴ J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Oxford 1975, p. 230.

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 231.

*properly channeled, eminently beneficial and reasonable much mores o than exemplary charity.*¹⁶ Competition between proprietors of goods who, competing with each other, force the possessionless part of society to do socially useful work, takes the form of a measure of economic development and a factor cementing the bonds of mutual dependencies between citizens, thus uniting society in a joint effort to raise the general standard of living.

Contrary to Strauss's standpoint, the above presented mechanism of economic and political building of social structures does not exhaust Locke's political philosophy. Strauss breaks Locke's philosophy into its "proper" element (the theory of private property) and "random" element (the theory of natural law with its religious and anthropological dimension). He does so in the conviction that *it was indeed easy for Locke to see a problem where later men saw only an occasion for applauding progres or themselves, since in his age most people still adhered to the older view according to which the unlimited acquisition of wealth is unjust or morally wrong. This also axplains why, in stating his doctrine of property, Locke so involved his sense, that it is not easy to understand hi mor wenr as much as possible with the herd.*¹⁷ Locke saw the phenomenon of this common-sense concept of justice, strongly rooted in reality, but he did not disregard it and did not treat it with indulgence. On the contrary, it has become an impulse for him to develop an original and unusual concept of human nature and natural law, in accordance with the maxim: *Utility is not the basis*

¹⁶ L. Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, p. 247.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 246.

*of the law or ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it.*¹⁸

In his *Essays on the Law of Nature*, Locke gives five arguments for the existence of the law of nature – at the moment, the first of them is of interest to us. Aristotle, says Locke, (...) *rightly concludes that the proper function of man is acting in conformity with reason, so much so that man must of necessity perform what reason prescribes.*¹⁹ Although the human being shares vegetative and lustful life functions with other creatures, differs from them in a peculiar function – the activity of the soul in accordance with reason or not without reason. Thanks to that, the human being is predisposed to live in a political community. Locke, referring to the authority of Aristotle, tries to reconstruct the way of thinking useful in defining the relationship between human nature and objective, socio-political conditions, within which its potential is updated. What is, however, of key importance here is Locke's theory of natural law: *Since therefore all men are by nature rational, and since there is harmony between this law and the rational nature, and this harmony can be known by the light of nature, it follows that all those who are endowed with a rational nature, i.e. all men in the world, are morally bound by this law.*²⁰

To clarify the concepts of reason and rationality, let us take a look at the solutions contained in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* – *Whence ha sit all the materials of Reason and Knowlegde? To this I answer, in one word, From Experience: In that, all our Knowlegde is founded;*

¹⁸ J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, Oxford 1954, p. 215.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 113.

²⁰ J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p. 199.

*and from that it ultimately derives it self.*²¹ Locke's quoted thought, which could be called the sensualist manifesto, establishes a clear cognitive perspective as a starting point: there are no innate rules – neither speculative nor practical, all our knowledge comes only from the mind's work on the material provided by sensory experience. Nature, with the exception of reason, *has put into a Man a desire of Happiness, and a aversion to Misery, and as Locke adds a little sarcastically: these indeed are innate practical Principles, which do continue constantly to operate and influence all our Actions, without ceasing.*²² Good is not yet of moral character here, but only volitional – good or evil can only be described by virtue of pleasure or resentment. We are dealing here with moral relativism resulting from the diversity of human feelings, aspirations and desires. The law of nature, on the other hand, defines the universal and unchangeable rules of human behaviour because of one's specifically human nature. *Cognitive principles regulating human behaviour*, defining natural law, can only be recognised via reason. Thus, belonging to human nature, activity in accordance with reason, whose work is based on material of only empirical origin, is here to be synonymous with following the rules of the law of nature.

However, doubts arise whether we are not dealing here with a naturalistic error. Does the fact that the human being is endowed with reason and in fact uses it to achieve one's particular goals, mean, out of necessity, that the human being will be using it in accordance with the requirements of the law of nature, requiring every human being *to preserve*

²¹ J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 104.

²² Ibidem, p. 67.

the whole human race? Is there really no gulf between the descriptive element of the law of nature, in accordance with which human nature is characterised by the invariable use of reason, and its normative element? How is it possible (if it really is possible) for the eternal rules of the law of nature to comply with the activity of reason, which draws material for its work only from the senses. In order to show that in Locke's theory the use of reason is tantamount to observing the principles of coexistence determined by the law of nature, it should be added that it is impossible when there are no suitable conditions, and necessary – when these conditions occur. So if Aristotle claims that the human being can achieve the optimum of one's perfection defined by nature only within a political community, than Locke adds that the state has the task of not so much shaping a human being, as letting one shape oneself, according to one's nature, establishing only the legal-political basis for social reality, within which an individual is able to acquire the natural law rules as one's own, but without the mediation of the authority of the positive law. In view of the above, conditions necessary for the practical identity of reason and the law of nature should be characterised.

According to Locke, for no Body can be under a Law, which is not promulgated to him; *and this Law being promulgated or made known by Reason only, he that is not come to the Use of his Reason, cannot be said to be under this Law*,²³ while reason cannot be used by children or the insane because they do not have it. Is, however, having reason, synonymous with using it? Of course not, after all *any vehement pain of the body; the ungovernable passion of a*

²³ J. Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, p. 323.

*Man violently in love; or the impatient desire of revenge, keeps the will steady and intent.*²⁴ Because the will is only a certain ability of a human being, which normally is determined by reason, and is subject to its decision, wanting or not, then freedom appertains to the individual as a rational being.²⁵ And although Locke argues that in most cases the reason has the power to restrain or stop actions and satisfaction of its desires, he is fully aware that when a human being is subjected to strong pressure from external reality, then the rule of reason ceases to be so easy and commonplace.²⁶ Anxieties and conflicts of a religious, political or economic nature exert an unquestionably greatly negative influence on the human possibilities of using reason – being led by it as the guiding principle of conduct. The task of the state is to eliminate conflicts by safeguarding the laws of nature of all citizens. Thanks to this, safeguarding individual, egoistic interests is possible only on the basis of reciprocity. However, it is not the state and its authority that are the source of normativity and its warrant. This source is constituted by social practices, and basically, one of them: religion.

The interference of the state, consisting in securing the natural rights of all members of society establishes principles of coexistence which exclude the functioning of religion as a political and ideological force, competitive against the policy of secular government. Not only does religion cease to be an ideology that generates spiritual conflicts that exclude rational principles of coexistence within the society, but at the same time gains the status of a culture-creating

²⁴ J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 350-351.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 241.

²⁶ J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p. 263.

factor, i.e. supporting the rationalisation and normalisation of social practices. On the other hand, religion does not take the form of a political tool for exercising power here. Locke had a strong conviction that religiosity belongs to human nature to a degree no lower than the self-preservation instinct, and in the same fashion, it can become a culture-creating factor capable of organising interpersonal relationships to a degree that enables harmonious co-existence in civil society as soon as its huge natural potential is properly utilised. To quote Locke: *A church, then, I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls.*²⁷ Whereas, the task of the state is to create real legal and political conditions that implement this maxim. Religious tolerance, according to Locke, is a basic condition for ordering the rules of coexistence, in order for natural and spontaneous religiosity not to be harnessed into ideological conflicts, for its power to remain in the service of culture and not the, directed against it, violence and lawlessness. Religious tolerance, however, is not to mean only activity in the area of law and politics, but as a consequence, of course – also in the social dimension. Locke's religious relativism stems from the fact that knowledge about things inaccessible to our senses is not, in fact, knowledge, but a set of beliefs belonging to the area of only faith. And if so, some beliefs cannot be placed above others. Locke harnesses this logic in a wider context – his concept of the human being. Well, he believes that only proper religious experiences, that

²⁷ J. Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Indianapolis 1955, p. 20.

is, those that always remain in the area of what is spontaneous and voluntary, can act as a factor that bonds interpersonal relationships, colouring them with what is irrational, but more powerful than the rational, while remaining an intimate and authentic care for one's own good. But what is the basis of the culture-forming potential of spontaneous and authentic religiosity, or rather the feelings that accompany it?

While the task of the state is to eliminate intra-social conflicts, the social work of religion consists in restraining lust, which is to open the way for rationality as a common rule of conduct. It is worth reminding that Locke, stressing the necessity of religious tolerance, indicates that not theological dogmas, not specific religious practices, ways of worshipping God, but above all, the work on ousting instincts aimed against universal reciprocity in interpersonal relations constitutes the culture-forming power of religion. From this point of view, the nature of the official doctrine of a particular church is of secondary importance, if only confessing it becomes a means of ousting what is lustful. At the same time, the adoption of a thesis according to which the human being is by nature a being that is not only rational but also religious is a necessary condition here. Hence, let us look at the third argument for the existence of the law of nature, which Locke offers in his *Essays on the Law of Nature*: (...) *the mind, after more carefully considering in itself the fabric of this world perceived by the senses and after contemplating the beauty of the objects to be observed, their order, array, and motion, thence proceeds to an inquiry into their origin, to find out what was the cause, and who the maker, of such an excellent work, for it is surely undisputed that this could not have come together casually and by chance into so regular and in every respect so perfect and ingeniously prepared a*

*structure. Hence it is undoubtedly inferred that there must be a powerful and wise creator of all this things, who has made and built this whole universe and us mortals who are not the lowest part of it.*²⁸ We should pay attention to the fact that we are dealing here with the perspective of perceiving the world as a whole of natural processes, harmonised by means of eternal and unchanging rules,²⁹ and as Locke adds – (...) *it does not seem that man alone is independent of laws while everything is bound,*³⁰ which constitutes the third mentioned argument.

However, the law of nature, which we deal with in our considerations, and thus the one applicable to the human being only, although it is an immanent part of the whole established legislation, it does not function with the same force of necessity as, for instance, the law of gravity. The reason for this is, of course, specifically human nature, not limited only to what is physical or vegetative. The human being, as the previously presented first argument teaches us, has a reason – the source of one's freedom and, consequently, the possibility of deciding about one's own life, also in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of the law of nature, which becomes possible only in a situation when the norms of the law of nature and the positive law are not fully accepted by a citizen as one's own. What can make one actually accept them? Locke replies that (...) *some things bind of themselves and by their intrinsic force, other indirectly*

²⁸ J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p. 153.

²⁹ This opens the perspective of faith in the Creator, born spontaneously through rationally discovering in experience the rules of the world's manifestation, as perfect, unchangeable and, above all, amazing in their purposefulness.

³⁰ J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p. 117.

*and by a power external to themselves. Of itself and by intrinsic force (and only so) is the divine will binding, and either it can be known by the light of nature (...) or it is revealed by God-inspired men or in some other manner, in which case it is the positive divine law. Indirectly and by delegated power the will of any other superior is binding, be it that of a king or a parent, to whom we are subject by the will of God.*³¹ The will of the God-creator applies only by virtue of faith, but (so) in a manner so authoritative that even a rational, universally understood and expressing vital human and social interest natural law cannot match it. It must be based on the authority of faith placed within the framework of the doctrine of a particular church in order to gain the universal acceptance which it needs and which it cannot otherwise gain.

Locke indeed puts a great deal of emphasis on the authority of the legislator, as the surest, in his opinion, guarantee for the law. He argues that every law must be defined as the will of the legislator, the will to which subjects must willingly submit; this applies to every law, in particular to the law of nature, which can only draw legitimacy from this source, and at the same time constitutes the foundation for every possible secular legislation.³² When we refer to the second argument for the existence of the law of nature, which can be expressed in this concise formula: (...) *no one who commits a wicked action is acquitted on his own judgement*,³³ we will be able to notice how great a role is attributed by Locke to conscience, which does not only “reveal” the existence of the law of nature, but also shows the source of obedience to

³¹ Ibidem, p. 187.

³² J. Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, p. 151.

³³ Ibidem, p. 117.

it. Conscience is a proper guarantee for the operation of the law of nature – an instance that prevents the human being from egoistic actions, as directed against social principles of reciprocity, enables life in harmony with reason. Locke presents a model of the spiritual organisation of the human being, which consists in renouncing the irrational as lustful in favour of what is rational, through faith – an irrational factor, but with rationality remaining in natural harmony – compatible with it in its claims. It is faith that allows one to curb lusts so as to enable the human being to live in harmony with reason; faith, or, rather, the authority of the Creator-Lawmaker unfailingly connected with it, internalised and expressed in the work of conscience, is the normative base for social order. It is not without reason that Locke writes: *those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.*³⁴

It should be added, at the same time, that Locke clearly assesses the cultural potential of religiosity, also the negative one. On the one hand, he puts a special emphasis on the assimilation of cultural norms through religion, as a way to guarantee the constitution of cultural processes, and on the other hand, he at all costs refrains from the idea that imposing religion on civil society as the authoritative and institutionalised form of a political tool for exercising power constitutes a solution to any social problems. Undoubtedly, Locke is extremely critical of such attempts: *the some may not color their spirit of presecution and un-Christian cruelty with a pretense of care of public weal and observation of the laws; and that others, under pretense of religion may*

³⁴ J. Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, p. 52.

*not seek impunity of their libertinism, and licentiousness (...) I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other.*³⁵ It is worth noting that Locke denies the state the “educational” functions in the sphere of opinion and morality, in accordance with the principle: *the business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the commonwealth, and of every particular man’s good and person.*³⁶ The state is to be a completely morally and religiously neutral instance, the role of which is solely to eliminate the pathological conditions of social functioning. When the separation between religion and the state is not carried out in a clear and determined way, then the state of war for material goods is replaced by the state of religious wars, *than, at last, it appears what zeal for the church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce, and how easily the pretense of religion and of the care of souls serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine, and ambition.*³⁷

The analyses presented in the article leave no doubt that, unlike Hobbes, Locke is successful in creating a model of the rationalisation of social and cultural processes that are not subject to absolutisation. Locke presents the theory of natural law and political rules that are to initiate the processes of a socio-economic organisation as developing on the basis of its own structure, which from the sphere of politics draws only guarantees of continuous securing of the unchanging basis of socialisation and normalisation of intra-social relations.

³⁵ J. Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, p. 16-17.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

Religion, inscribed in the movement of socialisation itself, unable to be established in what is political, draws directly from the spontaneous, specifically human way of perceiving the world and emotions associated with it, simultaneously creating conditions for the process in which it is entangled, abolishing what is selfish and only particularist. What is, however, the most important, Strauss's interpretation, in accordance with which Locke's political philosophy is only a more radical version of Hobbes's concept, turns out to be unsupportable.

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