

Polish Journal of Political Science



Volume 2 Issue 2(2016)

(this page is intentionally left blank)

Polish Journal of Political Science

Volume 2 Issue 2

Editorial Board

Clifford Angell Bates Jr., University of Warsaw

Stephen Brooks, University of Michigan

Michael Freedon, University of Nottingham, University of Oxford

Shpresa Kureta, Her Excellency Ambassador of Albania to Poland

Paolo Pombeni, University of Bologna

Bohdan Szlachta, Jagiellonian University in Krakow

Tomasz Żyro, University of Warsaw

Editor:

Jarosław Szczepański

Associate Editors

Przemysław Biskup

Aneta Marcinkowska (Statistics)

Stanisław Matsumoto

Iwona Miedzińska

Krystian Pałyska

Maciej Sadowski

Łukasz Smalec

Marta de Zuniga

eISSN 2391-3991

Original version: e-book

Visit our site: www.pjps.pl

Submit your paper: submit@pjps.pl

(this page is intentionally left blank)

Table of Contents

Articles

Susana Calderón Vizcarra de Kevans

The Critique of Democracy in the Writings of Nicolás Gómez Dávila (1913 – 1994) p. 6

Dolly Bhardwaj

Factors which influence Foreign Policy of Bhutan p. 25

Iurii Opoka

International Approaches to the Crisis in Ukraine p. 73

Paula Olearnik Szydłowska

Regime change and the future of popular sovereignty p. 103

Iurii Opoka

Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, University of Warsaw

International Approaches to the Crisis in Ukraine

Abstract

The crisis in Ukraine is one of the greatest challenges for international community, especially for Euro-Atlantic area ((EAA) USA and the EU). The political tension, caused by the annexation of the part of Ukraine, the Crimea, has inclined the experts to talk about the beginning of the new Cold War between Russia and the West. Evidently this crisis has an international character, complexity, and different levels. At least, there are "the West vs Russia", "Ukraine vs Russia", and "Ukraine vs Ukraine" levels. Naturally complexity determined different propositions of the conflict solution among scientists and decision makers. The article explores the conflict using the international relation theories as hallmarks of approaches to the crisis and SWOT-analysis and comparative method as tools of analysis. The liberal, realist, and constructivist approaches to the crisis are distinguished. Every approach has special propositions for the solution of the crisis. These propositions based on the set of beliefs which are involved by the approach. The liberal way of resolving foresees economical assistant to Ukraine, cooperation with Russia and Ukrainian neutrality. The realist approach admits Russian right to renew spheres of influence and sees Ukraine as a buffer state in a future. The constructivists approach to the crisis considers EU membership of Ukraine as a recipe of the solution.

Keywords: *The Crisis in Ukraine, Russia-Ukraine Conflict, The Ukrainian Crisis, War, IR Theories, Liberalism, Realism, Constructivism*

Introduction

The question how the social science theories concerning practice is still open. There are different views among the scientists. Some argue that a theory can shape the reality like the Communism did. Others believe that all big theories just described results of the human practice. Probably the first and the second are right simultaneously.

On the international relations field there are infinite debates about what theory is more applicable to the world structure and what theory can provide appropriate tools for international relations analysis. Robert Jackson and George Sorensen wrote that international relations theories are the “lenses” through which we can see the world.¹ The theory provides us to understanding facts and it systematizes our knowledge about the world. What facts are more or less important? These debates are also important because the decisions which politicians make depend on the theoretical “lenses” in their glasses. If one believes in the democracy, one would not usurp a power. The reasons why there is not one common and dominant theory lie in the complicated diversity of international relations (dissimilar cultural, social, political and others dimensions.)

As every international theory has distinguished features and it pays attention to the distinct main factors, it is rationally to apply different theories to one international issue. Change eyeglasses and gaze upon one subject from different perspectives. This practice is necessary when international issue involves dissimilar actors and dimensions.

In fact, if we want to understand reasons and ways of the international problem solution we have to look at the problem from points of the main actors' views. This is the aim of our article. We try to select main determinants of the evaluation and behavior of the actors of the crisis in Ukraine. Further these determinants will be assessed and compared with regard to the nature of

¹Jackson Robert, Sorensen Georg, Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych : teorie i kierunki badawcze; tł. Aleksandra Czwojdrak. Kraków : Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2006. s.65;

the crisis. This analysis helps indicate more and less adequate approaches and propositions to the crisis that still threatening a continental security.

Methodology

The object of the analysis is the crisis in Ukraine and the most popular approaches to its resolving. For that purpose we will organize the facts and approaches according to three grand theories of International Relations (eventually, scientific theories are the tools of knowledge organization.)

After the description and classification of the approaches to the crisis we will analyze their basic assumptions and recommendations. For that purpose we will use an interdisciplinary method named SWOT-analysis. Despite the fact this method is from economic field of knowledge it is convenient for analyzing strategies and different scenarios. Its general principles foresee exploring and analysis of object through four features: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT). One could object that it is dangerous practice to use specific economic methods in the international studies. However we think it could bring more usefulness than damage. Especially, that we are not pioneers in this field. There were some publications concerning international relations where SWOT analysis has been used.² In any case this heuristic method has an instrumental characteristic in our paper. It serves only to organize information.

We assume that actors (states and decision makers) on the international arena act according to their convictions and beliefs. The best systems of different beliefs and convictions in term of international relations are comprised by international relations theories: realism, liberalism, constructivism etc. For instance, we assume that Vladimir Putin uses the realism doctrine in his foreign policy strategy. So Russia behaves according to his beliefs about power or sphere of influences.

We realize that there isn't one approach within realist or liberal doctrines, but many. International relations theories in our case serve as criterion of typology

² Bryc Agnieszka, Izrael 2020 skazany na potęgę?, Warszawa : Wydawnictwo Poltext, 2014, 268 s; Sergunin A., Konyshv V., A SWOT Analysis of US-Russian Relations, International Relations and Security Network 27.01. 2016; Available at:<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail?id=195695>

of the approach. Supporters of the realist approach to the Crisis in Ukraine see the power concept, the anarchy or the equilibrium as main determinants of foreign policy. In the liberal approach the market, the international law, and a democracy would be the most important. In constructivist view it is an identity, a culture, values etc.

Second, we are convinced that the crisis in Ukraine has complicated structure and more than one dimension. It is a multidimensional crisis with different actors and levels. There are three main actors of the crisis: Ukraine, The West³ (EU, USA, Canada and others democratic state), and Russia. Further we will analyze the nature of the crisis deeper.

Each actor evaluates the crisis on the base of its own beliefs, which means within the frame of international relations theory which is the closest to the actor's view. So if EU acts according to liberal doctrine the evaluation of the crisis and the solution that are proposed are also framed by the liberal doctrine.

The analysis will be developed under four main headings. First is anatomy of the Crisis in Ukraine where we will be finding the most important reasons of the crisis. For this purpose, the nature of the crisis and its main actors will be described. Second, we will try to evaluate the crisis using the liberal approach. Then we will use the realist and constructivist theories in the same way and evaluate the most appropriate proposed solution.

³ In general, conception "the West" means a broad group of democratic states that in majority are NATO participants. But in the analysis we use term "the West" frequently having in mind EU (especially France and Germany) as their leaders represent the position of the West in negotiations with Russia and Ukraine (Normand format). We don't distinguish the position of USA as a separate one (despite USA position is more radical toward Russia) because of a few reasons. First, USA has completely entrusted the regulation process to EU partners. Second, it is methodologically difficult and requires more than one article. Very often the US talks like liberal but acts like realist as John Mearsheimer has noticed. Third, the USA policy is reacting regarding to the crisis. There isn't clear strategy towards the crisis and all decision makes after negotiations with EU leaders.

The sources of Ukrainian foreign policy and Anatomy of the crisis

Ukrainian foreign policy during all of its modern history (from 1991 – till now) has been determined mainly by internal factors, which were always volatile. There has never been a precise doctrine of Ukrainian international or foreign policy. On July 1993 the Ukrainian parliament accepted the act “On the main direction of foreign policy of Ukraine”⁴ but this legislation has never been fulfilled. When Leonid Kuchma became the president, he positioned himself as pro-Russian leader during the first term of his presidency and conducted foreign policy, which was directed toward Moscow. He began his second term as pro-European president, but after a number of international scandals and his “isolation” from Western countries he initiated the new foreign policy concept, called the “multivector,” trying to balance between Russia and the EU simultaneously. The next Ukrainian president, Victor Yushchenko, was pro-European leader, who started negotiations about the Association Agreement with the EU. The next president, Victor Yanukovych, started as pro-Russian, but in the middle of his presidency he changed his rhetoric and turned to the EU. However, in 2013 the Euromaidan Revolution occurred and he again backed to Russia. In 2010 Yanukovych elaborated a new foreign policy concept declaring the non-alignment status of Ukraine.⁵ After the Euromaidan revolution the new president Petro Poroshenko initiated principal amendments to the act. The Parliament rejected the non-alignment status and confirmed Ukrainian aspirations to join NATO.

We assume that there are two major determinants of Ukrainian foreign policy. The first is Ukrainian geographical position which is obvious if one looks on the map. The second is its identity or even different identities. The point is that there are two different political identities within Ukrainian nation. According to Volodymyr Kulyk we can single out “the national” and “the post-soviet” types

⁴ Про Основні напрями зовнішньої політики України, [On the main directions of Ukrainian Foreign Policy], Постанова Верховної Ради України, Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 1993, N 37, ст.379; Available at: <http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3360-12>

⁵ Про засади внутрішньої і зовнішньої політики, [On the fundamentals of domestic and foreign policy] Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 2010, № 40, ст.527 <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411-17>

of identities.⁶ These groups have different and often contradictory views on politics, history, national interests, religion, languages or even Ukraine at all. According to Samuel Huntington Ukraine was a “cleft state,” or divided by civilization border. The scholar argued that “Ukraine is divided between nationalist Ukrainian-speaking west and Orthodox Russian-speaking east...The civilizational fault line between the West and Orthodoxy runs through its heart and has done so for centuries.”⁷ Despite the author’s forecast about the Ukrainian future never came true we partly agree with his diagnosis of the state of Ukrainian identity, especially in the beginning of 90s. There wasn’t one dominant identity, and soon after the establishment of independence the issue of identity has become the question of political technologies. Insofar, the Ukrainian foreign policy is totally dependent on its domestic policy, and the domestic policy is dependent on the identity of Ukrainian electorate. Thus, Ukrainian identity is the cornerstone of its foreign policy. When the state and the government act contrary to the identity of the majority of the Ukrainians, the political crisis and revolutions have occurred. It happened in 2013. It is the main reason of Revolution and the Ukrainian crisis.

From 1991 the identity of Ukrainians has been shaping hugely. We can see it among young people. Prominent universities, NGOs, a lot of westerns institutions have been working to overall soviet heritage during 20 years. The generation change has occurred. As Jaroslaw Hrytsak argues today’s Ukrainian young people are more similar to the young people abroad than to previous generation of the Ukrainians.⁸ And in 2013 new, young, pro-European identity brought people to the street. It was response to the change of foreign policy direction. This direction toward EU in people’s minds associates with

⁶ Володимир Кулик, Дискурс українських медій: ідентичності, ідеології, владні стосунки, [Volodymyr Kulyk, The Ukrainian Media Discourse: Identities, Ideologies, Power Relations], Критика, Київ, 2010, pp. 656;

⁷ Huntington, Samuel P. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. London : Touchstone Books, 1998. pp. 138-165;

⁸ Тришак Ярослав. Євромайдан не мав би перемогти. [Yaroslav Hrytsak. Euromaidan wasn’t supposed to win], ZAXID.NET 11.09.15;

Available at: http://zaxid.net/news/showNews.do?yevromaydan_ne_mav_bi_peremogti&objectId=1365158

democratization, rule of law, prosperity, and freedom. “For Ukrainians, the promise of Europe is not only as a common market for Ukrainian goods and a spur to political reform; it also figures as an idea of reciprocal recognition of European states and civil societies that could bring Ukraine out of the shadows of Russian provincialism.”⁹

Joint national participation in the protest provided to active cooperation among civil activists from the whole country and different levels and fields of working. The Euromaidan was a horizontal broad civil movement that brought together creative people with one aim – change the country. That’s why after Revolution won and Yanukowych fled a big part of the activists have continued to cooperate.

*Over the course of one month, post-Maidan civic organizations – in the face of inaction on the part of the state – counteracted the separatist movements, kept the streets safe, put pressure on political groups with demands for lustration, and fought against Kremlin propaganda in Ukraine and all over the world. All this happened without state financing and outside of any legal system. New civic organizations saved Ukraine in the spring of 2014, when they took responsibility for fulfilling the basic tasks of a state and lent credence to the new party system, which was still embryonic at that time.*¹⁰

Despite some negative practice of the social self-organization (like rare uncontrolled military volunteer association) which is inevitably during the war, in general, civil movement in Ukraine was further gaining strength. A group of journalist and activists got into parliament.¹¹ Other activists started working in presidential and governmental structures. Mikheil Saakashvili joined new

⁹ Snyder Timothy, *Edge of Europe, End of Europe*, The New York Review of Books, 21.07.2015; Available at: <http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/07/21/ukraine-kharkiv-edge-of-europe/>

¹⁰ Mykhaylo Minakov Ivan Kolodiy *Ukrainian Sovereignty between Civic Activism and Oligarchic Renaissance*. Krytyka Magazine. March 2015; Available at: <http://krytyka.com/en/articles/ukrainian-sovereignty-between-civic-activism-and-oligarchic-renaissance?page=2>

¹¹ War Heroes, Activists to Shape New-look Ukraine Parliament. Voice of America. 21.10. 2014; Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-war-heroes-and-activists-to-shape-new-look-ukraine-parliament/2490977.html>

people in Odessa region. All of these are the evidences that social movement is still present in Ukraine and has leverages on the political process.

These leverages are still being very influenced because of the state condition. After the revolution and war Ukrainian institutions are still very weak. In 2014 Ukraine was on the fourth place in crony-capitalist index and strength of institutions in the state was 2 points, what means one of the weakest institutional strength in the world¹² (to compare Germany has 19, Turkey 12, Poland 8.)

Other active players in Ukrainian political process are oligarchic groups. When the state is weak huge economic groups influence it. The oligarchs have their own political party and ministers. So, the political process in Ukraine is hugely defined by civil society and oligarchic groups. One important feature – oligarchs influence economy, but civil society responsible for democracy. As we have mentioned before, foreign policy in Ukraine connects with democracy issues. So, any international move of Ukrainian politicians is studied precisely. Civil society is pushing Ukrainian authority to EU-integration.

Now the term of “The Crisis in Ukraine” should be defined.¹³ We treated the crisis in Ukraine as a chain of events which consists of the Ukrainian revolution in winter 2013-2014, the Crimea annexation in 2014, the war in Eastern Ukraine and other developments that related to foreign and domestic policies of Ukraine and others actors of the crisis. It began in summer 2013 when Russia has protested Ukrainian and EU intentions to sign the Free Trade Association Agreement. In November 2013 Viktor Yanukowych has resigned to sign the agreement. Immediately the protests named “The Euromaidan” has sparked in the center of Kyiv. Tensions on the streets grew and it turned into

¹²Planet Plutocrat. Crony-capitalism index. The Economist Newspaper. 15.03. 2014; Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21599041-countries-where-politically-connected-businessmen-are-most-likely-prosper-planet>

¹³ Because of complexity of the term “the crisis in Ukraine” we are distinguishing definitions: “the crisis in Ukraine” and “the Ukrainian crisis.” In the first case we talk about general international crisis with the West-Russia confrontation. By “the Ukrainian crisis” we mean domestic issues in Ukraine that are more narrow, but important in terms of the solution of the international crisis.

violence from the authority. At the end of February 2014 more than 100 unarmed people were killed by police.¹⁴

Viktor Yanukowych has escaped to Russia. Ukrainian parliament appointed the date of a new presidential elections and created new pro-European government. Simultaneously, Russian troops without any recognition marks have occupied main government buildings of the Crimea. They have provided the referendum where absolute majority vote for annexation the Crimea to Russia appeared. The West defined the referendum as illegal. On 20th of March Russian parliament has approved the annexation. All these events have provoked the first big economic sanction's wave against Russia. Further Russian troops without recognitions marks have appeared in the eastern Ukrainian region the Donbas. They initiated referendum like in Crimea and proclaimed "DNR" (Donetsk People's Republic) and "LNR" (Luhansk People's Republic) independence. They have organized local people in militia groups. Russian officers have provided them with heavy arms and training. When a war has begun, Russian army helped them directly in the battles with Ukrainian Army. The war, the downed Boing, the Russian threats and demonstrative military manures near EU borders have provoked other wave of Western sanctions against Russia. More painful for Russia, and for the West too.

Now the regulation of the conflict is in the Minsk agreement framework. Crisis in Ukraine still is one of the most serious challenges for international community today. The term "New Cold War" quite often is faced in mass media, scientific journals or variety reports of think tanks. Economic sanctions against Russia stay unflappable. The "Normandy Four" summits with Petro

¹⁴ More about the crisis in Ukraine see: Rokita Zbigniew, Majadan: Odsłona Trzecia, Nowa Europa Wschodnia, 2014; Available at: <http://www.new.org.pl/1665.post.html>; Darden Keith, Ukraine's Crisis of Legitimacy, Foreign Affairs, 3.03. 2014; Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-03/ukraines-crisis-legitimacy>; Hammer and scythe, The Economist, 20.03.2014; Available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/03/daily-chart-15>; Kramer E. Andrew and Gordon R. Michael, Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front, The New Yourk Times, 27.08.2014; Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-novoazovsk-crimea.html?_r=0; Nicks Denver, Russian Artillery Units Are Firing at Ukrainian Soldiers, NATO Says, TIME, 22.08. 2014; Available at: <http://time.com/3160900/nato-russia-artillery-ukraine/>

Poroshenko, Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande and Vladimir Putin are taking place regularly.¹⁵

All mentioned developments indicate the crisis in Ukraine as multidimensional as we have already noted. There is an international level where the main actors are Russia and the West. There is a Russian-Ukrainian level which involves two countries with all political, economic, historical bilateral problems. Also, there is Ukrainian domestic level with internal issues like social and cultural heterogeneity, political and economic crises. This Ukrainian internal level of the crisis will be described more precisely further, as we believe that other dimensions and levels can't be solved without solving the domestic level of the Ukrainian crisis. We can also see at least three participants of the crisis. In Ukraine, Russia has broken an international law by war and illegal annexation, so now EU involve into the process of law reviving and peacemaking on the EU borders. Simultaneously the US is involved as guarantor of Ukrainian security according to Budapest memorandum.¹⁶ So Ukraine, Russia and the West are three main actors of the crisis.

That is why the consequences of the crisis are not only about Ukraine. Andreas Ulmand in the article "The Global Impact of the "Ukraine Crisis": Russia's Decline and Euro-Asiatic Security in the Early 21st Century" wrote about international character of the crisis:

"The supra-regional, if not transcontinental corollaries of the "Ukraine Crisis" are not so much – or even not at all – about Ukraine. Rather, they influence Russian domestic affairs, Kremlin foreign policy, and their international repercussions. They concern, first, international efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They, secondly, question the sustainability of Russia's current regime and darken the general prospects of the

¹⁵ Nikolay Pakhomov, Why the 'Normandy Four' Summit Is a Big Deal for Ukraine. The National Interest. September 25, 2015; Available at: <http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-normandy-four-summit-big-deal-ukraine-13930>

¹⁶ Pifer Steven, The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control Series (Brookings, May 2011) Available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/05/trilateral-process-pifer>

Russian post-Soviet multi-national state. They, thirdly, worsen the prospects of pan-European cooperation and association across the Earth's northern hemisphere, in the new century."¹⁷

In sum, we can see broad set of issues which have interdependence, with an internal logic and an international influence. Every actor has own reasons, tactic and strategy. Their agencies are correlated with internal domestic nature of the actors and international structure (context).

Liberal approach to the Crisis in Ukraine

Articles in scientific journals, academic debates and media show that there are three main theoretical approaches for analysis of the crisis in Ukraine.¹⁸ First, there is the realist approach. The second is liberal one. The third is something that one could name a constructivist approach. These approaches has mirrored in the political positions of the actors.

If we take the main pillars of a theory and compare them with rhetoric of politicians and opinion leaders we can distinguish theoretical frames in which actors operate. Hence the rhetoric of political leaders and states actions point on the theoretical doctrine of IR in which they exist. For instance, liberalism is "currently guiding the world response to the crisis."¹⁹ Instead, Russia is guided by opposed theoretical attitude: political realism. John Mearsheimer in his controversial assay argued that "logic of realism" is still important and "realpolitik remains relevant" in the case of the Ukrainian crisis.²⁰

Liberalism became the most influenced international relations theory after the end of Cold War. From that time advantages of capitalism and democracy in

¹⁷ Andreas Umland The Global Impact of the "Ukraine Crisis": Russia's Decline and Euro-Asiatic Security in the Early 21st Century. Krytyka magazine. June 2015; Available at: <http://krytyka.com/en/articles/global-impact-ukraine-crisis-russias-decline-and-euro-asiatic-security-early-21st-century>

¹⁸ The neoconservative vision (Robert Kagan, Joshua Muravchik) is the fourth important approach especially in the USA. At the same time, the neocon ideas have no big influence among the decision makers today. So, because of space limitation we do not analyze neoconservatism in the article.

¹⁹ Spencer Christopher, Ukraine Crisis: The Theories Involved, 5.03. 2014; Available at: <http://guardianlv.com/2014/03/ukraine-crisis-the-theories-involved/>

²⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault. The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs. ESSAY September/October 2014 Issue; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>

the West world were rarely questioned. The influence of the theory became interdependent in academic and political fields. Politicians were constructing new free economic areas. Military thought about NATO enlargement. Scholars have been justifying democratic movement and initiatives.

Liberal tradition of international relations has three pillars. First, it argues that trade is one of the most important determinants of international relations. The supporters of this paradigm believe that capitalism and free market create a unique space of cooperation among states. Second, it is democracy. The idea of common benefits from democratization based on the conviction that democratic countries rather would be seek opportunity to cooperate for finding solution of a problem. There is the democratic peace theory within this idea. The theory argues that probability of the war between two democratic states is very low.²¹ Third pillar of the liberal theory is the international law. Liberals see the international law as a safeguard that can guarantee some comparative order in the anarchic world.

Liberalism has deep roots in the Western political practices, so it is no surprise that liberal standards reflected in the politicians' behavior. In the crisis in Ukraine the West strongly stands on the liberal position. It uses the market tools to influence a violator of the international law. Serious economic sanctions against Russia were imposed. These steps are painful for the West as well as for Russia. In Europe, especially in Germany the business community is pressing on the government. They demand to revive the economic cooperation with Russia. Despite that the position of Berlin is unshakable. Russia has broken the international law (the corestone of liberalism) by Crimea annexation, so it must be punished for that. But there is always room for reconciliation. If Russia implements the Minsk Agreement, sanctions would be lift.

²¹ Wiśniewski Bartosz, *Teoria demokratycznego pokoju*, . *Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych* / red. nauk. Ryszard Zięba, Stanisław Bieleń, Justyna Zajac ; Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych. Warszawa : Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych. Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2015. S. 52

Wolfgang Ischinger, former German diplomat and the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference has offered a comprehensive strategy for western decision makers in term of liberal views. It seems that the EU is moving in this informal road map. Ischinger sees two main problems threaten Ukraine today. First, war and territory separation. Second, it is the economic collapse. In order to avoid these threats, the cooperation among decision makers inside and outside Ukraine is necessary. Professor Ischinger sees four steps which have to be done for the crisis solution.

First, EU should “put in place more credible and capable defense policy.”²²

Second, International financial assistance to Ukraine should be increased. Third, international community has to support EU aspiration of young Ukrainians. For instance, be more active in the visa-free program. Fourth, the West should start “to begin to bring Russia out of the cold” which means assurance of non-NATO membership for Ukraine and alternative format of G-8 where Russia will have a place.

*“To start, the dispute over Ukraine's prospects of joining NATO must be definitively settled. After all, the question of whether to admit Ukraine into NATO has already essentially been answered in the negative in many European capitals. The EU could, while offering increased assistance, encourage Ukraine to redefine itself as a bridge between East and West — as Finland, Austria, and even Switzerland have done in the past.”*²³

All the points mentioned above more or less can be found in the speeches of the western politicians.²⁴ In brief: economic assistance to Ukraine – yes; military means – no; cooperation with Russia – yes; confrontation – no, even if Russia behaves aggressively.

²² Ischinger Wolfgang, Saving Ukraine, Project Syndicate. 2.07. 2015; <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-russia-solution-cooperation-osce-by-wolfgang-ischinger-2015-07>

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ukraine Crisis. There can be no military solution to the conflict, The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 2.02.2015
https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2015/02_en/2015-01-28-ukraine-eu_en.html

Strengths: the strategy is rational. Actually, liberalists believe in rational human behavior. And on these believes the strategy of the West is built on. If trade and market is the answer, so we have to bargain. Ukraine should be democratic, capitalistic and pro-European. It will be better for security of Europe. For that purpose financial assistance and grants should be increased. Simultaneously, any military actions don't even presume. "There is no military solution to the crisis in Ukraine"²⁵ – is the most popular position among the West's politicians. Paradoxically but rationalism simultaneously is a strength and a weakness of the strategy.

Weaknesses: Andrew Wilson indicates seven reasons ("deadly sins") why EU misunderstands the crisis in Ukraine. And most of them are determined by looking on the problem from one, European point of view, while the problem requires multidimensional approaches. He argued that bureaucratism can't be the answer in the Eastern Neighborhood policy because of the nature of the post-soviet political structure: "the rules-based approach of the Eastern Partnership is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of how post-Soviet societies work. They are anti-Weberian."²⁶ Other problem is Mercantilism in EU's policy. The primacy of economy in the EU's analysis of situation leads EU to wrong conclusions. If one wants to fix the problem, politics should be on the first place, not economy. "If politics would be wrong – economic would be suffer."²⁷

Wilson described also three main techniques that are used by Russian propaganda for constructing "right" agenda for EU's media: "what-about-ism" (we can't criticize Russia, because the West does the same), "An aversion to moral clarity" (the truth is in the middle), "It's-all-our-fault-ism" (the West has

²⁵ Mogherini: Ukraine crisis has no military solution, Kyiv Post, 07.10.2014
<http://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine/federica-mogherini-ukraine-crisis-has-no-military-solution-367167.html>

²⁶ Andrew Wilson. Europe's Seven Deadly Sins Or, seven reasons why Europe gets the Russia-Ukraine crisis wrong, Transitions Online: Regional Intelligence, 2.06. 2015; Available at:
<http://www.tol.org/client/article/24820-europes-seven-deadly-sins.html>

²⁷ Ibid.

provoked Russia.)²⁸ Other weakness of the Western approach lies on the field of understanding Russia.

*“There is no critical analysis, just the constant refrain of how we must listen to Russia’s worries, interests, and legitimate concerns, and assuage its supposed psychology of “humiliation.” All are treated as objective givens... But the real problem is that both supposed Russian national interests and tropes like “humiliation” are not objective givens but are the product of Russia’s political technology propaganda machine. Tropes like “Russia has been humiliated,” “Russia is surrounded by enemies,” “The West destroyed the USSR” – none of these is really true... Russia is a propaganda state or “political technology” state. Its day-to-day diet is myth. Its foreign policy is full of dubious assertions and fake facts, such as the current process of “reassuring” Russia over entirely spurious objections to the trade agreement with Ukraine. Our problem in the West is therefore not just classic appeasement. Nor is it even that we have internalized so much of Russia’s agenda. It is that we do not understand the nature of that agenda, and the modus operandi that generates it.”*²⁹

Opportunities. The opportunities of the approach have derived from its flexibility. By denying the “military solution” the Western politicians leave the wiggle room for possible compromise with Russia. Moscow hints that the Crimea could be this compromise.³⁰ One of the biggest challenges for European politicians today is the choice between economic cooperation and international law. It also should be noted, that the sanctions which are multiplied by the low oil prices turned to be really effective. But it is short time solution. An efficiency of the strategy depends on energy market conjuncture. Other big

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Andrew Wilson. Europe’s Seven Deadly Sins Or, seven reasons why Europe gets the Russia-Ukraine crisis wrong, Transitions Online: Regional Intelligence, 2.06. 2015; Available at: <http://www.tol.org/client/article/24820-europes-seven-deadly-sins.html>

³⁰ Lebedev Alexander , Inozemtsev Vladislav, Russia and the West need a compromise over the Crimea, Independent, 8.11. 2014; Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/russia-and-the-west-need-a-compromise-over-the-crimea-9848221.html>

opportunities lie in the negotiation's dimension. Two main formats: Normand and Minsk have been established. Within these formats parties have direct communication that is very important in a case of military conflicts. At least, it was settled two periods of ceasefire. One of them is effective till today. During the periods of ceasefire Ukraine with western assistance can build on military and economic capability.

Threats. The middle term rationality determines new frozen conflict and visibility of stability. Minsk protocol cannot be completed. Ukrainian Parliament wouldn't vote for Constitutional amendments regarding autonomy of the separatists' districts. Separatists' leaders and Russian curators don't give up the border under Ukrainian control. This is the deadlock. As the result, we will get two new (the Donbas and the Crimea) relatively frozen armed conflicts. It would be a threaten not only for Ukraine but for the whole continent. Especially if we look at it in a broader context we would see a range of artificially frozen conflicts from the Transnistria through the Donbass to the Nagorno-Karabakh which can catch fire according to political directives from Moscow.

Realist approach to the crisis in Ukraine

The doctrine of realism has few key assumptions. Realists see the international structure as anarchy. In this world, there is no power that can guarantee an order. The main actors of this struggle are independent states. They contest for the security, so struggle and conflicts lie in the nature of the international relations. Realists argue that the power and the military capabilities are the most important in term of international relation. Realists don't pay much attention to the agency of middle-power states. According to the realist doctrine, the main roles in the international arena are played by super-powers and great powers. They shape the international relations on the way of seeking their security. In the states where realism is prevailing doctrine of foreign policy the main role usually is played by the leader of the state. President or other legitimate leader interpreted aims of foreign policy according to national

interests. If liberalists put the international law on the first place, realists, on the other hand, have the national interest as leading determinant of their foreign policy.

As we have already noted Russia and their leaders are leading by the logic of realism. Probably that is why most of the articles and researches based on the “realpolitik” point of view consider Russia as the most important actor of analysis.³¹ In general, they argue that we cannot blame Russia as the main reason of the crisis. The West and Ukraine are more responsible because they provoked Moscow.

John Mearsheimer’s popular article “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault” is one of a classical example of the realist evaluation of this crisis. He tries to see the structure of the post-Cold war world looking through the Russian’s glasses. It seems that he precisely has described Kremlin’s point of view or at least declarative part of the point. Mearsheimer argued that “the taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement” which is the “central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West.”³² Professor wrote that three main reasons create the crisis: NATO enlargement, EU expansion, democracy promotion.³³

These points of view are correlating with Vladimir Putin’s words that he said about Crimea annexation. In 2014 Putin explained “Our decision on Crimea was partly due to ... considerations that if we do nothing, then at some point,

³¹ Kanet E. Roger, The failed Western challenge to Russia’s revival in Eurasia? *International Politics* (2015) 52, 503–522. p. 506; Walt M. Stephen, Would You Die for That Country? *Foreign Policy* 24.03.2014; Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/24/would-you-die-for-that-country/>; Mearsheimer J. John, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014; Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>; Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end, *The Washington Post*, 5.03.2014; Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html

³² Mearsheimer J. John, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014; Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>

³³ Ibid.

guided by the same principles, NATO will drag Ukraine in and they will say: 'It doesn't have anything to do with you.'³⁴

Mearsheimer agreed that mentioned by Vladimir Putin factors have provoked Russia to act in aggressive matter. That's how Moscow shows to the world that it won't tolerate any West's move eastward. Russia is going to use any energetic, economic and military resources for political strategy and it demonstrates that.

Roger E. Kanet also sees the source of the conflict in the term of the Western-Russian rivalry.

*"The West was committed to pushing Russia, and the other post-Soviet states, in the direction of democratic political system and capitalists economic institutions that would be fully integrated into existing western institutions. President Putin and his supporters in Moscow were increasingly committed to a nationalist agenda that would re-establish Russia's dominate role in its near neighbourhood and equality in the international system. These two policy orientations came into increasing conflict..."*³⁵

John Mearshaemer has proposed his solution of the crisis that can be regarded like a brief position of realists in this conflict. He claimed that the West could continue scenario of hostility with Russia that would devastate Ukraine. In this case everyone would lose.

*"Or they (The United States and its European allies – I.O) can switch gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that does not threaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win."*³⁶

³⁴ Putin says annexation of Crimea partly a response to NATO enlargement. Reuters. 17.04.2014; Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/17/us-russia-putin-nato-idUSBREA3G22A20140417>

³⁵ Kanet E. Roger, The failed Western challenge to Russia's revival in Eurasia? *International Politics* (2015) 52, 503–522. p. 506

³⁶ Mearsheimer J. John, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014; Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>

Strengths of the realists' approach stem from their pragmatism. They consider security and relationship of the powerful actors as a core issue of the conflict. Any risks that could jeopardize relations among great powers should be reduced. Especially, if these risks stem from the weak state that one country considers as own sphere of influence. This logic is guided by a fear of the new World War that could spark as a result of the great powers clash. Realists are not bounded by primacy of the international law, so they could construct the scenario of the crisis resolving relying on their understanding a nature of international relations. That provides simplicity and logic of the approach. That provides its strength and attractiveness.

Weaknesses. There are few critical points in mentioned realist positions which should be distinct. Initially, almost in all cases of the realist analysis of the crisis in Ukraine we haven't seen Ukrainian perspectives. We have not seen the position of Ukrainian government and vox populi. Sometimes there are the geopolitical position of Ukraine and its military and economic capabilities. The reason is simple as Walt puts it "Russia is the more important country."³⁷ In some respect it is normal within the realism doctrine because for realists only power really matters and should be evaluated. So they pay attention to Russia as more powerful actor of the crisis. But it is not appropriate for analysis the crisis in general especially when one intent to propose a solution. Alexandr Motyl selects three main "reasons why realism is irrelevant in the conflict."³⁸ First is the crisis is more about "important domestic developments within Ukraine and Russia."³⁹ Instead realists evaluate the conflict like ongoing war between two states. Second is that realists don't seriously take into consideration ideology, culture, believes, history, but pay all

³⁷ Walt M. Stephen, Would You Die for That Country? Foreign Policy 24.03.2014; Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/24/would-you-die-for-that-country/>

³⁸ Motyl J. Alexander, The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine, World Affairs, January/February 2015; Available at: <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/surrealism-realism-misreading-war-ukraine>

³⁹ Ibid.

attention to interests of the states. Third, states and their leaders don't always act rationally as realists assume.⁴⁰

There are empirical examples that make realist's argumentation weaker. Vladimir Putin explained that Russia has annexed Crimea because of NATO enlargement. A lot of scholars have agreed with him. But in Russia-Ukrainian relations there have already occurred tensions because of Crimea. In the first part of 90s the Crimea has broad autonomy. The peninsula has its own constitution and post of president. In 1994 there was the presidential election. Yuriy Meszkow had won. He was representative of the "Russia block". The Parliament in Simferopol "appealing to President Boris N. Yeltsin of Russia to back it in its dispute with the Ukrainian authorities."⁴¹ The developments were so fast that Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma sent the troops to Crimea and deleted the post of president. As we know in 1994 there wasn't any NATO enlargement and Russian minority in Ukraine lived without concerns for their national identity. In fact, President L. Kuchma won the elections as a pro-Russian candidate.

In 2003 there was another conflict over Tuzla Island near the Crimea. This conflict also provoked Ukrainian military activity. Ukrainian border guard had blocked Russian constructions in the Kerch Strait.⁴² There was big risk of military escalating and full-blow crisis.

These two examples show us two main points in Russian-Ukrainian relations. First, NATO enlargement doesn't play the main role in Russian aspirations over the Crimea. Second, in 2003 during the Tuzla conflict, Ukraine has pro-Russian president and government. These two examples show that Russian arguments about "NATO enlargement" and "threats of Russian minority" simple don't work. The Orange Revolution didn't occur yet, NATO wasn't enlarged, but Russia already has questioned Ukraine's sovereignty.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ukraine Moves To Oust Leader Of Separatists. NYT. 19.03.1995; Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/19/world/ukraine-moves-to-oust-leader-of-separatists.html>

⁴² Roman Woronowycz. Russian-Ukrainian dispute over Tuzla escalates. The Ukrainian Weekly, October 26, 2003, No. 43, Vol. LXXI; Available at: <http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/2003/430301.shtml>

Opportunities. Within this approach we probably would be able to understand and predict more some aspects of Russian foreign policy behavior. Power, security, imperialist ambitions, and internal determinants are frames which could give us broader understanding of Russian foreign policy. Looking through realpolitik lens we can see that economic benefits are inferior to geopolitical concerns. It is really important regarding EU-Russian reciprocal understanding.

Threats. The main hazard of the realists approach to the crisis in Ukraine would concern the propositions of crisis solution. Every few years we can see new war with similar patterns in the area which Russia treats as its sphere of influence. If the world does not pay attention to the Russian backyard (as realists call on) this strategy will continue. Ukraine could be annexed slice by slice. Further could be Kazakhstan, Belarus or some NATO-members. Another huge issue is a nonproliferation regime. It should be mentioned that Ukraine gave up more than 1 thousand of nuclear missiles. In exchange Kyiv got the security guarantees. If these guarantees would not be supported by deeds, it could lead to nonproliferation crisis. After all, who would believe in some new security guarantees?

Constructivist approach to the Crisis in Ukraine

Constructivism concerns about culture, identity, values and believes as main determinants of foreign policy. In some aspects constructivism is an alternative worldview to rational theories like realism or liberalism. Supporters of constructivism argued that reality is relative. Simply put: what is important to one state or society, not necessary will be important to others. "It all depends on how states and societies define their ends and apply means to achieve those ends. If culture is the basis of means and ends, then we can expect to see very different ideas of "rationality" around the world."⁴³ Within this theory, different non-state actors like NGOs or international institutions have played not the last role in the creating of foreign policy. It is proved that states change their

⁴³ Ferrero J. Christopher, Constructivism & US-Iran Relations. US-Iran-Relations.com. Available at: <http://us-iran-relations.com/wordpress/theory-us-iran-relations/constructivism-us-iran-relations/>

attitude to some war tools usage like land mines because of the influence of “rhetoric or other forms of lobbying, persuasion, and shaming”⁴⁴ from internal and international NGOs.

Like in the previous case there are many different approaches to the crisis in term of the constructivism. Some are completely polarized. For instance in 2015 Russian Institute for Strategic Studies printed the book titled “Ukraine – is Russia.”⁴⁵ Ideological concepts that are constructing in this institute lie on the field of identity and beliefs. Probably the biggest part of Russian propaganda machine works to promote the “Russian World” concept like new geopolitical reorganization. It is comprehended constructivist concept in the service of neo imperialism doctrine. The solution proposed by this concept is simple. There are not any Ukrainians. There are Russians who have forgotten their roots. When they come back home (to Russia), they will remember. This kind of project has a small value for us because it is the propaganda product without any scientific base.

There is not one point of view on the crisis among the Western analytics. The answers for the issue vary and could be described by name of the Ben Judah’s article: “Arm Ukraine or Surrender.”⁴⁶ Probably the most comprehensive receipt of solution of the crisis in Ukraine in regard of identity issues and values was proposed by famous philanthropist Gorge Soros who knows Ukrainian internal situation very good. In his essay “Ukraine and Europe: What should be done” printed in The New York Review of Books he wrote:

The only way to prove Putin wrong is by establishing a better balance between sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine. My “winning strategy” advocates effective financial assistance to Ukraine, which would combine large-scale budgetary support with

⁴⁴ Slaughter Anne-Marie, International Relations, Principal Theories Wolfrum, R. (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) Available at: https://www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf

⁴⁵ Смолина М.Б., Украина – это Россия [Ukraine is Russia], Российский институт стратегических исследований, 2015; Available at: <http://riss.ru/bookstore/series/ukraina-eto-rossiya/>

⁴⁶ Judah Ben, Arm Ukraine or Surrender, The New York Times 1.09. 2014; Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/opinion/arm-ukraine-or-surrender.html?_r=0

*affordable political risk insurance, along with other incentives for the private sector... By doing "whatever it takes" to enable the new Ukraine not only to survive but to flourish, the European Union would achieve a dual objective: it would protect itself from Putin's Russia and it would recapture the spirit of cooperation and solidarity that used to fire people's imagination in its early days.*⁴⁷

Soros argues that EU should consider economic assistance to Ukraine as defense expenditure. He elaborates "winning strategy" for the EU and Ukraine. Soros admits that Ukraine can't regain occupied territories in short perspective. In return Ukraine should maintain its moral and political integrity. EU shouldn't push the Ukrainian leaders with the Minsk issues, but has to promise "to do "whatever it takes" to help the new Ukraine to succeed."⁴⁸

Strengths. One of the main strengths of the constructivist approach is a multi-perspective analysis. The analysis sees the crisis from the Ukrainian point of view in contrast to the two previous approaches. Simultaneously the EU and Russian outlooks are included too. Soros is familiar with internal situation in Ukraine and in Russia. He understands the nature of post-soviet elites. He has also elaborated the plan that bypasses the biggest risks like recapturing territory or NATO-integration. In return, he calls for Ukrainian moral and political integrity, reforms and for "whatever it takes" assistance of the EU.

Weaknesses. The biggest weakness of this approach stems from its nature. There are no incontestable evidences that "new Ukraine" has appeared. Just because only few years have passed we can't understand if the reforms what have been done are irreversible. The history of the Orange revolution only strengthens the doubts. To apply the strategy the decision-makers should believe in winning. But it's not surprise, after all constructivists pay big attention to beliefs and hopes.

⁴⁷ Soros George, Ukraine & Europe: What Should Be Done? The New York Review of Books, 8.10.2015; Available at: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/oct/08/ukraine-europe-what-should-be-done/>

⁴⁸ Ibid.

Opportunities. This scenario foresees resolving the Ukrainian crisis (internal crisis in Ukraine) as the first step to resolving the crisis in Ukraine (international crisis). As it was reported before the solution included Ukrainian membership in the EU and new state with rule of law and democracy. There isn't any wiggle room for Ukraine as a buffer state. It is impossible because of Russia's attitude towards its neighbors. We have mentioned above that Ukraine has very low institutional strength. Main engine which determined foreign policy is the civil society. This society rose up with EU partners and believes in EU values. Simply EU's soft power has won in Ukraine. Hence any compromises that concern identity and international place of Ukraine can't be discussed. Ukrainian civil society has been taught during 25 year that values are more important than political circumstances. And "successful guys" from the West were the teachers.

Now if Ukraine doesn't get perspective of EU membership, there will be social frustration that involves 45 million people. It is hard to predict further developments, but permanent arm conflicts would be more than possible. After two years of war Ukrainian fertile soil is comfortable for far right nationalists who only wait for the Euro-integration activity fall. Visible the EU membership opportunity to Ukraine is as necessary, as well a financial assistance. Otherwise war, refugees and new fail state will be on the border of the EU. Or Russian backed forces will recapture the power and in few years new Soviet Union will rise. So, the choice is between resolving and deepening the crisis and constructivists see it very clearly.

Threats. The main threats of the constructivist approach are economic risks. The solution foresees big economic assistance from the West, so the failure would be measured by billions. Another risk regards reputation of the West as a democracy promoter. Ukraine was an unpredictable partner. If Kyiv suddenly changed foreign policy direction, it would be ponderable punch on the Western image (not to mention the image of Ukraine.)

TABLE 1. Outlook on the crisis through the different approaches

Features / Approaches	Liberal approach to crisis	Realist approach to crisis	Constructivist approach to crisis
Representatives of the approach	Ischinger Wolfgang, Federica Mogherini	Kissinger Henry, Mearsheimer J. John	Motyl J. Alexander, Soros George
The main concepts	Economic statecraft, cooperation, international law	Power, security, sphere of influences	Identity, values, civil society
Reasons of the crisis	Russia misunderstanding the West's policy in Eastern Europe and took it like a threat	NATO enlargement, EU expansion, USA dominance, and humiliation of Russia	The Ukrainians changed civilization and foreign policy vector
The status of Russia	Difficult and gross partner	Rational actor who protects his interests	Provocative of a new Ukrainian identity
The status of Ukraine	Weak partner	Sphere of influence	Central place in the crisis
The status of the Wests	Rational peacemaker	Rival	Beacon and donor
The proposed solution	Limited financial assistance to Ukraine and cooperation with Russia. Neutrality of Ukraine.	To recognize the right of a stronger partner to renew sphere of influence. Ukraine a buffer state.	The EU-Ukraine integration and modernization of a state.
Strengths	Flexible and secure	Pragmatic	Comprehensive and consequent
Weaknesses	Underestimated irrational factors	Underestimated irrational factors	Overestimated irrational factors which can't be measured
Opportunities	Permanent communication among parties of the conflict	Understanding of Russian behavior (limited)	Possibility to solve internal crisis in Ukraine
Threats	The unstable frozen conflict	The unstable frozen conflict	Economic and reputational losses

Conclusion:

The crisis in Ukraine includes three main actors: the West, Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, we could consider it as the international. The crisis is developing on the three different levels simultaneously. There is internal Ukrainian level (the Ukrainian crisis.) International levels include Russia-Ukraine conflict and West-Russia hostility (the crisis in Ukraine.)

As the conflict has the unusual scope it isn't surprising there is a broad range of different political and analytical approaches to the crisis. We have selected three general approaches and have classified them with regard to the main concepts. The liberal, the realist and the constructivist approaches have been selected. Everyone has the strategy of the crisis evaluation and everyone has proposed a solution to the crisis.

The analysis indicates that every approach has worked out a strategy toward the crisis in Ukraine. It is hard to forecast which strategy is better because the crisis resolution has not occurred yet. So, all assumptions about better strategy can't be measured empirically. Instead we can evaluate preferences and risks of the approaches. For that purpose we evaluate them within a SWOT-analysis method.

We have selected strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of every strategy. The general comparison of the strategies points out that every approach has a comprehensive view on the subject. Everyone has proposed the solution. The liberal strategy sees Ukraine as neutral and Russia as a partner. The realist strategy sees Ukraine as a buffer state in the Russia's sphere of influence. Nevertheless the rational approaches have misunderstood intents and irrational behavior of the post-soviet states. The constructivist approach assumes that the answer of the crisis in Ukraine is in the internal Ukrainian situation. This leads us to the conclusion, that constructivist strategy is more suitable and effective for resolving the crisis in Ukraine. So to say, through the internal to the international regulation.

References

- Bryc Agnieszka, Izrael 2020 skazany na potęgę?, Warszawa : Wydawnictwo Poltext, 2014, 268 s;
- Darden Keith, Ukraine's Crisis of Legitimacy, Foreign Affairs, 3.3. 2014, Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-03/ukraines-crisis-legitimacy>;
- Denver Nicks, Russian Artillery Units Are Firing at Ukrainian Soldiers, NATO Says, TIME, 22.08. 2014; Available at: <http://time.com/3160900/nato-russia-artillery-ukraine/>
- Ferrero J. Christopher, Constructivism & US-Iran Relations. US-Iran-Relations.com. Available at: <http://us-iran-relations.com/wordpress/theory-us-iran-relations/constructivism-us-iran-relations/>
- Foreign policy: theories, actors, cases / ed. by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne, 2nd ed., impression: 3.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p.543;
- Hammer and scythe, The Economist, 20.03. 2014, Available at: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/03/daily-chart-15>;
- Huntington, Samuel P. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. London : Touchstone Books, 1998.p. 538;
- Ischinger Wolfgang, Saving Ukraine. Project Syndicate. 2.07. 2015; Available at: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-russia-solution-cooperation-osce-by-wolfgang-ischinger-2015-07>
- Jackson Robert, Sørensen Georg, Wprowadzenie do stosunków międzynarodowych : teorie i kierunki badawcze; tł. Aleksandra Czwajdrak.Kraków : Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2006. s.360
- Judah Ben, Arm Ukraine or Surrender, The New York Times 1.09. 2014; Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/opinion/arm-ukraine-or-surrender.html?_r=0
- Kagan Robert, The return of history and the end of dreams, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008, p.115;
- Kanet E. Roger, The failed Western challenge to Russia's revival in Eurasia? International Politics (2015) 52, 503–522. p. 506
- Kissinger Henry: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end, The Washington Post, 5.03.2014; Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html

- Kramer E. Andrew and Gordon R. Michael, Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion on a New Front, *The New York Times*, 27.08.2014; Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-russia-novoazovsk-crimea.html?_r=0;
- Lebedev Alexander , Inozemtsev Vladislav, Russia and the West need a compromise over the Crimea, *Independent*, 8.11. 2014; Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/russia-and-the-west-need-a-compromise-over-the-crimea-9848221.html>
- Mearsheimer J. John, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014; Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>
- Mearsheimer J. John, *The tragedy of great power politics*, New York, London: W. W. Norton, 2001, p. 555;
- Minakov Mykhaylo, Kolodiy Ivan, Ukrainian Sovereignty between Civic Activism and Oligarchic Renaissance. *Krytyka Magazine*. March 2015; Available at: <http://krytyka.com/en/articles/ukrainian-sovereignty-between-civic-activism-and-oligarchic-renaissance?page=2>
- Mogherini: Ukraine crisis has no military solution, *Kyiv Post*, 07.10.2014; Available at: <http://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine/federica-mogherini-ukraine-crisis-has-no-military-solution-367167.html>
- Motyl J. Alexander, The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine, *World Affairs*, January/February 2015; Available at: <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/surrealism-realism-misreading-war-ukraine>
- Pakhomov Nikolay, Why the 'Normandy Four' Summit Is a Big Deal for Ukraine. *The National Interest*, 25. 09. 2015; Available at: <http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-normandy-four-summit-big-deal-ukraine-13930>
- Pifer Steven, *The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons*, Arms Control Series (Brookings, May 2011) Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2011/5/trilateral%20process%20pifer/05_trilateral_process_pifer.pdf.
- Planet Plutocrat. Crony-capitalism index. *The Economist* ,March 15th 2014; Available at: <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21599041-countries-where-politically-connected-businessmen-are-most-likely-prosper-planet>;
- Putin says annexation of Crimea partly a response to NATO enlargement. *Reuters*. 17.04.2014; Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/17/us-russia-putin-nato-idUSBREA3G22A20140417>
- Rokita Zbigniew, *Majadan: Odsłona Trzecia*, Nowa Europa Wschodnia, 2014; Available at: <http://www.new.org.pl/1665,post.html>
- Sergunin A., Konyshchev V., A SWOT Analysis of US-Russian Relations, *International Relations and Security Network* 27.01. 2016; Available at: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=195695>

- Slaughter Anne-Marie, International Relations, Principal Theories Wolfrum, R. (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) Available at: https://www.princeton.edu/~slaughttr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_20110509zG.pdf
- Soros George, Ukraine & Europe: What Should Be Done? The New York Review, 8.10.2015; Available at: <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/oct/08/ukraine-europe-what-should-be-done/>
- Spencer Christopher, Ukraine Crisis: The Theories Involved, 5.03. 2014; <http://guardianlv.com/2014/03/ukraine-crisis-the-theories-involved/>
- Ukraine Crisis. There can be no military solution to the conflict, The Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 2.02.2015 https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2015/02_en/2015-01-28-ukraine-eu_en.html
- Ukraine Moves To Oust Leader Of Separatists. NYT. 19.03.1995; <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/19/world/ukraine-moves-to-oust-leader-of-separatists.html>
- Umland Andreas, The Global Impact of the “Ukraine Crisis”: Russia’s Decline and Euro-Asiatic Security in the Early 21st Century. Krytyka magazine. June 2015; <http://krytyka.com/en/articles/global-impact-ukraine-crisis-russias-decline-and-euro-asiatic-security-early-21st-century>
- Walt M. Stephen, Would You Die for That Country? Foreign Policy 24.03.2014; Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/24/would-you-die-for-that-country/>
- War Heroes, Activists to Shape New-look Ukraine Parliament. Voice of America. October 21, 2014; Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-war-heroes-and-activists-to-shape-new-look-ukraine-parliament/2490977.html>
- Andrew Wilson. Europe’s Seven Deadly Sins Or, seven reasons why Europe gets the Russia-Ukraine crisis wrong, Transitions Online: Regional Intelligence, 2.06. 2015; Available at: <http://www.tol.org/client/article/24820-europes-seven-deadly-sins.html>
- Wiśniewski Bartosz, Teoria demokratycznego pokoju, . Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych / red. nauk. Ryszard Zięba, Stanisław Bieleń, Justyna Zajac ; Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych. Warszawa : Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych. Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2015. S. 52
- Woronowycz Roman, Russian-Ukrainian dispute over Tuzla escalates. The Ukrainian Weekly, October 26, 2003, No. 43, Vol. LXXI <http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/2003/430301.shtml>
- Грицак Ярослав. Євромайдан не мав би перемогти. [Yaroslav Hrytsak. Euromaidan wasn’t supposed to win], ZAXID.NET 11.09.15 Available at: http://zaxid.net/news/showNews.do?yevromaydan_ne_mav_bi_peremogti&objectId=1365158

Кулик Володимир, Дискурс українських медій: ідентичності, ідеології, владні стосунки, [Volodymyr Kulyk, The Ukrainian Media Discourse:

Identities, Ideologies, Power Relations], - "Критика", Київ - 2010, p. 656.

Про Основні напрями зовнішньої політики України [On the main directions of Ukrainian Foreign Policy], Постанова Верховної Ради України, Відомості Верховної Ради України (ВВР), 1993, N 37, ст.379 Available at: <http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3360-12>

Смолина М.Б., Украина – это Россия. [Smolina M.B., Ukraine is Russia]

Российский институт стратегических исследований. 2015 Available at: <http://riss.ru/bookstore/series/ukraina-eto-rossiya/>