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Table of Contents

Working papers

Andrzej Guzowski

ISIS – a Unifying Enemy?, p. 5

Abdulrahman Mnawar

Corruption and the “Arab spring”: As One of the Main Elements Leading to Revolutions, p. 24

Ayfer Alptekin

The Partitions Of Poland During The 18th Century And The Rejection Of The Ottoman Empire, p. 36

Reviews

Agata Poczmańska

Westeren K.I. (ed.), “Foundations of the Knowledge Economy. Innovation, Learning and Clusters”, p. 75

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The Partitions Of Poland During The 18th Century And The Rejection Of The Ottoman Empire

Abstract

The year 2014 marks the 600th anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish-Polish diplomatic relations.

The 600-year-old relations is not only an exceptional phenomenon for political history between Turkey (in time evaluating from the Turkish Principality to the Ottoman State, then to the Ottoman Empire) and Poland (similarly, from the Piast Kingdom to the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom, then to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), but also for the whole Europe as well. On the territories once was ruling the Ottoman Empire, today almost thirty independent states are established. Naturally, the historical, cultural and commercial relations of people living on those territories were inextricably entangled. Consequently, during long period of history Turks and Poles beside their civil relations, faced each other in military conflicts exogenously and endogenously. However, throughout history Turkish-Polish relations have based on strong bonds of 'friendship' and common vision of 'solidarity' in difficult times. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire never recognized the partitions of Poland. I stick to the label 'friendship'. Is it merely friendship, or balance of power or some other qualities in this relationship? This article is an attempt to offer a theoretical approach to these questions. I will argue these issues from the realist political perspective.

What is the political realism? Political realism having competitive and conflictual side, considers the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are primarily concerned with their own security, pursue their own national interests, and struggle for power.

Key words: *The partitions of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire, the friendship, the political realism, the balance of power*

Introduction

It is a unique example that two dynasties established in different continents one in Asia and the other in Europe far from each other, long after their emergence as two small principalities one settled in Bursa and the other in Cracow would become neighbours from the end of the 15th century.¹ The Ottoman state had emerged c.1300 in western Asia Minor, extending its territorial accretion, had expanded both west and east, defeating Byzantine, Serb, and Bulgarian kingdoms as well as Turkish nomadic principalities in Anatolia (Asia Minor) and the Mamluk Sultanate based in Egypt. By the seventeenth century possessing vast lands in west Asia, North Africa, and southeast Europe, in 1529 and again in 1683, Ottoman armies tried to conquer Habsburg Vienna. Ottoman forces, just a few days after had encircled Vienna, had been forced to flight from their camps by the central and east European allies, notably King John (Jan) Sobieski of Poland.² When King Sobieski encircling Ottoman armies and preventing the second Ottoman effort to seize Vienna, had not probably thought that he was preparing his own country's end being shared by his very European allies in the next century, and was depriving his country from the support of a friendly but unfortunately weakened empire after the second siege of Vienna, during his country's partition.

The Ottoman Empire had never recognised the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Is this approach of the Ottoman Empire based merely on the friendship between the two countries? Is it the balance of power? Or to what extent is friendship and to what extent is the balance of power? I will argue these issues from the realist point of view? Before I establish my hypothesis it would be useful to start by reviewing the history of the emergence of the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, their initial contacts and the turning points in their relations.

¹ Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish diplomatic relations (15th - 18th century): an annotated edition of 'ahdnames and other documents*, Brill Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2000, p. 99

² Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.25.

Looking Back

Turkish Origins

The Ottomans descended from the nomads in the area of the Altai Mountains, east of the Eurasian steppes and south of the Yenisei River and Lake Baikal in lands that today are part of Outer Mongolia.³

The area in which the Turcomans⁴ with their origins in central Asia, around Lake Baikal, began migrating out of their ancestral homes and, c.1000 CE started pouring into the Middle

East, had been part of the Roman Empire and its successor state in the Eastern Mediterranean world, the Byzantine Empire had ruled over virtually of today's Middle East (except Iran) – Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, north Africa, and Italy of today.

For the next several centuries, until the mid-fifteenth century, the Anatolia became the stage of struggle between Byzantine imperial and feudal lords and Turcomans having formed their own small states. In the short run, Anatolia was controlled alternatively by Byzantine, predominantly Greek speaking, and Turcoman principalities and states. In the long run, inexorably, Anatolia became Turkish speaking and Muslim. This chaotic environment stimulated the emergence of the Ottoman state.⁵

The rise of the Ottoman beylik is related to the developments in Anatolia in the second half of the thirteenth century during which the

³ Stanford Shaw, *History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808*, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.1

⁴ Historically, all the western of Oğuz (Oghuz) Turks have been called Turcoman. During the Ottoman Empire these nomads were known by the name of 'Yörük' which was used to describe their nomadic way of life, rather than ethnic origins. Other names such as 'konar-göçer', 'göçebe', 'göçer-yörük' were used and the most common one among these was 'konar-göçer'. Today, only 200 households Sarıkeçeli konar-göçer are living a nomadic life in İçel-Silifke-Gülman-Anamour during winter time and in the highlands of Seydişehir-Beyşehir-Konya during summer time. Hilmi Dulkadir, http://turkoloji.cu.edu.tr/CUKUROVA/sempozyum/semp_2/dulkadir.pdf, pg.143 and Cevdet Türkay, *Oymak Aşiret ve Cemaatlar, Tercüman Kaynak Eserler Dizisi 1*, pg. 143

⁵ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.16.

Mongol oppression continued to intensify in Central Anatolia. In 1299-1301, Osman and other Turcoman beys taking advantage of the weakening of Mongol control, launched an attack on Byzantine cities. Osman besieged Nicaea (İznik) and Prusa (Bursa), the two important strongholds of Byzantium in Bithynia. The battle of Bapheus (Koyunhisar) took place between Byzantine army and Osman's foot soldiers and cavalry in 27 July 1302, according to Pachymeres and to the Ottoman sources which are in agreement on the course and the date of battle. The victory of the battle Bapheus (Koyunhisar) over an imperial army of the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II brought Osman an immense reputation in Anatolia and enough charisma which was enough to make him to be the founder of a dynasty. Therefore, 27 July 1302 is accepted as the date of the formation of the Ottoman dynasty.⁶

After the collapse of Byzantine resistance, Ottoman state preferred to expand in western Anatolia and across the Dardanelles into Southeastern Europe, to the Ukrainian steppe and as far as the Danube, developing a system of rule by which the native Christian princes were supposed to retain their positions and lands in return for acknowledging Ottoman suzerainty and providing soldiers and money. At the end of the fourteen and the beginning of the fifteen centuries was the difficult period for the Ottoman Empire due to the new nomadic raid, led by Tamerlane, Timur, the lame. The Interregnum of the Ottoman Empire (1402-1413) started with the battle of Ankara which took place on July 27,1402. Tamerlane defeated the Ottoman army, and Sultan Bayezit fell captive. During the Interregnum the different elements of Ottoman society struggled for power. The rivalry for power among the Sultan Bayezit's sons appeared just after the defeat. Mehmet I (1413-1420) after his triumph over his brothers started to reorganize the internal problems of the Empire, and the restoration period started.⁷ During this restitution and reconstruction period of the Ottoman state Mehmet I, son of Beyazıt, became successful in establishing the order and peace after the destruction caused by the occupation of Tamerlane in 1402.

⁶ Halil İnalcık, *Foundation of the Ottoman State*, Yeni Türkiye Publications, the Turks 3-Ottomans, Ankara 2002, Editors: Hasan Celal Güzel and C.Cem Oğuz Osman Karatay, pg.46-53.

⁷ Shaw, *History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808*, Cambridge University Press , 1976, pg.12-17.

This was the period that the initial contacts started between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.⁸ According to Kołodziejczyk's explanation, one may infer that the direct contacts between the two countries started late due to the internal issues in both states:

Direct Polish-Ottoman relations were initiated after the delay caused by the battle of Ankara (1402) on the one hand, and the battle of Grunwald-Tannenberg (1410) on the other. After 1410 the danger posed by the Teutonic Order to Poland-Lithuania was removed, and the Ottomans managed to overcome the crises caused by the invasion of Tamerlane.

On the other hand according to Arık's explanation, although it is not known the exact date of the beginning of the Turkish-Polish relations, she is pointing out that the first encounters could be during the period of feudal fragmentation (1138-1288-1290) in Poland, at the battle of Legnica (Liegnitz) in 1241 with the Mongols named by Polish people as "cehennemden gelen Tartari (the scourge of God)", and afterwards during the further Mongol incursions in 1259-1260 and 1287-1288.⁹ The legacy of Mongols as two local customs have survived until today in Cracow. One, a rider in Mongol dress tours the streets on a hobby-horse on the eight day after Corpus Christi. Second, every hour, the trumpet call voice from the St. Mary's Church commemorates the death of the city watchman who was pierced through his throat by a Mongol arrow as he tried to raise the alarm.¹⁰ The same legend was narrated in the booklet "Lehistan'dan bugünkü Polonya'ya" published by the Polish Embassy in Ankara.¹¹

While the Ottoman Empire expanded its territories toward the West starting from 1300s, the Polish Kingdom annexed western Ruthenia (historical territory which corresponds Ukraine and Belarus) in the years 1340-1349. In order to explain the diplomatic relations between those

⁸ Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish diplomatic relations (15th -18th century): an annotated edition of 'ahdnames and other documents*, Brill Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2000, p. 99

⁹ Sabire Arık, *Kuruluşta XVII. Yüzyıla Polonya Tarihi*, KÖK Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Serisi: 20, Ankara, 2010, pg. 53-57 and 159-161.

¹⁰ Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland, Volume I: The Origins to 1795*, Columbia University Press, New York 1982, pg. 87

¹¹ Polonya Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, *Lehistan'dan bugünkü Polonya'ya*, Ankara, 2001, pg. 5

two countries in a better way, it would be logical to mention the historical background of Poland from the prehistory.

Prehistory

According to the findings of the contemporary Polish 'Autochthonous School', the territory of the Republic of Poland is regarded between the Oder and the Bug as the fixed and exclusive homeland of the early Slavs. According to non-Polish authorities, 'Lusatian Culture' of the Vistula Basin in the Iron Age is called Slavonic but the historical evidences are little to prove it. The name of Polska (Poland) appears on the beginning of the historic times in the tenth century.¹²

The Piast Kingdom

The documented history of Poland goes back to the 10th century. The first written reference to Mieszko I was made in a chronicle by Ibrahim-Ibn-Jakub, a Jewish-Arab merchant sent by Caliph al-Hakam II, as an envoy (960-966) to the Holy Roman Emperor Otto I.¹³ Davies quotes to Ibrahim-Ibn-Jakub fragments of his report (were known to later Arab geographers), citing "Relajca Ibrahim Jakuba z podrozy do krajow slowianski w przekladzie Al Bekriego, ed. T.Kowalski (Cracow,1946)" According to the fragments of his visit to the lands of Slavs, Ibrahim-Ibn-Jakub narrates about Mieszko as King of the North and gives some details about the life and cultural characteristic of Slavs.¹⁴

The same year that the Caliph's envoy visited Prague, and according to Davis, perhaps Cracow which was at that time within the kingdom of the Czech lands.¹⁵ Mieszko I betrothed the Czech King's daughter, Dubravka and, accepted Christianity as part of the marriage agreement, renouncing his ancestors' pagan religion. Mieszko was chief

¹² Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe-A short History of Poland*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, pg. 282-283

¹³ Agata S. Nalborczyk, *Islam in Poland. The Past and the Present*. Islamochristiana 32 (2006), Roma, pg. 225-226.

¹⁴ Norman Davies, *A History of Europe*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1966, pg. 325 and also Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland, Volume I: The Origins to 1795*, Columbia University Press, New York 1982, pg. 3

¹⁵ Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland, Volume I: The Origins to 1795*, Columbia University Press, New York 1982, pg. 3

of Polanians (Polanie), one of the numerous Slav tribes of the period. King Mieszko I is considered as a national hero who introduced his people with the western culture by choosing the Christian faith.¹⁶ The official adoption of Roman Catholic Christianity has big influence in modern Polish culture. The clergy gained big power on the rulers and its power also continued during the Piast princes' difficult time to rule the country.

During the Period of Fragmentation of Piast dynasty until 1320, Poland became the bastion of Catholicism in the East.¹⁷ The collapse of unification of the Piast dynasty opened the way for the Bohemian Przemyslid dynasty to rule Polish throne. By 1306 the last two members of Przemyslids were dead and Wladyslaw I Lokietek (Ladislas the Elbow-high, 1306-1333)'s successful attempt for consolidation of the kingdom started and with his coronation in 1320, the period of fragmentation ended.

During Kazimierz III Wielki's reign (Casimir the Great, 1339-1370) reign, with the conquest of Red Ruthenia (1349) and Podolia on the River Dniester Polish frontiers expanded until the paths of Black Sea coast. It is significant that the expansion of the Ottoman Empire towards the West starting from 1300s corresponds almost to the same period that the Polish Kingdom's expansion to the East. The expansion of the two countries, one towards the West and the other towards to the East, was inevitably going to create a conflict area of the overlapping of the interests.

Piast rule started with King Mieszko's baptism into the Christian faith in AD 965 and lasted over half millennium until the death of Kazimierz III Wielki, (Casimir the Great, 1339-1370). His baptism into the Christian faith is considered as the first step of formation of the modern Polish culture, and the Roman Church's decisive authority in the administration of Poland. According to Davies:

It is usually said that Piast Poland adopted Christianity. It may be more accurate to say that the Catholic Church adopted Poland.

¹⁶ Davies, *ibid.* pg.4

¹⁷ Norman Davies, *Europe: A history*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pg. 325.

With the death of Casimir the Great, the Jagellions had the possession of the crown.¹⁸ The death of the last king of the Piast dynasty created a new political situation in Poland and Hungary and paved the way to the relations between Ottoman and Polish states through Kingdom of Hungary. In order to fully understand this complicated situation, it is necessary to glance at the personal union between Poland and Hungary which will last until 1385.

Union of Poland and Hungary under Louis of Anjou

In 1370, following the death of Casimir the Great without leaving any male heir the royal succession passed to his nephew, Louis of Hungary. Through this personal union, Poland became neighbor of Kingdoms of Bosnia and Serbia and the Principality of Wallachia (See Map:1 'the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1512').

In 1372, the Despot of Dobrudja and the King of Bulgaria became Ottoman vassals.¹⁹ Thus, after establishing his union with Hungary, Poland and Ottoman Empire became close neighbors. And later in the first decade of 1400s, Ottoman Empire and Poland experienced their first diplomatic relations, that the latter was under the name of Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom.

The Jagiellonian Period and Polish-Lithuanian kingdom

After the death of Louis of Hungary, the Polish nobility wanted to secure the succession of the crown to his daughter, Jadwiga²⁰, and they proposed a conjugal and political union. According to this proposal, Jadwiga of Anjou was going to be crowned as king in Cracow in 1384 and to be married with the Lithuanian prince Jogalia who was going to be converted into Christian fate. Jogalia was baptised in 1386 and became the elected king of Poland. With this marriage Poland and Lithuania consolidated their power against the common enemy, the Teutonic state. Poland was ruled from 1386 until 1572 under the personal union with Lithuania.²¹

¹⁸ Davies, *Heart of Europe-A short History of Poland*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, pg.291

¹⁹ İnalçık, *ibid.* pg. 11

²⁰ Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland, Volume I: The Origins to 1795*, Columbia University Press, New York 1982, pg. 211.

²¹ Davies, *ibid.* pg. 155.

In 1410, the victory of the Battle of Grunwald of the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom was very important to mark the beginning of Teutonic Order's long decline.

Direct Polish-Ottoman relations were officially initiated following the first decade of the fifteenth century after the battle of Ankara (1402) and the battle of Grunwald (1410). During their first encounter of the Ottoman Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom, these two states would not have predicted that one was going to be called as "the dead man of Europe", and the other as "the sick man of Europe" by the emerging powers of Europe of the eighteenth century. These two states would not have most probably imagined that they were going to share the same destiny centuries after their expansions, one in the Balkans and Anatolia, the other in East European steppe toward the Black Sea.

If one glances at the maps of the Ottoman conquests during 1300-1512 (See Map: 1) and the trade routes of the Ottoman Empire during 1300-1600 (See Map: 2), can easily see that the lucrative trade routes from Venice and Ancona through Cracow and Luów to the Moldavian ports Kilia and Akkerman and furthermore to Caffa which was the Genovese colony in the Crimean peninsula at the same period was relatively easiest access to the Black Sea connecting Europe with the Central Asia and China. At this point, we see that history has been repeated itself and shows that economic factors have played an important role in international relations throughout history. As Robert Gilpin pointed out:

Economic objectives, resources, and instruments of foreign policy have always been significant elements in the struggles among political groups. It is unlikely that, in Homeric times, Helen's face-contributing factor though it may well have been was the primary reason for launching a thousand ships and causing King Agamemnon to lay siege to Troy. More likely, the Greeks' crucial motive was their desire to seize control of the lucrative trade route that passed through the Dardanelles. Centuries later, the Persian Empire used its great hoard of gold to influence the foreign policies of lesser states. In the fifth century B.C. the Athenian closure of ports of Delian League to an ally of its Spartan rival provides one of the earliest recorded cases of economic warfare. History is replete with similar examples of the role of economic factors in the affairs

*of nations; in this sense, the political economy of international relations has always existed.*²²

With the expansion of Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom during 1340-1349 and 1387, the interests of Ottoman Empire, Hungaria and Polish Kingdoms were overlapping on Wallachia and Moldavia (See Map: 1). The conflict area between Hungaria and Poland-Lithuanian Kingdom was the control over Red Ruthenia, Moldavia and Wallachia, the military and commercially strategic Danube river area. But, the competition between Hungarian king Sigismund and Polish king Jagello was inevitably evolved into cooperation after the Hungarian defeat at the battle of Nicopolis in 1396 by the Ottoman forces, signing an agreement in the town of Stara Lubowna (Slovakia) in 1412. With this treaty Hungarian and Polish-Lithuanian Kingdoms agreed upon a permanent peace and cooperation against common enemies, the Teutonic State especially the Ottoman Empire.²³

First encounters of the Ottoman Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom

According to the famous Polish chronicle Jan Długosz, the Hungarian King Sigismund sent a letter from the Council of Constance in 1414, requiring the Polish King for military assistance against the Ottoman Empire. But the Polish King Jagiello instead of military assistance to Hungary, proposed the mediation and sent two diplomatic envoys, Skarbek of Góra and the Armenian Gregory, to the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed Çelebi (I. Mehmed).²⁴ Kołodziejczyk is also referring to the same text and is adding that the Ottoman Sultan is called erroneously Cristen (in the 'Liber Undemicus' text is written "Turcorum Caesarem Christen").²⁵ Although there isn't any reference to the first Polish diplomatic envoys by the Turkish source, the Turkish chronicler Neşri confirms that in the year 1414, Ottoman Sultan Mehmed I had resided in Bursa, first capital of the Ottoman Empire. So the connection

²² Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1987, pg.3-4.

²³ *Historia Dyplomacji polskiej*. Ed. Marian Biskup. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982: vol. I. Pg.324-331

²⁴ Jan Reyhman, *Polonya ile Türkiye arasında Diplomatik Münasebetlerin 550. Yıldönümü, (Polonya Halk Cumhuriyeti Büyükelçiliği tarafından neşredilmiştir-It is published by the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland)*, Ankara, 1964. Pg.6

²⁵ Kołodziejczyk, *ibid.* pg.100

in term of the dates and places confirmed by both Polish and Ottoman chroniclers, the year 1414 has been acknowledged as the beginning of the diplomatic relations between the two countries.²⁶ Since then the diplomatic missions were continuously sent to and from both countries. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı states that no other foreign state sent envoys to the Porte (Bab-ı Âli) as often as the Polish kings.²⁷

The relations between Ottoman Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom on the 15th century depended on the Polish relations with Hungary. During the Ottoman civil wars Hungaria tried to consolidate his influence in Wallachia and Serbia. The Hungarians were profiting from the expansion of the Ottomans in the Balkans in order to extend their influence on the lower Danube and Venetians as well were doing the same to gain possession of the Byzantine land.²⁸ The Byzantines and the Pope called for a crusade against the Ottomans.

The crusade of Varna-1444

The crusade of Varna in 1444 was led by Ladislaus III, the King of Hungary and Poland. The Ottoman victory changed the fate of the Balkans and gave the path to lay plans to assault on Byzantium.²⁹ Kołodziejczyk is writing that “Poland officially did not take part in the Hungarian-Ottoman war and the crusade of Varna in 1444, but this crusade was led by the Polish king accompanied by numerous Polish volunteers.”³⁰ Whatever Poland’s intention was in the Hungarian-Ottoman war, at the end the Polish king was leading the crusade. One should understand that Poland applied one of the state preferences: to survive. The reciprocal relations between nations are determined most of the time not only by geopolitical factors, but by the economic factors, interests, common dangers, friends and enemies, rivalries and antagonisms which conducting them to the alliances. All those issues had been seen between the two countries from the first decade of the fifteenth century and also the fraternity in misfortune had been seen between the two countries during the first partition of Poland and peace

²⁶ Boleslaw Gebert, *Five hundred and fifty years of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Poland*, 1963, pg.104.

²⁷ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “Hiçbir ecnebi devlet Leh kralları kadar sık sık elçi göndermemiştir.” *Osmanlı Tarihi*, C.II, Ankara, 1995, pg. 481.

²⁸ İnalçık, *ibid*, pg. 20

²⁹ İnalçık, *ibid*, pg. 20

³⁰ Kołodziejczyk, *ibid*. pg.100

agreement Küçük Kaynarca in 1774.³¹ The solidarity between the two countries continued during the second and the third insurrections as well.

In the 15th century and later, the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been almost hostile due to the wars in the region. Although the conception of the Poles appear in the Ottoman chronicles with wars, especially the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's taking part in the Holy Wars (1526-The Battle of Mohacs, 1620-Tutora, 1621-Kothyn, and the last minute attack of Poland in 1683-Vienna), the two nations could establish solidarity in the difficult times.³²

Moldavian issue

The political manoeuvre of the Moldavian palatine Bogdan (obtaining the recognition of Bayezit II from the Ottoman court and at the same time asking the hand of King Alexander sister from the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom) turned the question of Moldavia during the first quarter of the sixteenth century into stalemate between the two countries.³³ And, the Polish court was increasingly convinced that the only solution to solve the Moldavian problem could be a lasting peace treaty with the sultan. At that time, the general political climate was in favor of the peace process. The emperor Charles V, who had been excommunicated by the Pope and regarded as *persona non grata* in all Habsburg court, began considering a peace treaty with the sultan. On the other hand, the sultan also was favored by signing a peace treaty due to the concern that the Habsburg and Polish forces would not unite. As a result, in 1533 the Ottoman-Polish relatively long-lived peace treaty

³¹ Stefan Kieniewicz, *La Turquie et l'indépendance de la Pologne au XIX. Siècle*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Belleten Cilt: XLVII, Sa. 186. 1984, pg. 545.

³² Topçular Katibi (Scribe of the Artillery Corps) Abdülkadir (Kadri) Efendi, *Topçular Katibi Abdülkadir (Kadri) Efendi Tarihi*, Ankara, 2003, pg. 705-754. Cited by Hacer Topaktaş, *Ottoman-Polish Relations from the Turkish Perspective. Written, Unwritten and Remembered*, European Horizons of Turkey, Herito Nr. 14 (1/2014), pg. 52

³³ *Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej*, Tom I, Polowa XV-1572, pod redakcja Mariana Biskupa (Opracowali: Marian Biskup, Karol Gorski, Zdzisław Kaczmarczyk, Gerard Labuda, Zenon Hubert Nowak, Roman Zelewski), pg. 565-566.

(Kołodziejczyk is defining this treaty as “perpetual peace treaty”³⁴) was concluded for the life time of both rulers and including a provision for its prolongation by their successors.³⁵ The treaty was important not only

³⁴ Immanuel Kant in his work “*Perpetual Peace*” regarding the possibility of ‘making war to cease’ explains three definitive articles for a perpetual peace:

- First definitive article of perpetual peace “The civil constitution of each state shall be republican” pg.120

- Second definitive article of perpetual peace “The law of nation shall be founded on a federation of free states” pg. 128

- Third definitive article of perpetual peace “The rights of man, as citizen of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality” pg. 137

The only constitution which has its origin in the idea of the original contract, upon which the lawful legislation of every nation must be based, is the republican. It is a constitution, in the first place, founded in accordance with the principle of the freedom of the members of society as human beings; secondly, in accordance with the principle of dependence of all, as subjects, on a common legislation; and, thirdly, in accordance with the law of the equality of the members as citizens.

Immanuel Kant, *A Philosophical Essay*. Translated with Introduction and notes by M. Campbell Smith, M.A. with a preface by Professor Latta. London: George Allen&Unvin Ltd. Newyork: the MacMillan Company, First Edition, 1903, Second Impression, Feb.1915, Third Impression, Feb. 1917, pg. 120, 128, 137.

Michael W. Doyle is arguing in his article “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace” these “definitive articles” are the constitutional, international and cosmopolitan laws. And, Doyle is considering that three causal mechanisms of liberal peace are the republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights, and transnational interdependence. He is underlying that the peace among liberal states rests on a simple and straightforward proposition that connects those three causal mechanisms as they operate together and only together, and not separately.

Michael W. Doyle, *Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace*, American Political Science Review, Vol.99, No.3 August 2005, pg. 463

I assume that perpetual peace treaty could not be possible between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom during the 16th and 17th centuries. With all my respect to Kołodziejczyk, this is not a nihilistic diatribe against him. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the context of the political environment of the period.

³⁵ Ilona Czamanska, *Poland and Turkey in the 1st Half of the 16th Century - Turning Points*, Fight Against the Turk in Central-Europe in the First Half of the 16th Century, Edited by Istvan Zombori, Society for Church History in Hungary Budapest and Historia Ecclesiastica Hungarica Alapitvány, Budapest, 2004, pg. 100-101.

for the Ottoman and the Polish courts, but also for the whole Europe, since the principle of not entering into any long lasting agreements with Christian states consistently followed by the Ottoman Empire in the past was thus broken. From the point of interests the agreement was beneficial for Poland, since it allowed Poland to concentrate on more important issues, Muskovy and the Baltic region.³⁶

With the recognition of the vassal status of Moldavia by Poland, the Ottoman Empire and the Polish Lithuanian Kingdom became in direct contact. By that time, Poland did not want to have any direct conflict with the Ottomans because the incursions of the Crimean Tatars into the Polish territory.³⁷ However, the Moldavian issue kept its importance between the two states during the first half of the sixteenth century.

The reign of the "Sigismund the Old" (Zygmunt Stary) from 1506 until his death 1548 overlaps the "classical era" of the Ottoman Empire. The friendly relations between Sigismund the Old and Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566) lasted until the Sigismund the Old's death in 1548 and continued after his death during his son, Sigismund Augustus's reign (1548-1572). Sigismund Augustus received condolences from the Sultan Magnificent.³⁸ The Sultan's wife, Hürrem Sultan (known as Roxelana, Ruthenian origin), and his daughter, Mihrümah Sultan also sent the condolences letters to King Sigismund Augustus³⁹. The style of the language seems to be unusual and even exaggerated in those diplomatic letters sent by the Porte to a foreign ruler. And especially the words chosen signify that there were good and friendly relations between the two countries.

Ottoman Empire learned that in 1566, the King Sigismund made an adversely agreement against Ottoman Empire with Moldavian palatine Bogdan. The Sultan dismissed the Moldavian palatine Bogdan

³⁶ Czamanska, *ibid*, pg. 101

³⁷ Shaw, *History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808*, Cambridge University Press , 1976, pg.72-73.

³⁸ Reyhman, *Polonya ile Türkiye arasında Diplomatik Münasebetlerin 550. Yıldönümü, (Polonya Halk Cumhuriyeti Büyükelçiliği tarafından neşredilmiştir-It is published by the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland)*, Ankara, 1964, pg. 7

³⁹ Nejat R. Uçtum, *Hürrem ve Mihrümah Sultanların Polonya Kralı II. Zigmund'a yazdıkları mektuplar, Belleten, Cilt XLIV, Sayı: 176 (Ekim 1980'den ayri basım), Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1980 pg.712-714.*

and appointed Prince Ivonia who was Polish. Polish King proposed to the Sultan the reappointment of Bogdan. But his royal envoy Taranovski created a problem in the capital of the Ottoman Empire. If the King Sigismund August hadn't died in 1572, the Moldovian issue could have create a belligerent issue between the two rulers.⁴⁰

Kołodziejczyk is pointing out that the roots of political equilibrium lasted in Central Eastern Europe throughout the sixteenth century were initiated by the friendly relationships of Sigismund the Old and Sultan Süleyman Magnificent.⁴¹ Indeed the Ottoman Empire pursued a policy aiming to ensure that none of the European powers became powerful enough to unify Europe under its domination since the beginning of the sixteenth century.⁴²

The war of the Holy League and Peace of Karlowitz, 1683-1699

The Ottomans, encouraged by the promises of the Hungarian nationalists to accept the sultan's suzerainty for the assistance of the Ottoman Empire to realize their hope to establish an independent Hungarian kingdom, as well as by the support of France with the aim of diverting its Habsburg enemy entered into the war with the Habsburgs. Pope Innocent XI made an appeal extensively for a new Christian Crusade against the infidel, even asking for the help of shah of Iran. He obtained the support from Portugal, Spain, various princes of Germany and the biggest army from Poland. In June 1683, the Habsburg capital, Vienna was under the siege of the Ottoman army. After a series of raids which had lasted almost six months, in September 1683, when the Ottomans tried to make a stand at Gran, they were overwhelmed by Jan (John) III Sobieski's last minute arrival.⁴³

The events immediately following the failed siege in 1683 which turned into a catastrophe for the Ottomans. The loss of the key fortress of Belgrade and, the disaster at Slankamen (26 kilometers southeast of Karlowitz), in August 1691, which caused the Ottoman army dispersing after the grand vizier Fazıl Mustafa was shot and killed.

⁴⁰ Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, *Tarih Boyunca Osmanlı-Polonya İlişkileri*, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur Armağamı 1985'den ayrı basım. Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985, Ankara, pg. 251-252.

⁴¹ Kołodziejczyk, *ibid.* pg.113

⁴² Halil İnalçık, *Turkey and Europe: A Historical Perspective*, Turkey and Europe in History, Eren Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2006, pg. 111-112

⁴³ Shaw, *ibid.* pg. 214-215.

The negotiations of the peace agreements were concluded at Karlowitz on the principle of *uti possidetis*. Transylvania remained in Habsburg and with the confirmation of freedom of worship to Catholics by the sultan to his Christian subjects enabled the emperor to intervene in the Ottoman Empire's internal affairs. The related articles concerning Poland, the Ottomans accepted full Polish control of Podolia and the Ukraine, giving up claims to suzerainty over the Cossacks and ending their short-lived rule northwest of the Black Sea and promised to restrain the Tatars from further raids. With Russia a separate treaty was signed on July 1700 due to the Russia's covetous intentions to gain more on the Black Sea.

Jan (John) III Sobieski's last minute attack, irony of ironies

As it is mentioned in the beginning of this essay, when King Sobieski encircling Ottoman armies and turning the second Ottoman effort to seize Vienna, had not probably thought that he was preparing his own country's end being shared by his very European allies in the next century, and he was also preparing the same destiny of the then enemy, the Ottoman Empire who did never recognize the partition of Poland-Lithuania Commonwealth. Davies is pointing out this unfortunate happening such as:

"For Sobieski's strategic decision to concentrate all his resources on the Turkish threat, at the cost of all of Republic's other foreign concerns, was a certain invitation for later disasters. Sobieski may have scattered the Turks, and recovered the province of Podolia, which was returned to Poland by the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699); but in so doing, he saved Vienna, and exhausted his troops in the Austrians' recovery of Hungary. He surrendered his original intention of bringing the Prussians to heel; and he was forced to leave the Muscovites in their possession of Ukraine (1686). The costs far outweighed the gains. The Habsburg realm, in control of Hungary, was revived as a great power. The Prussians proceeded to gain international recognition for their independent kingdom (1701); and the Muscovites, in possession of Ukraine, were set to build the Russian Empire. These three powers, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, were destined to dominate eastern Europe in the

following century, and, irony of ironies, to partition of the Republic between them."⁴⁴

The second irony was the presentation of the battle with such a simple definition of the victory of the Holy League: "Victory for Christendom over Islam". Poland, at highly considerable risk to itself, rescued its Habsburg neighbors from the Ottomans. Such a simplistic description may not be historically true, if we take into consideration the diverse population of the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As Şener Aktürk pointed out that Timothy Snyder, a renowned American historian opened a major dent on the simplistic definition of the Siege of Vienna.⁴⁵ According to Snyder, old Poland was in no simple sense was a Christian State. Against the papal objections Poland made treaties with Muslim and Pagan states. By law, Poland had to tolerate various forms of Christianity, including Protestantism, as well Judaism and Islam. At the time Poland's Jewish population was much more than in any other European country. A considerable amount of Jews converted to Christianity and became Ukrainian Cossacks and Lithuanian noblemen. These two groups were also part of the Polish army. Poland was also in contact with Islam since the first decade of 1400s. The Tatars had been fought with Poles in several battles, for example to defeat the Teutonic Knights at Grunwald-Tannenberg in 1410.⁴⁶ Similarly, at the Siege of Vienna the frightful Polish cavalymen were Muslims who helped to defeat the Ottomans. In short, King Jan Sobieski's Polish forces comprised a large amount of "Muslim" Tatars, who were crucial to the allegedly "Christian" victory.

The treaty of Karlowitz was the first of many agreements between the Ottoman Empire and European powers.⁴⁷ With this agreement the Ottoman Empire was transforming from the offensive position into the defensive position. For the first time, the sovereign Ottoman Empire formally acknowledged his defeat and the permanent loss of lands conquered by his ancestors. Ottoman's defensive position,

⁴⁴ Davies, *Heart of Europe-A short History of Poland*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987, pg. 304.

⁴⁵ Şener Aktürk, *September 11, 1683: Myth of a Christian Europe and the Massacre in Norway*, Insight Turkey Vol. 14/No.1/Winter 2012, p2. 7

⁴⁶ Timothy Snyder, *Tolaration and the Future of Europe*, The NewYork Review of Books, <http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/aug/10/anders-breviviks-historical-delusions/>

⁴⁷ Shaw, *ibid.* pg. 224.

due to the lack of his militarily technological advances was very expensive.⁴⁸

If the Ottoman army had not been collapsed in Vienna at the last moment, Russia would not have been able to demand the final confirmation of the Andrusovo treaty with Poland (according to the 1667 Truce of Andrusovo, Ukraine was dividing between Poland and Russia at the Dnieper) which meant to confirm the final surrender of Smolensk and Kiev to Russia. Poland could not resist to the pressure of his allies who were concerning to open a new front against the Ottomans in the north, finally yielded to the Russian demands. This was a skillful diplomatic maneuver of Russia who had the Ottoman Empire and Poland recognize its sovereignty over the Ukraine. And also, with the great enthusiasm of the members of the Holy League to include Russia into it, the latter joined the Holy League only in 1686 after all his possessions over Ukraine was promised. As a result, the influence of the Ottoman power collapsed in East-Europe and Russia initiated to penetrate into the Black Sea area.⁴⁹

My assertion is that, the battle of Vienna and the treaty of Karlowitz were one of the greatest turning points between the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Ottomans as a staunch defender of Poland against Russia

In the peace treaty concluded in Istanbul on July 1700 with Russia, demilitarized zones were marked around the Crimea. Azak (Azov) fortress provided a stronghold for Russians to reach the Crimea at any moment and even threaten the Ottoman capital.

In 1711, the Ottoman Empire took the advantage of the new conflict between the Sweden and Russia, declared war against Russia and recovered Azak. Then, the Ottoman state and Crimean Khanate emerged as the staunch defenders of the independence and territorial integrity of Poland against Russia.⁵⁰ The motive behind the Ottomans being as the staunch defender of the territorial integrity of Poland against Russia was that the Ottoman Empire's foreseeing that the rivals

⁴⁸ Quataert, *ibid.* pg. 37-38.

⁴⁹ Halil İnalçık, *Struggle for East-European Empire: 1400-1700, The Crimean Khanate, Ottomans and the Rise of the Russian Empire (Read at the international conference on "The Crimea: Past and Present", Kiev, 12-13 May 1994, The Turkish Yearbook Vol.XXI, pg.9*

⁵⁰ Halil İnalçık, *ibid.* pg. 12-13.

are stimulated to “close in” for the hegemony.⁵¹ The cooperation between Russia and Austria ended with the conflict between the two rivals over the disposition of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire which inextricably caused the World War I.

New Struggles with the Ottoman Empire with Russia and Austria (1768-1774)

Catherine the Great (1762-1796)'s imperialist policies caused the new war with Russia. In 1764, Catherine sent her troops into Poland in order to have her former lover, Stanislas Poniatowski (1764-1795), be elected as king. The new king's first proposed reform was the abolishment of *liberum veto*⁵², which had been the cause of the anarchy. Catherine the Great, disappointed by Poniatowski's independence, encouraged religious dissension in Poland-Lithuania's Eastern Orthodox population, and requested religious equality for non-Catholics. Under heavy Russian pressure, the Sejm restored Orthodox equality in 1767. This action fueled the formation of Polish national resistance. As a result eight nobles opposed to the conditions met in Bar, little town in Podolia, and formed a confederation, in 1768. They

⁵¹ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics-Chapter 5. Hegemonic War and International Change*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981, pg. 101

⁵² 1. The *liberum veto* originated in the principle that a free man cannot be governed or taxed contrary to his own declared will. Thus unanimous consent was required for all resolutions, and the dissent of a single individual was sufficient for rejection of any measure. A single individual could bring to a standstill the entire mechanism of the state. (Nevin O. Winter, *Poland of To-Day and Yesterday*, L.C. Page & Company, The Colonial Press, Boston, 1913, pg.11.

2. The principle of the *liberum veto* could be easily deteriorated. As Robert D. Putnam is pointing out in his article “*Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*” that “Ratification procedures clearly affect the size of the win-set. For example, if a two-thirds vote is required for ratification, the win-set will almost certainly be smaller than if only a simple majority is required. Under the Constitution, thirty-four of the one hundred senators can block ratification of any treaty. This is an unhappy and unique feature of our democracy. Because of the effective veto power of a small group, many worthy agreements have been rejected, and many treaties are never considered for ratification.” (Robert D. Putnam, *Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*, International Organization Vol.42, Number 3, Summer 1988, pg.448)

organized an army and protested against the Russian yoke. Catherine declared the confederates as rebels and enemies, sent her troops against the Confederation of Bar. The leaders of the Confederation of Bar sought support in Istanbul and Paris. The Ottoman Empire requested Russia to immediately evacuate Poland which was rejected by Catherine the Great and the Ottomans proclaimed war against Russia for Poland in 1768.⁵³ The war was more devastating than the previous one. The Russians entered into Wallachia, occupied Bucharest in 1770. The war created an opportunity for Russians to complete their occupation of the Principalities, and advanced through Bulgaria toward Istanbul the following spring.⁵⁴

This campaign known as the “Polish war” (Lehistan seferi) was disastrous for both of the Ottoman Empire and the Commonwealth. In 1772, the first partition of Poland was declared, and on July 1774, the humiliating Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca was imposed upon the Porte.⁵⁵ One of the clauses of this treaty was interesting with regard to ‘Russian method of conquest’: “Sultan had to give the czarina the right to build and protect an Orthodox church in Istanbul – which was subsequently interpreted to signify Russian protection over all Orthodox Christians in the empire as well as the population of Principalities – thus enabling Russia to intervene in Ottoman internal affairs for its own advantage.⁵⁶

“Protection of Orthodox population” which was actually an instrument to stir up disorder in any given country with the pretext to defend the rights of the religious minority population, was again applied in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The below conversation between Catherine the Great and one of her aids shows how much she was practical to stir up Poland.

“What advantage will accrue to Russia,” said Catherine, “if I take the part of the Greek Orthodox believers in Poland?”

“Rich territory and a large population” was the answer.⁵⁷

⁵³ Ahmet Vasif Efendi, *Mehasinü'l Asar ve Hakaiku'l Ahbar*, İstanbul 1978, pg. 30. Cited by Hacer Topaktaş, *Ottoman-Polish Relations from the Turkish Perspective. Written, Unwritten and Remembered*, European Horizons of Turkey, Herito Nr. 14 (1/2014), pg. 52

⁵⁴ Shaw, *ibid.* pg. 248.

⁵⁵ Kołodziejczyk, *ibid.* pg.163-164.

⁵⁶ Shaw, *ibid.* pg. 250-251.

⁵⁷ Winter, *Poland of To-Day and Yesterday*, L.C. Page & Company, The Colonial Press, Boston, 1913, pg.93.

Catherine who was a German princess, gained the throne through a court conspiracy in 1762 (until 1796), in which her husband, Peter III, lost his life. In order to secure her position, she posed publicly in front of the Orthodox Russians, as the protector of the persecuted Orthodox believers in the Commonwealth. It is ironically remarkable that Voltaire, French philosopher, writer of the era of the Enlightenment preferred to be blind for the request of Catherine the Great, concerning the religious tolerance and equality in Poland-Lithuania's Eastern Orthodox population, which would have become the origin of the civil war in Poland. In 1767, Voltaire under the pseudonym of Joseph Bourdillon, published his 'Essai Historique et Critique sur les dissensions des Eglises de Pologne', in 1767. In his book, Voltaire "gave advices to the Polish people not to oblige their protectors to destruct them. They came to establish the tolerance in Poland, otherwise they will punish the intolerants by being shot".⁵⁸ Voltaire in his history books such as "L'histoire de Charles XII" (1731) and "L'essai sur les moeurs" 1756, criticized Poland and supported Catherine the Great against the confederation of Radom (1767) and the confederation of Bar (1768-1772). The hostility of Voltaire against the Confederation of Bar stemmed from the alliance of the latter with Vatican and Turkey - the two bastions (one Catholic, the other Muslim) of intolerance of Europe.⁵⁹ I would redefine Voltaire's definition for the latter as the "alleged intolerance" or "the bastion of tolerance". If the Ottoman Empire were intolerant vis-à-vis its Christian subjects after the conquest of Istanbul, would have been survived today. The Ottoman Sultans did not interfere into the religious affairs of their subjects. Orthodox Church was more powerful under the Ottoman Empire's administration than it had been under Byzantium. Ottoman's subjects in the Balkans were also never forced to convert into Islam and the Ottoman army was multi religious. The Ottoman Empire accepted the diversity of its subjects as its richness. According to Max Weber, "The modern state is a compulsory association which organizes

⁵⁸ Christophe Laforest, Andrzej Nieuwazny, *De Tout Temps Ami, Cinq siècles des relations franco-polonaises*, Nouveau Monde Editions, 2004, pg.107-108.

"Sachez que les Russes tirent mieux que vous; n'obligez pas vos protecteurs à vous détruire, ils sont venus établir la tolérance en Pologne, mais ils puniront les intolérants qui les reçoivent à coups de fusil."

⁵⁹ Kaléidoscope Franco-Polonais, *Ouvrage collectif sous la direction de Bronislaw Geremek and Marcina Frybes*, Les éditions noir sur blanc, Paris, 2004, pg.259

domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory. To this end, the state has to combine the material means of organization in the hands of its leaders, and it has taken their positions and now stands in the top place.”⁶⁰ Snyder points out that the leaders of modern states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries abolished religious and other intermediaries in order to have direct relation between the state and the individual. States are supposed to communicate directly in order to raise the army and taxes without dealing with the local authorities. Snyder is adding that the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth failing to do so, did not survive.⁶¹

The foot steps preparing the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht terminated the War of Spanish Succession, in an other word ended the European domination and recognized the balance of power. With this treaty the Habsburgs and the Bourbons divided most of the Spanish possessions in Europe and in the colonies on the name of “*ad conservandum in Europa equilibrium*”.⁶² The pretext of the division was to protect the European order. And, consequently the pretext of the The Treaty of Utrecht was paving the way for the three partions of Poland to keep the European order.

Since the human nature did not changed from the era of the classical philosophies of China, India and Greece; from the rational point of view, the world is imperfect as a result of forces inherent in human nature. The theoretical concern with human nature is presented under the name of *realism*⁶³. Although the realism has dominated international relations theory since the second World War, the review of the history of the both countries, the Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian

⁶⁰Max Weber-Basic sociological terms [Doc] z harvard.edu. sclolar.google.pl/scholar?q=max+weber+and+state&hl=pl&lr=lang_en&as)_sdt=O

⁶¹ Timothy Snyder, Toleration and the Future of Europe, The New York Review of Books, <http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/aug/10/anders-brevikis-historical-delusions>

⁶² Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Seventh Edition, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton, The McGraw-Hill/Irvin Companies, New-York, 2005, pg.191.

⁶³ Morgenthau, *ibid*, pg. 4.

Commonwealth, shows us that international tensions and conflicts confirm realism in large measure.

According to the propositions of realism, states are the major actors in world affairs.⁶⁴ Waltz, refers to the states that are *the units whose interactions form the structure of international political systems*.⁶⁵ Waltz, also points out that *national politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation*.⁶⁶

International anarchy is also one of the propositions of the Realism. International anarchy is the principal force shaping the motives and actions of states.⁶⁷ Waltz defines three principal themes of images such as: war as a consequence of the nature and behavior of man, as an outcome of the internal organization of states and as a product of international anarchy.⁶⁸

Grieco referring to Waltz, points out that, *the international environment severely penalizes states if they fail to protect their vital interests or if they pursue objectives beyond their means; hence, states are "sensitive to costs" and behave as unitary-rational agents*.⁶⁹

By using these tools, I hope to provide the realist approach to the stage of the partitions of Poland. Since 1648 it was clear that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth slipped into poverty, disorder and anarchy. Between 1600 and 1700 the Commonwealth had only fifteen years without a war. It was calamity for Poland that it was under the leadership of a king, nominee by Catherine the Great. After King John Sobieski, Poland did not have a real leadership during the first three

⁶⁴ Morgenthau, *ibid*, pg. 4-16.

⁶⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Waveland Press, Inc., Long Grove, Illinois, pg. 95.

⁶⁶ Waltz, *ibid*, pg. 113.

⁶⁷ Joseph M. Grieco, *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism*, International Organization. Vol.42, No.3 (Summer, 1988), The MIT Press, pg.488.

⁶⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War, a theoretical analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York and London, Printed in the U.S.A, 1954, 1959, pg. 224-238

⁶⁹ Grieco, pg. 488

quarter of the 18th century in which Prussia was becoming a rising power and starving for the greatness.⁷⁰

In the 18th century, Russia, officially being recognised as part of Europe, pursued a plan of replacing the Ottoman Empire in Istanbul which was the eternal Russian dream, and claimed to be the protector of the Christian populations of the Balkans. Beside that, the Habsburgs had the intention to conquer the Balkans.⁷¹ The real intention of these two powers was the Ottoman Empire to be occupied. In such a case, the Prussia was going to be between the two powerful and ambitious countries, and with a clever diplomatic manoeuvre could be able to direct their attention to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Instead of the Ottoman Empire which will be divided one and a half century later, Austria, Prussia, and Russia forced the terms of partition upon the commonwealth under the pretext of restoring order in the anarchic Polish situation.⁷² A former diplomat in Orient is explaining in his book 'La politique de la Russie envers la Pologne et la Turquie' that, during the negotiations concerning the conditions of the partition of Poland between the three partioning powers, Austria accepted the propositions of Prussia that the strong part of Pologne was promised to her, while the Russia had offered her the partition of the Ottoman Empire.⁷³

According to realists, equity in term of distribution of gains is important for the balancing among the states. Morgenthau points out that states expect to receive approximately equal compensations. The inequality in term of the distribution of gains would upset the balance of power. And he gives as an example the cooperation among Austria, Prussia and Russia during the negotiations to divide the territory of Poland. In the treaty of 1772 between them, it was stipulated that "the portion of one cannot exceed the portion of the other".⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Edited by S. Konovalov, *Russo-Polish Relations, An Historical Survey*, Princeton University Press, Princeton-New Jersey, 1945, pg. 12.

⁷¹ İnalçık, *Turkey and Europe: A Historical Perspective*, Turkey and Europe in History, Eren Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2006, pg. 112-113

⁷² Jerzy S. Latha, *Polonya-Türkiye İlişkileri (1945-1988)*, Çevirenler: Bogumila Chochlinska, Mustafa Turhan, pg. 3

⁷³ Un Ancien Diplomate en Orient, *Le Dossier Russe dans la Question D'Orient, la Politique de la Russie envers la Pologne et la Turquie par un Ancien Diplomate en Orient*, E. Dentu, Libraire-Editeur, Paris, Imprimerie Jouaust, 1869, pg.36.

⁷⁴ Morgenthau, *ibid*, pg. 191

For Gilpin, from the perspective of the dominant power regarding the hegemonic war, states' aim is to minimize one's losses rather than to maximize one's gains.⁷⁵ As an example of this proposition is what Catherine the Great said, addressing to King Poniatowski to prove her country's legitimate claim to the greater part of Lithuania for justification of the first partition. After her pseudo-legitimate claims on the part of Poland, she said that second barrier is Turkey. "Shall Europe wait for her vanishing term? The partition of Poland did not give rise to any war, while the partition of Turkey would have covered the East and the West with probably continuous fierce battles of which the outcome would be the huge ruins in which the interests of the civilisation would be perish infallibly".⁷⁶ It was clear that the partition of the Ottoman Empire would not be an easy task like Poland to be a breakfast for Catherine. She knew that if she had wanted to have the Ottoman Empire as dinner, she could not have been able to swallow her. Nevertheless, the partition of the Ottoman Empire was going to be started almost one and a quarter centuries later than the Polish partitions.

The second partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

The first partition in 1772 created reformist notion among the Polish elites, under the light of the European Enlightenment. Polish intellectuals continued to discuss Enlightenment philosophers such as Montesquie and J.Jacques Rousseau. During the period of Enlightenment in Poland, the concept of democratic institutions for all classes was accepted. During 1788-1791, the reformers of Sejm abolished the constraints, undermining the foundations of Russian protectorate which was established with the balefull settlement of 1717. The "Great Sejm" or "the Four Years Sejm" produced Europe's first written constitution, the "Constitution of May 3, 1791" which abolished the "liberum veto" (individual veto) in parliament and provided a separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and established people's sovereignty.⁷⁷ The Four Years Sejm also abolished the application of the 'elected kings' and thus the kingship was going to be hereditary. The architects of the 1791 Constitution were

⁷⁵ Robert Gilpin, *Hegemonic War and International Change, War and Change in World Politics* , Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981, pg. 104-107b

⁷⁶ Un Ancien Diplomate en Orient, *ibid*, pg.19

⁷⁷ [Countrystudies.us/pland/11htm-Source: U.S. Library of Congress](http://Countrystudies.us/pland/11htm-Source:)

Stanislaw Małahowski, Ignacy Potocki, Hugo Kołłątaj and Adam Czartoryski⁷⁸ who was settled near Istanbul in the village Adampol (Polonezköy) which was called after Prince Adam Czartoryski.

The 1791 Constitution alarmed many nobles who would have lost some rights and gave rise the conservative Confederation of Targowica. The richest magnates among them K.Branicki, S. Rzewuski and S. Potocki signed counter act in Petersburg and proclaimed it in Targowica.⁷⁹ The Targowica Confederation asked Russian assistance to restore status quo. Catherine the Second, profiting this opportunity asked Prussian help and invaded Poland with the pretext of defending Poland's ancient liberties. The Russo-Polish war of 1792-93, or the War of the Second Partition lasted more than a year. In the autumn 1792, Catherine offered a suitable share of Poland to Prussia which was entered an anti-revolutionary alliance with Austria in February 1792. As a consequence, Poland's ally Prussia left the Poles with their fate and participated to the Russian invasion to complete the Russian conquest. The Treaty of Partition was signed on January 4, 1793. Prussia took not only Danzig and Thorn, but the whole Wielkopolska. The Russia annexed the remainder of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Poles were obliged to submit in a legal and orderly manner. The Constitution of May 1791 was formally accepted by the last Sejm of Poland. The "Golden Freedom"⁸⁰ was restored. The second partition was approved by the King, and agreed by the nobility who was threatened with the wholesale sequestration of their estates.⁸¹ The Targowica Confederation put aside the 1791 Constitution.

The third partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

The second partition was the defeat of Poland, but hopefully not yet the defeat of the nationalists. The great polish revolt broke out on March 24, 1794 under the leadership of Tadeusz Kościuszko.

⁷⁸ Neşe Taluy Yüce, *Özgürlük Peşindeki Polonya*, Ankara Üniversitesi - Dil ve Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları: 398. Ankara, 2004 pg. 50-55

⁷⁹ Yüce, *ibid*, pg. 55

⁸⁰ Golden Freedom or Liberty is a unique aristocratic political system in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under which all nobles regardless of rank or economic status were considered to have equal legal status and enjoyed legal rights and privileges. According to this unique political system the nobility controlled the legislature (the Sejm-the Polish Parliament) and the Commonwealth's elected king.

⁸¹ Davies, *God's Playground*, Vol.1. pg. 520-537

Independence movement started with the slogans similar to the French revolution “liberty (wolność), equality (równość), entirety (całość) and independence (niepodległość)” in Krakow. Although Kościuszko’s insurgent armies won some successes, were defeated on November 1794 by the much more stronger Russian and Prussian armies.⁸² After Russian army suppressed the insurrectionary government, and deported the King, there was no Polish authority to negotiate for the Third Partition. Actually, the partitioning powers did even not think to get the Polish approval for an act which was to abolish the Polish government completely. In 1795, the Commonwealth of Two Nations was not any more on the European map in the name of balance of power.⁸³ For the Poles, the Third Partition was the beginning of a period of continuous foreign rule that would last for well over a century.

For realism, the balance of power is to prevent any one state from gaining universal dominion.⁸⁴ Morgenthau points out that, *the balance of power was successful in preserving the existence of all members of the modern state system from the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 to the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century.*⁸⁵

But all those acts accomplished in the name the balance of power failed to keep the very principle of the balance of power which was the preservation of the independence of the individual states. The destruction of Poland for the virtue of balance of power was the first series of partitions of individual states. The European balance of power could unfortunately did not keep the independence of Poland.

Conclusion

At the end of 18th and in the beginning of the 19th centuries, The Ottoman Empire threatened by Russia to realize his plan to replace Istanbul, and also threatened by Habsburg to conquer the Balkans, became the most adherent of the balance of power more than ever in Europe. The Ottoman Empire strongly protested the partitions of Poland. During the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman Empire immediately declared the war to Russia in order to help Poland. The Ottoman Empire showed the genuine example of the

⁸² Yüce, *ibid*, pg. 55-56

⁸³ Davies, *God’s Playground*, Vol.1. pg. 538-542

⁸⁴ Morgenthau, *ibid*, pg. 213.

⁸⁵ Morgenthau, *ibid*, pg. 213-214.

friendship to come to help Poland while itself was in a difficult position. S.T.Gasztoult points out that the declaration of war by the Ottomans against Russia due to violation of the Polish territories by the Russian army, proves that how much the friendship existed between the two countries is genuine and natural.⁸⁶ He also described the Ottomans as the victims of Europe and emphasized the Ottomans' efficient fraternity during the periods the most tragic of the Polish history.⁸⁷

The Ottoman Empire was the only country who did not recognize the partitions of Poland for 123 years. I assume that if the peace treaty concluded by Voivode Gninski, sent by King Sobieski, in Istanbul in 1678 had not been broken by the latter himself⁸⁸ and consequently the Ottoman army hadn't been defeated at the last moment by the Polish artillery under the command of King Jan Sobieski, on September 12, 1683, neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would have been called as "two invalids of Europe" first, then the former as "a sick man of Europe" and the latter as "a dead man of Europe". The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth entering in the Holy League in 1684, neglected to give the attention to internal reforms as well as the crucial problem of the eastern frontier. Meanwhile, Russia with his splendid maneuver, joined to the Holy League only in 1686, when its possessions in Ukraine had been confirmed. Contrary to the gain of Russia, Poland's recovery of Podolia with the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 was a very small compensation considering its huge losses due to the war against the Ottomans in 1683.⁸⁹ Zbigniew Wojcik is also questioning the benefit of the battle of Vienna, except the fame for the immediate present to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Wojcik is adding that Poland, entering to the Holy League in 1684, became the tool of Austrian policy and, was not any more an equal partner with the Habsburgs.⁹⁰ History showed us how the Crusades could dangerously prepare the collapse of an empire, Byzantium. Were the second in line the Polish-Lithuanian

⁸⁶ S.T. Gasztoult, *Turquie et Pologne*, Imprimerie Polyglotte A. Reiff-Heymann, 1913, pg.12.

⁸⁷ S.T. Gasztoult, *ibid*, pg. 47

⁸⁸ Zbigniew Wojcik, *King John III of Poland and the Turkish Aspects of His Foreign Policy*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Belleten, Üç Ayda Bir Çıkar (Periodique Trimestriel) Cilt: XLIV (Tome: XLIV), Sayı: 173-176 (No:173-176), pg.668

⁸⁹ Davies, *God's Playground*, Vol. I, pg. 480-487

⁹⁰ Wojcik, *ibid*, pg.669

Commonwealth being a part of the Crusades, and the third in line the Ottoman Empire being against of the Crusades? It would not be wrong to say that both countries were the victims of the Crusades. According to Weber : “The acceptance of the religious propaganda of the Crusades is linked to the imperialists aspirations of feudal lords, who were interested in securing fiefs for their progeny.”⁹¹

On the other hand, the defeat of Vienna paved the way to the rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire. During the period of 1684-1700, the relations between the Ottoman Empire, Russia and Crimea underwent a crucial change. The peace treaty concluded in Istanbul in 1700 between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, changed the century-old pattern of the relations between the latter and the Crimean Khanate. The Crimean Khanate mediation was not any more in force in the Ottoman-Russian relations. With this agreement the initiative was passing from the Ottoman Empire to Russia and the latter was becoming in the position to dictate the provisions of the treaty.⁹²

The Ottoman Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were almost condemned to build the friendship against the common danger, Russia. As the logic says so, the two countries acted similarly. The Ottoman Empire’s fraternity, solidarity and his friendship continued during the Poland’s second and third partitions as well. The fraternity, solidarity and friendship built up in the difficult times of Poland were also the signs of the balance of power strongly supported by the Ottoman Empire. The disappearance of Poland from the map in 1795 was not underestimated by the Ottoman Empire. The prominent nineteenth-century Ottoman historian and statesman, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha (1822-1895), remarked in his book “Tarih-i Cevdet” (“History of Cevdet” – with its conceptual meaning “History of the Ottoman Empire”): “When this unfortunate news [the partitioning of Poland-Lithuania] reached the Sublime Porte, it was a warning to us.”⁹³ Therefore, the Ottoman Empire started to complete the military and financial reforms

⁹¹ From Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology/edited, with an introduction by H.H. Gerth and C.Wright Mills with a new preface by Bryan S. Turner*, published 2009 by Routledge, pg.65. www.google.pl/books?hl=pl&lr=lang_en&id=I1b69.

⁹² İnalçık, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire, Essays on Economy and Society*, Indiana Universtiy Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry of Culture Joint Series, Vol. 9, pg 391-393

⁹³ *Polonia Ottomanica: Polish partitions*, [file:///E:/Scientific Article/Polonia Ottomanica Polish Partitions.htm](http://file:///E:/Scientific/Article/Polonia%20Ottomanica%20Polish%20Partitions.htm)

as soon as possible. Of course, the elites of the Ottomans were well aware that if they did not implement the new reforms in almost every aspect of the life the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was indispensable. Unfortunately the indispensable end was realized by the newly rising powers of Europe in the first quarter of the 20th century. I assume that the two countries needed to each other's support among their covetous neighbors. It is ironic that their neighbors' covetousness made them so blind that they did not see the approaching danger which was plunging them altogether into calamity twice, during the first half of the 20th century in Europe.

Polish leaders of independence movement have found refuge in the Ottoman soil, like Prince Adam Czartoryski. The Ottoman Empire became a safe shelter for Polish revolutionaries after the 1831, 1848 and 1863 insurrections in Poland. Sultan Abdülmecid, who was under pressure by Poland's neighbors to expel the refugees, declared that he would rather renounce his throne than surrender refugees who had come to seek shelter in his territories. The worldwide known Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz who came to Istanbul for Poland's independence and passed away in 1855 there, always expressed his gratitude towards Turkey while he was in exile in France, with such words : "The only voice that rose against the dismemberment of Poland were Turkish people's. We, Poles cherish the Turks for not having yielded to force in front of our enemy and for not having consented to the partition of our homeland."⁹⁴

According to Karolina Suchodolska (ca.1835-1883), daughter of the chief organizer of the Polish political activities on the Bosphorus, her father's friend Benderli Hüseyin Pasha, the Serasker (the Commander of the Land Forces in the Ottoman Empire) of Sultan Mahmud II, recognized only seven European monarchs: kings of Poland-Lithuania, Bohemia, England, France, Spain, Hungary and the Pope. He regarded the kings of Prussia as Poland-Lithuania's vassal and he did not allow the ambassador of Prussia to sit next to Mehmet Sadık Pasha (born Michal Czajkowski,1804-1886), and he only accepted the ambassador could sit down on the chair with his remark that in his household a vassal can't sit next to his lord.

During the World War II, the Ambassador of Hitler, Von Papen, requested the Polish Embassy building in Ankara when Poland was

⁹⁴ Lehistan'dan Bugünkü Polonya'ya, Polonya Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, Ankara, 2001, pg. 62-63

occupied by the Nazis. The then President of young Republic of Turkey, İsmet Pasha did not accepted his request with such words: "We have a traditional friendship with Poland. In the past, during the partitions, Turkey waited 150 years for the arrival of the Polish ambassador, and now Turkey will not meet your request".⁹⁵ Thus, Ambassador Von Papen watched the Polish flag during the World War II.

Another remarkable event during the World War II, was pointed out by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Władysław Bartoszewski, in an interview to *Die Welt* in 2002, "During the World War II, when the bombardments were heard in the city, only the Ambassadors of the Holy See and Turkey did not leave Warsaw".⁹⁶

Concluding my article, I feel compelled myself to transmit an anecdote baseless a written record, but having a good base in the Polish collective memory. According to the first written record of this story registered by the Polish ambassador to Turkey in the years 1936-1945, Michał Sokolnicki (1880-1967), whenever the diplomatic corps was received by the Ottoman sultan, on the sight of the empty chair of the Polish deputy, the Ottoman chief of protocol would impressively ask: Where is the deputy from Lehistan? And, in every occasion he would receive the same reply from his aide: "Your Excellency, the deputy of Lehistan could not make it because of vital impediments" to the embarrassment of the diplomats of the partitioning states.⁹⁷


To sum up, the 600th anniversary of the Turkish-Polish diplomatic relations will offer an opportunity to strengthen cooperation in economic and cultural level, and joint projects to be implemented on this occasion will help to sustain the already existed solid relations. My strong desire is that, the young generations of both countries with their rich political and cultural heritage would experience the solidarity not only in the mutual misfortune but in the prosperity as well.

⁹⁵ <http://poltub.com.tr/%C5%9Fanl%C4%B1-tarihimiz/tarihte-t%C3%BCrk-polonya-ili>.

⁹⁶ varsova.be.mfa.gov.tr/.../1684ad1d-c8e1-4424-83aa-


⁹⁷ *Polonia Ottomanica: Polish partitions*, [file:///F:/Scientific Article/Polonia Ottomanica Polish Partitions.htm](file:///F:/Scientific%20Article/Polonia%20Ottomanica%20Polish%20Partitions.htm)

Map 1 - The frontiers of the Ottoman Empire during the years 1300-1512



Source: Halil İnalcık, "An Overview of Ottoman History", The Great Ottoman, Turkish

Map 2 - The trade routes of the Ottoman Empire during the years 1300-1600



Source: Halil İnalcık, "An Overview of Ottoman History", The Great Ottoman, Turkish Civilisation I POLITICS, Yeni Türkiye, Ankara 2000, pg. 87

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