


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Tadeusz Klementewicz
University of Warsaw

Trans-Disciplinary Strategy of Research Structure For Study of Civilization.

The Evolution From the City-State to the Capitalist Economy-World¹.

Abstract

This article is dedicated to the origin, evolution and development prospects of the global civilisation. The object of a thorough analysis is history-forming crises as a result of which qualitative changes occurred in intercivisational relations. A transdisciplinary research strategy combining the ecological, economic, political and cultural (anthropological) perspective was applied to analysis. The principal problem in researching the macrohistorical process of the global civilisation evolution is combining knowledge from several disciplines: natural sciences (climatology, ecology, evolutionary biology, physical anthropology), economics, political sciences and cultural anthropology. This is because the global civilisation needs to be analysed from four angles: ecology, economy, politics and culture. It is only after they are coherently combined, owing to the adopted theoretical perspective (inspired by F. Braudel concept), that the analysis becomes transdisciplinary.

Keywords: *global civilisation, the transdisciplinary research strategy, turning points in human history, crisis regulation, the World New Deal*

¹ Translation: Grzegorz Omelan

1 . Civilization as a dynamic whole

The history of *Homo sapiens* have been under way within the scope of different forms of social organization.¹ There were communities of hunters and gatherers (minisystems), tribal communities, chiefdoms, agrarian empires, and finally nation states. The path of this development has been marked by the progress of technology and energy. They were the tools of adaptation to the local ecosystems, or they allowed to shape them in order to create material basis for collective existence. This basis is produced by economy which possesses means of connecting direct manufacturer to conditions and means of production. The leader of the adaptation process has always been, and probably will be the state. After the last ice age there have been three historically significant slowdowns which may be considered turning points: creation of the manufacturing economy and the city (Neolithic Revolution), crossing the barrier of oceans (14th/15th centuries) and the Industrial Revolution. The vast majority of mankind, divided into state or ethnic communities, is now in the stage of industrial civilization in the form of global capitalism in the phase of another scientific-technological revolution (the so-called Information Civilization).

1.1 Eurocentrism or Eurasian convergence?

World history, macrohistory, macrosociology constitute the current, axiologically neutral, reflection on the genesis and structure of the wider whole – the world-system in the most developed form of connections and mutual affections, at the same time spreading to the whole ecumene. Within this global-historical perspective the territorial units possessing different political status must be connected economically (commerce, loans, manufacturing and supplying chains) and politically (tribute, conquest, strategic alliances), migrations of people and cultural properties (diffusion of ideas, religions,

¹ The following serves as a presentation of the method and results of the study of world civilization, presented in the author's book in title *Geopolityka trwałego rozwoju. Ewolucja cywilizacji i państwa w trakcie dziejotwórczych kryzysów*, published in Warsaw in 2013.

technological and organizational innovations). The centres of human civilizations did not develop evenly. There was rivalry between them which sometimes led to hierarchization into the centre and outskirts (from the perspective of the whole world) and into the metropolis and province (within a given state territory). There are processes of diffusion, exchange and mutual borrowings, mixing of people and ideas between local civilizations and their systems of production, cultures and forms of social organization. It has been more or less like this throughout history. In Eurasia (according to the ideas of W. H. McNeill, Ph. Curtin, J. Goody, K. Pomerantz, J. Goldstone and other world history agents) the development was polycentric. It led to convergence, especially in the field of cultural output. The current civilization was then created within the scope of the East-West system, as the result of commerce, exchange of ideas and discoveries that were executed between them.

The starting point of this process is constituted by the great intercontinental migrations, and – later – the birth of agricultural civilizations: China, India, Middle East and its Mediterranean branch, and also African and both Americas. Out of the Mediterranean branches (Minoan Civilization and Mycenaean Greece) soon arose the Greek-Roman civilization, next the European one (9th century). Within the agrarian civilizations cities became administrative and religious centres. Traders, merchants, craftsmen, artists fulfilled their missions in the shades of the courts and temples. That's the time of the Gordon Childe's Urban Revolution. It was the first turning point in the history of societies. A new field of social activity surfaced – manufacturing economy. Its foundation was land and natural energy sources – solar one, converted into horse pulling power, as well as powers of human muscle, gravity, water and wind. Commerce in the above-mentioned states created the first central civilization in Eurasia – the Civilization of the Middle. Its centre was Mesopotamia. From there the commerce and military conquests intertwined histories of Egypt, Persia (Iran), states of Anatolya and Harappa. This civilization lasted between 3000-1500 BC until around 700-500 BC.

Enriching the resources available in the local ecosystem and complementing goods manufactured single-handedly, as well as gathering economic surplus might be regarded as the main driving force behind the creation of the Civilization of the Middle.

The next starting point was the old-world East-West system without the hegemon. It emerged thanks to the means of transport like cabotage shipping, camel transportation or porters working in rainforests. These means, throughout millennia, limited long-distance transport to a few light, long-lasting goods like silk or spices. It was characterized by constant Western deficit in commerce with the East and outflow ore, mainly of African origin. The no-hegemon system lasted for 2000 years and created 8 regional commercial networks. Its main axis was the sea route between the Red Sea via the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Its unifying force was India. The remaining one were Silk Roads. This phase was closed with the first transoceanic journeys, which was achieved thanks to caravels – they were another technological step forward, because they used the wind force in transportation better. The Europeans became the masters of the oceans. It was the next turning point. The new phase began with the change of the system's structure. Europe, which dominated militarily started controlling the world commerce – after both Americas joined – and using natural resources and manpower to extend its own wealth. The world market was created as the next phase of uniting the paths of development of local civilizations, which were distant from one another at the beginning. The then system consisted of two elements until the end of the 18th century: the commerce system between Asia and Europe according to Smith's rules through the oceanic route around the Cape of Good Hope and the Atlantic system – trading Caribbean and Brazilian goods together with African slaves.

As late as at the time of English industrial revolution there was a qualitative change. Due to that there were discoveries within the field of transport and communication (steamboat, telegraph). This novum, together

with the mechanization of production and its efficiency allowed the European industrial powers to create a new whole – the capitalist economy-world. Its centre was located in Europe, from which many peripheries of various geopolitical status branched – from colonies to territories indeed dependent (free-trade imperialism). Due to the industrial revolution, which meant mastering new sources of energy and manufacturing techniques the market society emerged. The world system was molded by competing merchants, entrepreneurs, transnational businesses and financial shares holders pursuing the status of rentiers. They looked for cheap goods and resources, market outlets and investments. In short, they multiplied the civilization's wealth and technological base. We owe them the world as we know today. Fast economic growth depended on technological progress and organizational improvements, but at the same time the mechanism in which the economy functioned was subordinated to accumulating of economic surplus. Domination, and at times hegemony, was won by industrial powers: England, France, Germany, Japan, USA, Russia (Soviet Union). Some of them created impressive colonial systems.

1.2 The notion of world civilization

The original structure of the social life is human as a bio-psycho-socio-cultural whole. The human organism, as a morphophysiological structure, is subjected to all metabolic processes. It is also able to symbolically control its behaviour through the reflexive consciousness. In order to satisfy its biogenic needs, a human being must be a part of the network constituting the social division of work or different social roles. With the process of socialization it inherits the possessions of the spiritual development of wider groups, of which it is a part of. Supraindividual structures create, normatively and customarily, long-term relations among individuals, for instance the ruled vs the ruling, the division of assignments and functions within a company, proprietary relations with different types of property – private, personal, common, international and human. Supraindividual structures constitute objectivized, in different cultural codes, forms of symbolic activity – national language, legal system, ideologies,

literary works, paintings, sculptures, musical works, national culture as a system of such works. They form an external symbolic-cultural world of human beings. Another type of structures are objectivized material products, being created out of discoveries, innovations and techniques such as means of work or national wealth. They constitute mankind's technical environment – the space of human world appointed by technology and energy, which humans use as extension of its arms.

Separate elements, possessing objectivized products of material and spiritual activities of its members (economy, state, legal system, family, science, religion, education, health service, social classes, professions, cities, villages) must be treated as social structures as well. Another type of social structures are nations and nation-like groups: nations organized as states, tribal communities, nationalities, social life segments: clans, lineages, etc. To his group also belong local civilizations (cultural circles). They include people living within limited spaces on earth, who are bound by various and long-lasting economic, political and cultural relations (for instance the post-Confucian civilization). Mankind is a peculiar social structure, living in certain ecosystems and divided into separate populations and local civilizations. It is connected by router of commerce, discoveries or microbes. It is also about mankind understood as all contemporary societies and conditioning relations between them. These relations cover reproducing features of previous societies, whose material and spiritual output they carry on. Mankind constitutes world civilization. As a whole it is formed of all national societies, inhabiting the global ecosystem at a certain time and it is a part of the biosphere. The biosphere is a part of even larger dynamic whole – the organic and non-organic world: geochemistry with biology, geology with climate – Gaia or Medea (depending on the interpretation of earth's history).²

² S. Kozyr- Kowalski, *Socjologia, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i państwo*, Poznań 2000, p. 120-121. On natural structures read more in P. Ward, *Hipoteza Medei. Czy życie na Ziemi zmierza do samouinicestwienia?* Warszawa 2010, s. 66; S. H .Schneider, *Laboratorium Ziemia*, Warszawa 1998, p.19.

Further reflection will touch upon the largest of the social structures – the world civilization, which right now in the phase of neoliberal development of market economy. It constitutes a new social structure – a human population divided into nations. Because it exploits the global ecosystem, it might be understood as another additive macrostructure, although certain local civilizations and national communities do not have to blend into a homogenous whole. Since 19th century this whole has become the aim of research from a newly created academic discipline – social sciences. One may select from a few names for this whole. William McNeill, the co-creator of world history, ceased using the word ‘civilization’ and began using the term “world system”, and it seems that the latter is most widely accepted today. It is popularized by the circles inspired by Wallerstein’s conception of world-system analysis. Three terms bear similar connotations in the language of social sciences: society, civilizations and social system. In the modern interpretation a society is ‘a specific (different one at different times of human history) system of interpersonal and intergroup material and spiritual relations, necessary and sufficient for the development of the groups and units that belong there’.³ As regards the term ‘society’ the emphasis falls onto objective relations among people, mainly due to division of work and being dependent on others at fulfilling his/her existential needs. Thus ‘society’ constitutes a dynamic, hierachical and functional structure, moreover, it exists here and now, within certain conditions of time and place.

The term “nation” pertains to emotional bonds (using similar cultural symbols, sense of union of history and values, internalized in the process of socialization).⁴ However, civilizations are societies lasting in a given ecosystem for hundreds, even thousands of years. They preserve relatively unchangeable social organization and fixed patters of behaviour (social culture, mentality,

³ Z. Cackowski, *Filozoficzne problemy człowieka i społeczeństwa*, Warszawa 1990, p. 205.

⁴ See A. Zajączkowski, *Rzecz o socjologii*, Warszawa 1993, p. 90-94; E. Hobsbaum, *Narody i nacjonalizm po 1780 roku. Program, mit, rzeczywistość*, Warszawa 2010, p. 19-21; M. Waldenberg, *Kwestie narodowe w Europie Środkowo- Wschodniej*, Warszawa 1992, p. 16-17; A. D. Smith, *Kulturowe podstawy narodów*, Kraków 2009, s.29-47.

attitudes towards the world and life, value systems), which distinguishes it among neighbours – language and religion. Thus, which was stressed especially by Fernand Braudel, civilizations are ‘the longest of the long histories,’ and the history itself is ‘neither a certain economic reality, nor a certain society. It is what lasts and lives with no end in sight in the series of economic and social realities, displaying with it a significantly reduced flexibility.⁵ Each civilization has its own, distinguished history. Its content are dynamic stories of using different ways of organizing social work in given environmental conditions and cultural tradition. Thus civilizations do not assume either intergenerational continuity, or stability of institutions and class structure, or permanent cultural norms, concerning, for example, the position of a woman or family. Moreover, they may consist of, like the current western civilization, many national societies (Marshall Hodgson calls them supranational societies). The term ‘civilization’ emphasizes technologies and energy used in socially permanent forms, so that next generations of a given population could co-exist in a certain ecosystem – creating ‘gardens in clouds’ like the inhabitants of the Andes, survive in the tundra, desert or on a small island in the middle of a gigantic ocean. The following generations enrich technological infrastructure, agriculture, improve organization and efficiency of labour, continue a ruling system, although within often-altering limits, etc. Using tools, energy and human labour is initiated and preserved, through a certain community. A direct manufacturer, depending on the means of manufacturing, is a next-of-kin, a serf, a slave or a hired hand. His superior acts in the role of a member of the elderly, a chief, a senior or a capitalist. He is at the same a member of different groups, segments, or social classes. Władysław Tatarkiewicz was right to emphasize that a civilization is a supplement of a man to nature surrounding him.⁶ In the light of this only five

⁵ Tegoż, *Gramatyka cywilizacji*, op. cit., p. 68.

⁶ See his *Parerga* Warszawa 1978, p. 76-79. See more in J. Szacki, *Historia myśli socjologicznej. Wydanie nowe*, Warszawa 2008, ch. 18. A survey of classical terms in T. Ellingsen, *Civilizations: Features, Structures, and Dynamism*, Paper presented at the Annual National Convention of Political Science, Trondheim, Norway, January 8-10, 2003. The author supports Braudel's concept. Some researchers understand ‘civilization’ in the same way as P. Bourdieu does by habitus, cultural capital

civilizations still exist: in the Far East the Chinese one (since 2000 BC) and the Japanese one as its variant (since 200 BC), Indian (since 2500 BC), the Middle East (Persia-Iran, since 4000 BC), Arabic-Islamic (since 7th century) and the Western (since 9th century), which at the beginning was just a periphery of the Euroasian-African centre.⁷ For the few last decades the Latino-American civilization has been distinguishing itself as the result of biological and cultural miscegenation. It stems from overlapping of three ‘matrices’: the matrix of the local Indian peoples, the matrix of two European nations – Portuguese and Spanish, and the matrix of African peoples, who survived the trauma of the cross-Atlantic journey in the cargo holds belonging to the leading European entrepreneurs.

We may introductorily call the world civilization a dynamic whole, which consists of all national societies and/or local civilizations, ergo an additional $n+1$ structure, a conglomerate whole, quasi whole. If one wants to speak about the dynamic whole, there must be affectioning and conditioning between among societies and their substructures (economies, states, national cultures). Speaking freely, the world civilization is the largest possible whole consisting of national states and interstate system, nations and local civilizations, manufacturing chains within industry and agriculture, global financial system of the economy-world, hybridization of cultures, and finally global system of economy. In its current form it was created due to the interaction between human population, mainly through technology and labour, and nature. The result of these interactions that have lasted for a thousand

or C. Castoriadis by social *imaginarius*. It is a group of partially or completely identical patterns of perceptron, thinking, evaluating and acting. Usually it stems from religion and social ethics, cultural-political programme (Sh. Eisenstadt). See his *Utopia i nowoczesność. Porównawcza analiza cywilizacji*, Warszawa 2009, p.34-46. For the autor the beginning of modernity is strongly bound with the fall of the concept of God’s order and destiny of kosmos.

⁷ M. G. Hodgson, *Rethinking World History. Essays on Europe, Islam and World History*, Cambridge 1993, p. 26. The problems of distinguishing certain civilizations are talked about by M. Melko in *The Nature of Civilizations*, w: *Civilizations and World Systems. Studying World-Historical Change*, Ed. by S. K. Sanderson, Walnut Creek, Lanham, New York, Oxford 1995, p. 33, also M. Hall, P. T. Jackson, *Introduction*, w: *Civilization and International Relations Theory*, (eds) M. Hall, P. T. Jackson, New York, Houndsill 2007, p. 15-31. On the continuity of the Chinese civilization: R. Bin Wong, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience*, Ithaca 1997, p. 198-200; *Cywilizacje starożytne*, A. Cotterell (ed.), Łódź 1990.

years is humanized nature: technologically-environmental surroundings of human existence. This is only a fragment of a wider natural whole – system-earth.

2. Features of durability and change: perspectives for studies of Word civilization.

Researching the complex and dynamic social wholes, for instance civilizations, requires linking different scientific fields. In a given case it is about linking knowledge of natural sciences (history of earth, climatology, ecology, evolutionary biology, physical anthropology), economic, political sciences and anthropology of culture, whose main subject of research is global multicultural society. The world civilization, in order to understand its genesis and evolution, must be regarded together from the point of view of four perspectives: ecological, economic, politological and cultural. Only with their coherent linking, thanks to the adapted theoretical perspective, the analysis is given a macrosociological trait. The research problem, which arises here, is the problem of integrating this knowledge, of transdisciplinary strategy of researching. All researchers, whose work's subject was the evolution of the vast-in-time-and-space social whole devoted their reflection on how to link knowledge this scattered. It is Fernando Braudel's program of global history, Immanuel Wallerstein's social historical sciences, Marshall Hodgson's studies of civilization, or Andre Gunder Frank's studies of horizontally integrated macrohistory. And above all of research practice of macrohistorians – Braudel, McNeill, Wong, Pomerantz and others. It brings forth the consequence of 'being convinced of the unity of social sciences, whose value is not only a general theory or a collection of highly attractive terms, but rather creating incentive to intellectually grapple with notions of mankind's situations, in the past and today, without being forced to limit yourself with one field or method'.⁸

⁸ J. Goody, *Logika pisma a organizacja społeczeństwa*, Warszawa 2006, p. 25.

2.1 Ecological perspective: from the Malthusian catastrophe to the Meadow's trap.

Human history should be reconstructed as the history of constantly rising population, rising social metabolism, and rising pressure on local ecosystems' functioning. In short, it should be understood not only from the point of view of global-systemic point of view, but also from the perspective of human relation to nature, the ecological perspective.

In this perspective one may, for example, interpret European feudalism as developing Northern soil with a moldboard plough and an advanced rig. The counterpart for human societies' biogeography are histories of controlling local ecosystem and biomes by nations and civilizations. Various ecosystems evolved into common house of nations, local civilizations, directing their economies' and social cultures' development. These populations adopted given environments to their, mainly biogenic, needs, developing such model of economy, as if they wanted to practically actualize Bacon's directive stating, that nature might be subdued by humans only when they learn about its rules and be subjected to them. *Homo sapiens* settled the following ecosystems, often creating odd civilizations presented in the fine work of Felipe Fernandez-Armesto: desert, tundra and ice, non-fertile steppes ('oceans of grass'), tropical rainforests and glacial forests, alluvial soils in drying up climates, highland plateaus ('heaven's mirror'), and eventually oceans, whose domestication became historical work of nations inhabiting Atlantic coasts of Europe.⁹ Few of them – six to be precise – are world agriculture cradles, focal points of cultivating crop, vegetables, fruit and cattle farming. Territory is a place where distinct cultural identities are formed, it is also a space of long-lasting relations within a given community with its environment, which fulfil its various needs,

⁹ His *Cywilizacje. Kultura, ambicje i przekształcanie natury*, Warszawa 2008, p. 35. Napoleon Wolański distinguishes analogous geoclimate environment of human existence": the Arctic, high mountains, dry areas, grassy ecosystems and tropical forests. N. Wolański, *Ekologia człowieka. Wrażliwość na czynniki środowiska i biologiczne zmiany przystosowawcze*, T.I. Warszawa 2006, p. 410-423.

for instance existential, recreational and aesthetical. A habitat, *loci*, is formed in this way.

Throughout millennia *Homo sapiens* used natural resources in a relatively sustainable way. In this phase the growth was extensive. It was based on agricultural production, gradual ameliorating of agrotechnology and efficiency of natural sources of energy – gravitational, solar or biomass recycling. Labour was carried out mainly by body (Mencius). The result was the slow population growth – around 0,1% a year. It was the Malthusian models of economy: population size, average lifespan and level of fulfilling the needs depended greatly on agricultural resources and available technologies, materials (wood) and energy. Using these until the industrial revolution increased, albeit very slowly, productivity of farmer's and craftsmen's labour. For example: population of China grew in the 18th century by 0,8% a year, namely from 120-150m (1600) to 350m (1800). In contrast population in Europe grew 16,2m between 1600-1750, and 28,5m between 1750-1800 (J. de Vries). The way out of the Malthusian catastrophe was access to new energy sources and materials to produce tools. These were hydrocarbons energy used to power machines, cheaper iron and steel. This took place in England in time of the industrial revolution. It is the second most important turning point in human relations with nature through labour. It seemed that the end of the Malthusian era came and mankind became independent of natural economy.

The industrial revolution and the beginning of the industrial society in the 19th century radically changed the landscape and environment. The rise of food supply due to agrotechnology and mechanization of farmer's labour, fall of newborns' deaths due to progress in medicine and generally growth of social product – all this led to fast growth of population on earth and reached today's levels after 200 years. Before last ice age, 10000 years ago, there were 2-3m *Homo sapiens* on our planet. There were billion new people every dozen or so years and mankind found itself in a new trap. It was named after the author of a report from 1974, who drew the public attention towards

environmental limitations of industrial civilization in its current, free market, capitalistic form – I call it the Meadows' trap. In contrast to the Malthusian one it has three new features. First, it encompasses the whole of the global ecosystem, while the preindustrial one used local ecosystems, mainly soil and wood. The current one influences all ingredients of the biosphere – atmosphere, hydrosphere and biosphere, it also reduces the biodiversity. In short – industrial economy is different in character. In order to function efficiently it requires constant accumulation. New fields of accumulation, growth of consumption demand cause the economy to leave deeper and deeper ecological marks. And third – in order to set oneself free from this trap all societies need to co-operate globally to set extreme conditions of functioning of market-capitalist economy. These conditions are among others: labour conditions (time, payment), and conditions of taking advantage of nature. Human has not subdued earth. It made itself addicted to nature and its ingredients – its climate, fertile soil riches and other resources, tropical rainforests, hydrocarbons, drinking water reserves. The nature's revenge is in civilization diseases, malnutrition and poverty within third world states, climate disorders, desertification, energy price growth. The current human being is harnessed to another type of treadmill than a farmer.

Within relations with nature one element of the world civilization is the space of the human world. Its borders are marked by technological extensions of human arms. In the current phase of industrial society it has encompassed natural environment so strongly, that now one cannot reflect on social life without referring to categories and knowledge stemming from natural sciences, and even technical. And conversely – natural sciences specialists see the necessity to include political science categories and knowledge in their analyses.¹⁰ The next system without which one cannot understand how the

¹⁰ Np. S.H. Schneider, *Laboratorium Ziemia*, Warszawa 1998, p. 13; J. Diamond, *Strzelby, zarazki, maszyny*, Warszawa 2010, p. 23; H. Rogall, *Ekonomia zrównoważonego rozwoju. Teoria i praktyka*, Poznań 2010, p. 140, 541; W. H. McNeill, *The Human Condition: An Ecological and Historical View*, Princeton 1980.

world civilizations functions is the global ecosystem.¹¹ But by 'ecosystem' one understands all species interacting with one another and the physical and chemical environments, forming biological population. Within ecosystems production of biomass takes place. Exploitation of soil, oceans, grazing grounds, tropical rainforests and expanding ground for settling, which is connected to the population growth, changes local ecosystems. Economic activity of human population in the ecosystems led to fragmentation of natural environment, chemical pollution and movement of species to new ecosystems. It decreases biodiversity, the biosphere shrinks, interventions into biogeochemical cycles take place – carbon, oxygen or hydrological cycles. According to estimated numbers mankind has lost 25% of best soils since 1945 – they fell into oceans. It also consumed 1/3 of its forests, utilizing them mainly as wood to produce tools and firewood. Currently mankind is using 40% of plant production (the only autotrophs), measured on the basis of photosynthetic productivity. The ecological mark that mankind leaves on its natural environment, according to Mathis Wackernagel, has grown 80% in the last 40 years. Mankind is using 20% more resources than nature is able to recycle.¹² In ecological economics there is an equation where the influence on environment

¹¹ N. Eldredge, *Życie na krawędzi. Rozwój cywilizacji i zagłada gatunków*, Warszawa 2003, p. 151; E. Wilson, *Różnorodność życia*, Warszawa 1999; C. Sagan, *Błękitna kropka - człowiek i jego przyszłość w kosmosie*, Warszawa 2001. Among social science experts there exists a reflection on the role of ecosystems in various societies' historie. See E. Burke III, K. Pomerantz, *The Environment and World History*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2009. Introductory reflections by K. Pomerantz on pages 3-32; A. Hornberg, *The Power of the Machine: Global Inequalities of Economy, Technology, and Environment*, Walnut Creek, Lanham, 2001, p. 49-64. On the influence of climate on human history see H. H. Lamb, *Climate, History, and Modern World*, London and New York 1995, p. 272-309, a także J. Cowie, *Zmiany klimatyczne. Przyczyny, przebieg i skutki dla człowieka*, Warszawa 2009, ch. 3.

¹² M. Wackernagel, W. E. Rees, *Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth*, Gabriola Island, Philadelphia 1996, p. 7-27; P. Ward, *Hipoteza Medei. Czy życie na Ziemi zmierza do samouściszwienia?* Warszawa 2010, p. 21, 62-63,123; Ch-D. Schoenwiese, *Człowiek i klimat*, Warszawa 1997, ch. V; E. Kośmicki, *Teoria ekorozwoju a możliwości przewyciężenia normatywizmu*, w: *Sterowanie ekorozwojem. T.I, Teoretyczne aspekty ekorozwoju*, pod red. B. Poskrobki, Białystok 1998, p. 138-141; J. Foley, *Bilans zdrowia Ziemi*, Świat Nauki 2010, nr 5, p. 50-53; H. Meadows, D. I. Meadows, J. Randers, W. W. Berens III, *Granice wzrostu*. Warszawa 1973 and D. Meadows, *Evaluating Past Forecasts. Reflections on the One Critique of Limits to Growth*, w: *Sustainability or Collapse?. An Integrated History and Future People on Earth*, R. Constanza, L. Graumlich, W. Steffen (eds). The MIT Press, 2007, p. 339-416. Current data in the last WWF report *Living Planet Report 2012, Biodiversity, biopolicy and better choices*, Annex 2, Ecological Footprint, p. 135-145.

is measured by multiplying the population size, per capita income and technology used (pressure on environment = population size x per capita income x technology used). In it the only unknown quantity now is the quantity of time which is left until the moment when the ecological mark imprinted on nature makes it impossible for it to save its balance.

On the basis of our knowledge of earth as a system, showing the place of the biosphere, and in it the role of human activity, we come to the field of a narrower scientifically natural discipline – ecology. It was founded at the turn of 19th and 20th centuries. Its subject are mutual influences between species and the environment they live in. The theory of evolution answers the question how these influences came to being and how organisms were created. There is then a tight relation between modern ecology and evolutionism.

As late as here one faces the problem of relation between natural environment (global ecosystem) and growing human population, which developed wide economic activity, utilizing vast natural resources in the process. The clash of the world civilization with nature elicited a lot of waves, which can sink it, and the last one is like a tsunami. Relations between economy and environment, from the point of view of social metabolism or the mark set on nature, is the job for ecological economics (W. Smil, H. Daly, H. T. Odum, R. Constanza, H. Bartmann, H. Rogall, M. Wackernagel). In this research perspective one sees the coevolution of the economy and environment. Human with its economic activities translates local ecosystems, and next it must adopt itself to these changes, which is achieved, on long-term basis, by boosting labour productivity thanks to better technologies. There is a thesis from this ascertainment: ‘functioning economic system is doomed to functioning ecological system’.¹³ Because human cannot exist without nature,

¹³ H. Bartmann *Umweltoekonomie- Oekologische Oekonomie*, Stuttgart 1996, p. 13; R. Constanza, J. Cumberland, H. Daly, R. Goodland, R. Norgaard, *An Introduction to the Ecological Economics*, Boca Raton 1997, p. 6-7; N. Wolański, *Ekologia człowieka. Wrażliwość na czynniki środowiska i biologiczne zmiany przystosowawcze*, T.I. Warszawa 2006, cz. III, *Zróżnicowanie i geograficzne rozmieszczenie człowieka*, p. 335-363.

the primacy of economy is currently put in question. Categories of analyzing the world civilization in the ecological perspective are: limits of tolerance of nature, constant development, anthropogenic load put on the biosphere, balance of the ecosystem. They are about specifying the thesis that further development of national economies may proceed only within the limits of tolerance of nature.

2.3 Economic perspective. As regards the analysis of a group of people's adaptation to the natural environment, there are two relatively independent aspects – the technological one and the one concerning proprietary relations.

The aspect of technology, technique and energy utilized in the process of adaptation is decisive as regards the range of influencing the natural environment through labour. For 10000 years the only sources of energy used to multiply the effort of human arms were wind, sun and gravitational energy. Solar energy was used in the form of biomass, which domesticated animals transferred into pulling power. The breakthrough in this field was utilizing power from hydrocarbons to propel machines in 19th century in England. The new propulsion quickly enhanced labour productivity within the fields of industry, transport and military operations. This aspect of economy is among interests of evolutionism and history of technology. From this point of view in the history of human communities we have: the phase of hunters-gatherers, the phase of agricultural communities, and the industrial civilization. One important analytical category in this context is the notion of civilization as a model of common existence of people, based on the mechanism of adaptation to the natural environment. In this mechanism the most important part is the kind of economic activity which is enabled by technology (including writing or practical knowledge) and utilized energies. Disposal technological means of utilizing natural resources enable population growth, differentiation of settlement, development of labour specialization, and finally – the creation of

an institution to coordinate collaboration of masses of people. Only then a system of food distribution and wide social gaps can come into being.¹⁴

The next aspect of the process of people's adaptation to natural environment is the one concerning propriety relations, first towards land, then all natural resources, next – labour tools and social wealth, which was created out of human labour. As Polish academic, Andrzej Zajączkowski, writes: 'the system of ruling the land and the organization of developed land and settled space are the basic conditions for human existence'.¹⁵ Through millennia, up to 17/18th century, when the commodification of agriculture based on private ownership of the land came into being, first in England – land, water and resources located in a certain part of the world was owned by a nation. The object of common national ownership, apart from the land, were also material, spiritual and intellectual means, which served to adapt this certain ecosystem to the needs of human existence and to perpetuate the position of real co-owners. Necessary to achieve this adaptation were proper spiritual and physical abilities. They created labour strength, which was assisted by personal skills.¹⁶ It is important to learn, as far as the human communities' history is concerned, how they organize social labour, or the way in which they utilize workforce and social wealth that is created out of it. The category we use to describe complex bonds between people who get involved in manufacturing goods and services and their redistribution is the means of production. This was introduced by Karl Marx. In this conceptualization manufacturing goods encompasses active relationship between humans and nature and rich physical and social bonds. They appear, directly and indirectly, between nature, individual labour, social labour, various activities

¹⁴ Similar definitions in Fernandez-Armesto Cite work, p. 20, as well as vast group of reaearchers of human societies: G. Childe, *O rozwoju w historii*, Warszawa 1963, p.79-80, 159-160; E.P. Lanning, *Peru przed Inkami*, Kraków 1985, p. 9-10, B. Buzan, R. Little, *Systemy międzynarodowe w historii świata*, Warszawa 2011, p.236, A. Galganek, *Historia stosunków międzynarodowych. Nierówny i połączony rozwój*, v.2, Warszawa 2013, p.944-973.

¹⁵ His, *Rzecz o socjologii*. Warszawa 1993, p. 46.

¹⁶ See more on apriopriative koncept of nation : S. Kozyr- Kowalski, op. cit., p. 24. See also J. Tittenbrun, *Gospodarka w społeczeństwie .zarys socjologii gospodarki i socjologii ekonomicznej w ujęciu strukturalizmu socjoeconomicznego*, Poznań 2012, p. 343-344.

and people within the social division of labour, as well as the state. In the combination of nature-economy-human there have been four ways of managing dominated in the history of societies: the means of production based on kinship, slave, tributary and capitalistic. The last one is created on the connection of privately owned means of factory production, utilizing scientific-based technologies and based on hired workforce.¹⁷ In practical economy there are often overlaps between all ways of connecting direct manufacturer and labour conditions, currently this shows in oil-rich Arab societies. The most problematic thing seems to be understanding the modern era, which started with the industrial revolution of 18/19th centuries. The reason for these problems are analytical phenomena that are difficult to distinguish – industrialization, capitalism and modernity. Analytical problems are also present within the scope of the modern form of capital ownership, namely corporate ownership. At the starting point one must distinguish proprietary relations from relations which depend on ownership, or being the result of economic ownership, as well as in the systems of political authority, family life and relations which influence ownership. In result ownership is explained by Stanisław Kozyr-Kowalski 'as such system of socio-economic relations, where obtaining material and spiritual goods appear – always, sometimes or only hardy ever – free, relatively or absolutely independent from own labour or generally human labour. Such obtaining of the goods is often connected to a form of practical economic and social monopoly.'¹⁸ In that case ownership might be treated as special gift of nature or human history, for only in certain conditions for the development of technologies, labour tools and relations of domination of one group of people over other another it is possible to utilize that gift. It constitutes a non-labour feature of production, economy, social life and extra-social economic activities. Many modern nations are able to obtain gifts from nature. For example, according to World Bank estimates, capital assets made 9% of total Canadian wealth, but the state owes as much as 69% of

¹⁷ E. R. Wolf, *Europa i ludy bez historii*, Kraków 2009, p.337-350, P. Berger, *Rewolucja kapitalistyczna*, Warszawa 1995, p. 66-67, and G. Ingham, *Kapitalizm*, Warszawa 2011, p.23-35.

¹⁸ There, p.225. See J. Tittenbrun, op. cit., p. 351-352.

its wealth to natural resources. In contrast Luxembourg has the biggest human share in creating social wealth – 83%, next places in this ranking: Japan (81%) and Germany (79%). According to R. Constanza team's estimates, the whole biosphere returns services to humans which are worth 33bln dollars (with the then GNP of 18bln dollars)¹⁹. The inclusion of electricity into production processes rapidly increased the effectiveness of human labour. In result, according to S. Albinowski's calculations, every employee hired in modern industry is assisted in his professional position by 130 'energy-related slaves'.²⁰ So the economic process is wider and deeper than monetary exchange. It encompasses the external results, both positive and negative. The analysis of functioning mechanisms of the modern economy must consist of: market mechanism, monetary system, production system, industrial conflict, or fighting for surplus, financial assets, the role of the state in economy and the cultural basis of the economic system. If one wishes to study global capitalism he/she must additionally treat national economic systems as elements of a wider whole, namely the capitalistic world economy. The structures of national economy transgress national states' borders, creating integrated economy, at least of a transnational character.

The main weakness of the mainstream economy is ignoring the historical aspect of the evolution of market-capitalistic economy. In econometric models it is usually assumed that economy is characterized by perfect competition, complete markets and symmetric information (as in the Arrow-Debreu's model). In the practice of the modern economy there are tendencies for gradual concentration and monopolization. What is still present is basic, indispensable in all phases role of the state, however temporarily weakened. Another important weakness of the classical analyses is the problem of

¹⁹ *The natural resources myth*, The Economist, 23 XII- 5I, 1995-1996 and R. Costanza, et.al. *The value of world's ecosystem service and natural capital*, Nature, 1997, No.387, 15 May, p.253-260. On methodology of respect see G. C. Daily, et. al. *The Value of Nature and the Nature of Value*, Science, New Series, 21 July 2000, Vol.289, No.5478, p. 395-396. G. Becker estimates the share of material resources, devices and natural resources in creating national income for 20%, the rest was to be created by human capital. See Tittenbrun, op. cit., p. 245.

²⁰ His *Bogactwo i nędza narodów. Studia o gospodarce światowej u progu XXI wieku*. Warszawa 1996, p. 159.

external effects, which are not taken into account by prices (externalization of environmental costs). Still its identifying point treating natural resources as public goods such as water and atmosphere. It turned out (J. Robinson, P. Sweezy, J. K. Galbraith) that in practical capitalistic economy there exists a 'monopolistic competition' or oligopoly. Then the strategy of sustaining profit is created, which is the source of wasting of social wealth (expensive advertising campaigns, purchasing patents in order not to allow them to enter markets, limiting production to maintain monopolistic prices).²¹

2.4 Political science perspective.

What is important in this perspective is the analysis of particular and social interests, whom the state policies serve. It might be about its role in implementing and sustaining the neoliberal variant of modern globalization. The important thing is the analysis of strategic functions of the state, including new typology of its goals: assisting the capital on global level, protection of social order and its legitimization on national level, providing good conditions for investment and co-operating with NGOs on local level. In this phase of capitalist world economy's development it will be necessary to create new functions of states. This phase means more visible structural crisis in relations between human, economy and nature (Meadows' catastrophe). Its results and displays will be climate and food wars and old-new class wars. From the analysis of previous history-making crises there is a generalization, that in order to solve them it is necessary to step out of the previous institutional frames, strategies and conventional wisdom constituting their base. Now we have the liberal conception of "self-regulating markets" and the neoclassical economy sustaining the illusion of free competition of capital and labour and the consumer's independence.

²¹ More in J. A. Schumpeter, *Kapitalizm, socjalizm, demokracja*. Warszawa 2009, P. 94-98; J. K. Galbraith, *Ekonomia w perspektywie. Krytyka historyczna*. Warszawa 2011, P. 171-182; H. Rogall, op. cit., p. 85-89.

Ruling people's hearts and minds is carried out by bank economists. The alternative economics is waiting for its historical time, it is the economics of sustainable development and is the theoretical basis for new civilization – the civilization of constant development.

The solution to the new structural crisis will require changing of the neoliberal Leviathan. It is currently characterized by disciplinary social policies, expansive penal policies, individual responsibility as a motivating discourse (L. Wacquant), and above all – service for financial markets. There will be a new function for it – the function of global co-ruling, or structural (industrial), fiscal and social policies, but carried out in parallel with the remaining national economies. The goal of this new function will be to harmonize the businesses of national companies, trades and sectors with civilizational optimum. The hardest trial will be experienced by states who regulate their economies, which take most advantage of neoliberal globalization: USA, UK, China, and small countries but big 'tax havens'. Together states may win another war, this time against banking and financial sector. There appear the necessity to create institutional frames, utilizing recast international organizations, to formulate and execute boundary conditions of taking advantage of production factors on global scale. Thus one important scientific aim is to find the answer to the question why modern ruling class has become the slaves of financial markets, why the attempt to weaken the independence of central banks is now the only coup d'etat, and the biggest threat is inflation. In short, it is about registering mechanisms which make politicians dependent on business. In practice it is down to pressing the administration of national states to suppress the inflation. So in order not to be caught in Meadows' catastrophe, the dynamic of accumulation, goods and services structure (mainly in the field of health service), other fields of technology and branches of economy must be different.

The concept of hedonistic lifestyle is also out of steam.

All this puts into question the possibility of continuing the current model of economic growth. One possible way out in the middle of the current century might be the civilization of sustained growth: World New Deal – the world ecologically, socially, politically and culturally sustainable; connecting economic efficiency with social safety and biodiversity. The next target for a political science expert is to find the answer to the question of whom the taxpayers money should serve – rentiers or general public. Another problem is the dilemma of common grazing ground in the global era, or the problem of collective goods connected with preserving the natural environment for the incoming generations. Moreover, we must solve the problem of legitimization of international organizations, which impose international regimes, often in the interest of large corporations (WTO, IMF, WB). And finally the problem of global leadership and government, or searching for institutional order being able to manage the world system (G-20, G-2, regional empires system?).

3.4 Cultural perspective: confrontations or friendly meetings of local civilizations?

Each of the perspectives of analyzing world civilization discussed so far requires a rich arsenal of terms and thesis. But to reach the centre of the spiritual culture of various nations, local civilizations and cultural formations requires untangling a few tissues that have been formed throughout millennia. Many academic disciplines try to organize the reflection on cultural interchange. They constitute a wide academic current called global anthropology. It blends many fields: sociology, social anthropology, ethnography, postcolonial studies, even philosophy of knowledge and politics.²² In this perspective a few processes seem to attract the most attention. The first

²² K. A. Appadurai, *Nowoczesność na wolności. Kulturowe wymiary globalizacji*. Kraków 2005; W.J. Burszta, *Różnorodność i tożsamość. Antropologia jako kulturowa refleksyjność*. Poznań 2004; J. Clifford, *Kłopoty z kulturą. Dwudziestowieczna etnografia, literatura i sztuka*. Warszawa 2000; E. R. Wolf, *Europa i ludy bez historii*, Kraków 2009, S. Lukes, *Liberałowie i kanibale. O konsekwencjach różnorodności*, Toruń 2012.

process starts at the notion that 'modernity is created due to the presence of 'other' in it and in the perspective of depriving the West of the exclusiveness to depict it.²³ There is the dialogue between the dominating culture of the centre, peripheral cultures and the pluralism of values that they are based on. This is the problem of universality versus particularity of certain cultures. It brings about the idea of their relativism and a paradoxical thesis, that 'there is nothing ethnocentric, nothing more particular than pretension to universalism.'²⁴ It is mainly about rationalism and individualism (bonded with human rights and democracy), always taken for granted within the sphere of Western influence, and also treating the process of its modernization as a paradigm for the development of societies. As K. A. Appiah ,one of the proponents of global anthropology writes, 'the challenge here is to equip hearts and minds shaped throughout millennia in local groups in ideas and institutions which will allow us to live together as a global tribe, which we have become.'²⁵ There is a tension between nation and universalism, but not contradiction. Jean Ziegler, who agrees with this opinion, states that 'nation which does not succumb to being closed within its own identity is the bearer of universal values. It accepts otherness and puts it in the awareness of belonging to a group which provides security.'²⁶ There are also meetings of different cultures and ethnic identifications within one nation. Paradoxically, it brings diversity to it, for – as E. Ionesco states – ' the only living community is one that everyone may stay different among the same.'²⁷ But one result of the McWorld is Jihad, re-birth of nationalistic tendencies,, fundamentalisms,

²³ M. Turowski, *Antyeuropocentryzm i jego wrogowie*, w: J. Goody, op. cit., p. 25. His point of view on European political philosophy were brought to the multicultural discourse by postcolonial studiem. See D. Chakrabarty, *Prowincjonalizacja Europy. Myśl postkolonialna i różnica historyczna*, Poznań 2011, p.33-58 and A. Lomba, *Kolonializm/Postkolonializm*, Poznań 2011, especially p. 254-263.

²⁴ I. Wallenstein, *Europejski uniwersalizm. Retoryka władzy*, Warszawa 2007, p. 54. Steven Lukes, interpretując spór między relatywizmem a uniwersalizmem, zauważa, że „uniwersalizm jest etnocentryczny, ponieważ etnocentryczność jest uniwersalna”, *Liberałowie i kanibale*, dz. cyt., p.39.

²⁵ Tegoż, *Kosmopolityzm. Etyka w świecie obcych*, Warszawa 2008, p. 11.

²⁶ Tegoż, *Nienawiść do Zachodu*, Warszawa 2010, p. 292.

²⁷ There. Steven Lukes stresses that „cultures are never 'drawers,' but open systems, places of protest, hybridization whose limits are blurred'. People live in cultural caleidoscope (J. Waldron). An opposite argument is called by him a ;sociology for the poor.' (za S. Benhabib), *Liberałowie i kanibale*, op. cit., p.51.

regional movements, separatisms. At the same time what connects people all over the world is the belonging to the community of the indebted. It is connected by common business – the rate of inflation. As Jan Toprowski states, ‘politics, culture and history – other sources of our humanity – become either private consumer options or ideas on spending free time, in the image of tv channels being watched by private units’ (...) or common consumer options, like sports events or concerts’.²⁸

The second process, directly engaged with the first one is the process of theoretical and ideological overcoming of eurocentrism and what it was accompanied by in the era of colonial conquests – racism. There are in practice two sides of the problem. The first one touches upon the debate on the reasons of the ‘great furcation’ between the West and East. Many scholars believed the source was in the European culture, the “European miracle” which was to give birth to rationalism, modern science, modernization standards (M. Weber, E. Jones, L. Dumont, D. Landes). The position culturalism, strengthened in the age of romanticism, was based on the belief that the output of classical Greece was the foundation of Europe. Many studies done recently, especially ‘Black Athena’ by Martin Bernal, show Egyptian, Phoenician, Mesopotamian sources of Greek democracy, architecture, myths, religion and philosophical ideas.²⁹ In the wider perspective, studies of early modern economy and society which are more profound and based on familiarity with historical practice show that between European and Chinese or Indian institutions the difference is only about intensity. It concerns, among others, such determinants of development as freedom, private ownership, human rights, innovation, urbanization, family planning, democracy. They are present, with different intensity, in many civilizations. In the European academics’ research the eclectic liberalism axiology dominates. According to

²⁸ His, *Dlaczego gospodarka światowa potrzebuje krachu finansowego*, Warszawa 2012, p. 156/157.

²⁹ M. Bernal, *Black Athena. The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilisation. T.I: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785-1985*, New Brunswick, New Jersey 1987, p. 38-62. See J. Goody, *Logika pisma a organizacja społeczeństwa*. Warszawa 2006, p.77-80; M. Popko, *Huryci*. Warszawa 2005, especially p. 138-167. These authors point to the fact that ancient civilizations of the Middle East were superior to Greek peoples in respect to technology and culture, whose Greeks were willing to accept.

Andrzej Walicki it is formed on a set of beliefs popular in academic discourse, media and colloquial thinking: 1) private ownership and free market (free market capitalism of the 'new right'), 2) human rights rhetoric (civil and political, not socio-economic), 3) believing in universal beneficialness of the political democracy (opposition against autocracy).

The third process within the cultural perspective is the communicative dimension of globalization. It developed mainly due to new technologies of sending and coding information, the machinery of mass culture (U. Hannerz, W. Burszta, V. Mosco, S. Czapnik). It is mainly cyberspace – the new empire being constructed now by popular media. The content popularized by it lead to standardization, homogenization, and even more – americanization. The omnipresence of popular culture in media endangers local cultural traditions. There is a question of evaluating cultural globalization from the point of view of systems of values, ideas, ideologies, consumption patterns, lifestyles: do the bites of information, growing rapidly in number being available to almost every human being on earth provide knowledge so that it can be the basis for wisdom? (N. Postman). Summing up the research on media cycle of cultural transmission Wojciech Burszta sees a tendency. Namely, 'the culture, which circulates around the world are not certain objects and symbolic forms, but the idea, that one can take part in this global metacultural game. This desire is not to be fulfilled by any local cultures'.³⁰ Is there, then, an era of detraditionalization ahead of us? Increased migrations forecast its coming. In result multicultural societies are created, with weakened cultural barriers and decreasing role of tradition as repository for life models, behavioral patterns, choices of life strategies. The sign of modernity seems to be – according to L.

³⁰ W. J. Burszta, op. cit., p. 106; See U. Hannerz, *Cosmopolitans and Locals in Word Culture*, in: M. Feartherstone (Ed.)*Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation And Modernity*. London 1990, p. 237; His *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places*, London and New York, 1996, p. 102-111; V. Mosco, *The Political Economy of Communicatition: Rethinking and Renewal*, London 2009, p.179-183, S. Czapnik, *Władza, media i pieniądz. Amerykańska ekonomia polityczne komunikowania*, Opole 2014. p. 95-99.

Lindstrom – ‘seeing the present in the notions of the past through depicting the past using terms of the present’. ³¹

And finally an important level of relations between civilizations is searching for normative basis of co-operation of people of different races, national identities, local cultures, citizens of big and small countries, rich and poor societies. On the level of consciousness this basis is creating the formation of global awareness, apart from the national or local ones. At its base there are global collective goods, without which the constant development of the world civilization will not be possible. Implementation of the convention for climate protection, sustainable development, elimination of famine and poverty in the world leads to relegation of sources of everyday existence in the world market society. To incur such commitments international community is led by, on the one side, pragmatic considerations, on the other rising human solidarity, ethics of globalization. It is built on directives common to all important religious systems and ethical doctrines, they are their common denominator. A possible basis for this search is the conception of pluralism of values (I. Berlin, A. Walicki, S. Lukes, J. Waldron). It consists of such beliefs as recognition of plurality and disproportion of peoples’ goals, but at the same time each local civilization selects respected values and lifestyles from a limited pool, constrained by the manner of bio-psycho-socio-cultural existence, common to all *Homo sapiens* (rejection of cultural relativism).³²

According to Edmund Lewandowski’s re-creation of various nations’ characters, one may get these directives to few rules. As the most important in our perspective one should regard the golden rule of ethics – reciprocity: *do, ut des* (I give, so you give to me, too). It is the basis for social exchange, it is

³¹ W. J. Burszta, op. cit., p. 113. See his *Świat jako więzienie kultury. Pomyślenia*. Warszawa 2008, p. 18-42.

³² See I. Berlin, *Rzekomy relatywizm w XVIII-wiecznej myśli europejskiej*, in: *Pokrzywione drzewo człowieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2004, p.68-70, 76, A. Walicki, *Od projektu komunistycznego do neoliberalnej utopii*, Kraków 2013, p.387-402, S. Lukes, *Czy pluraliści muszą być relatywistami?*, in: *Liberałowie i kanibale*, dz. cyt., s.155-162, J. Waldron, *Minority Culture and the Cosmopolitan Alternative*, in: W. Kimlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford, New York 1995, p.99-100, Deepak Lal, *Does Modernization Requires Westernization*, The Independent Review, no.1, vol. 5, 2000, p.5-24.

present among various species, so for humans it has a genetic background. Another natural virtue is moderation, *aurea mediocritas*. Hesiod, Laozi, Confucius, Buddha, Sophocles, Aristotle – they all called to respect it in peoples' lives. In the face of diminishing natural resources it might inspire quality-oriented lifestyles. Compliance, prudence, sense of responsibility, fairness are connected to the above-mentioned. They all lead to a free-of-conflict life, they introduce reliance and boost trust and social capital. It is believed that in the world of Islam fairness is more important than freedom. Here the Islamic civilization departs from the Western one, which cherishes freedom, often understood economically. There freedom is confronted by fairness which requires that inequalities arose in the process of redistribution of goods were justified by labour and skills, and as we know from our previous deliberations, they are often of gift-like character. Another virtue is tolerance, or agreeing to attitudes other than ours. The realization of profound basis and arbitrariness of one's own culture, intellectual openness and reduction of cultural barriers among national, ethnic communities or local civilizations. The opposition of tolerance is fanaticism, or emphatic belief that one is absolutely right in his/her ways and willingness to make others behave similarly. As Amos Oz ironically writes: 'a fanatic takes great care of you, puts his arms around your neck, because he/she loves you so much, or he/she cuts your throat if you turn out to be invulnerable to salvation'.³³

In this perspective the role of a scientist is to show what role might be layed by the most important fields of spiritual culture influencing the consciousness of the modern man, especially regional, national, cosmopolitan awareness as well as popular or developing ideologies, such as economic neoliberalism, human rights, ecologism or religious fundamentalism.

³³ Cyt. za E. Lewandowski, *Konfrontacje cywilizacyjne*. Dziś, 2007, nr 1, p. 95; P. Singer, *Jeden świat. Etyka globalizacji*, Warszawa 2006, p. 164-206, a także J. Krejci, *The Paths of Civilisations. Understanding the Currents of History*, New York 2004. For example the golden rule of Confucianism as the basic virtue in the shape of *Ai ren*, decrees friendliness towards other people. See Haesung Lee, *Kapitalizm konfucjański. Koreańska droga rozwoju*, Toruń 2011, p. 28-29 oraz *Dialogi konfucjańskie*, Wrocław 1976, XV:23.

3. Trans-discipline strategy of research structure for study of civilization.

On macro level all global society, meaning humanity consisting of all nations and ethnic communities living in all corners of our planet, might be treated as a system. According to Charles Tilly one may state that a society is 'a network of plenty social relations, some of which are totally local, and others pertaining to the global scale'.³⁴ Of this network some junctions are chosen to be researched and they obtain practicability under the names of national states, social organizations or social groups. The transfer towards the social world is done through empirical indicators. They might be events in history and their sequences made of individual and collective actions, such as revolutions or adaptation strategies. Such research policy leads to specific tests based on historical records.

3.1 Theoretical inspirations for trans-discipline strategy – neoclassicism.

The immense academic output from masters of social sciences may become a heuristic structure of research going outside of basic aims, scientific questions and formulated thesis or generalizations. A condition to achieve that would be their expansion and materialization through referring to new scientific goals, phenomena and processes, in short, generalizing correspondence between previous application and new cognitive needs. Stanisław Kozyr-Kowalski states that neoclassicism is conscious employing of the classicists' output in a given field or fields.³⁵

Sociologists developed many theories or visions from historical dynamics. However we still lack the theory for the largest structure of social life, which is the world civilization. It does not mean however, that in the rich output of the whole sociology, and in the social sciences as well, there are no

³⁴ His *Big Structurrs, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. New York 1984, p. 25.

³⁵ Tegoż, dz. cyt., p. 27-35.

mature theoretical conceptions or conceptions materialized in research practice. Conditions for that are fulfilled by Immanuel Wallerstein's and his, to a certain extent, master and rival – Fernand Braudel's theory of world-systems. Among such vast in space and time scientific undertakings are undoubtedly Karl Marx's and Max Weber's theoretical systems. An attempt to embrace the accelerators for social change, extended to the whole of the history of human societies, was undertaken by evolutionists and neoevolutionists. But the factual reconstruction of the historical process of intertwining of destinies being far away from one another, is attempted by world historians, anthropogeography experts, anthropologists of culture, sociologists of history. They all are looking for conditions and mechanisms of development, stagnation, fall of many societies, local civilizations, different paths of development taken by peoples living in different habitats. Such presentation of human history is typical for bigger and bigger group of academics who try to overcome the cognitive and axiological limitations of national histories, and especially to overcome the understanding history from European perspective. Aspiring to overcome europocentrism may be associated mainly to Edward Said, James Blaut (geography expert), Marshall Hodgson, William McNeill (historians), Eric Wolf (anthropologist), Andre Gunder Frank (economist), Barry Buzan, Richard Little, John M. Hobson (international relations experts).³⁶ Fernandez Armesto, who belongs to this group, stresses that 'world history is about mutual relations among nations. Its most representative episodes, for certain groups, mirror strong intercultural relations: migrations, commerce, mutual influences, missions, pilgrimages, wars, forging of empires, popular social movements,

³⁶ Zob. E. W. Said, *Orientalizm*, Poznań 2005; J. M. Blaut, *The Colonizer's Model of the World. Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History*, New York 1993; W. H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community, with a Retrospective Essay*, Chicago 1990 and his *The Rise of the West after Twenty-Five Years*, w: *Civilisation and World Systems*. Op. cit., p. 303-320; M. Hodgson, *Rethinking World History*, Cambridge 1993; E. R. Wolf, *Europa i ludy bez historii*, Kraków 2009; A. G. Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1998. The output of world history is presented at <http://www.h-net.org/~world>. J. Goody. *Kapitalizm i nowoczesność. Islam, Chiny, Indie a narodziny Zachodu*, Warszawa 2006, p.7-33; R. Collins, *Introduction: The Golden Age of Macro-Historical Sociology*, w: *Macrohistory. Essays in Sociology of the Long Run*, Stanford University Press 1999. See O. Halecki, *Historia Europy - jej granice i podziały*, Lublin 1994, p. 34-35.

technology transfers, biological species and terms.³⁷ World history adherents developed a wide sociological reflection over difficulties of researching such a complex structure: interdisciplinarity, bonding subjectivity with objective conditions, especially ecological ones, consistency and qualitative changes, distinguishing developmental cycles, the role of the state and accumulation of capital, universal tendencies and regional curiosities, synchronized integration of local civilizations' histories and their relative diachronic separation.³⁸ What is especially emphasized is the thesis that there are no historical narrations that are not history-burdened. 'Ignoring this fact leads either to bad history or bad theory,' as Randall Collins concludes.³⁹

In this article's author's opinion, the decisive circumstance was the technological revolution of the 19th century and profound social, cultural and political change it brought with it: industrialization, urbanization, democratization, birth of modern nations and liberal-democratic states. Currently the 'modern religion of progress' is rejected more and more often. Technology – the main source of modernity – has been criticized, too. The dualism of technology and science is emphasized. One painful fact is also the

³⁷ His *Cywilizacje. Kultura, ambicje i przekształcanie natury*, Warszawa 2008, p. 28 and *Milenum. Historia ostatniego tysiąclecia*, Poznań 1999.

³⁸ See M. G. Hodgson, op. cit., p. 2-9, 72-95, 245-246; G. A. Frank, *ReOrient*, op. cit., p. 230-257, 339-360; I. Wallerstein, *Analiza systemów światów. Wprowadzenie*, Warszawa 2007, p. 13-40; J. M. Hobson, *The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change*, Cambridge 1997, p. 173-22; J. Abu-Lughod, *Discontinuity and Persistence. One world system or a succession of systems*, [in]: *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?*, A.G. Frank, B. K. Gills (eds.), London, New York 1993, p. 278-291; I. Morris, *Why The West Rules – for now. The patterns of history and what they reveal about the future*, London 2010, p. 21-26, J.A. Goldstone, *Why Europe? The Rise of The West in World History, 1500-1850*, Boston 2009, p. 16-33, K. Pomerantz, *The Great Divergence: Europe, China and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, New York 2000.


³⁹ His, the introduction of *The Golden Age of Macro-Historical Sociology*, University of Pennsylvania 1998. See articles of American authors: G. Stokes, *The Fates of Human Societies: A Review of Recent Macrohistories*, The American Historical Review, April 2001, Vol. 106, No. 2., and P. Manning, *Navigating World History: A Guide for Researchers and Teachers*, New York 2003. p. 15. Of Polish authors see A. Chodubski, *Wyznania cywilizacyjne w poznaniu nauk humanistycznych (i społecznych)*, w: *Cywilizacje w czasie i przestrzeni*, Zeszyty Naukowe, nr. 4, Uniwersytet Gdańsk, Toruń 1998, p. 21-33. B. Buzan, *From International to World Society*, Cambridge 2004; B. Buzan, R. Little, *Systemy międzynarodowe w historii świata*, Warszawa 2011, J. M. Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*, New York 2004. Rozwojowi tego kierunku badauczego towarzyszy bogata refleksja metodologiczna. See e.g. J. Hobson, G. Lawson, J. Rosenberg, *Historical Sociology*, w: *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ISA, 2010, ed. R. A. Denenmark, <http://epints.lse.ac.uk/28026/>

lack of main destination point, the project of 'kingdom of freedom' and welfare. It was replaced by a permanent and unfocused change.⁴⁰

As a heuristic conception, binding all levels, the biggest heuristic virtues is presented by Fernand Braudel's concept. The French historian enumerates three levels of social reality:

1) the level of structural history. Long waves might be interpreted as specific historical periods, when the structure or the course of the researched processes is determined by the occurrence of the same conditions.⁴¹

Chart 1. Block model of relations between global ecosystem, human economic activities, global government and culture.



⁴⁰ See U. Beck, *Władza i przeciwwładza w epoce globalnej*, Warszawa 2005; A. Giddens, *Nowoczesność i tożsamość. „Ja” i społeczeństwo w epoce późnej nowoczesności*. Warszawa 2001; Z. Bauman, *Płynna nowoczesność*. Kraków 2006; E. Wnuk- Lipiński, *Świat między epokami. Globalizacja. Demokracje. Państwo narodowe*, Kraków 2004. See also J. Delumeau, *Strach w kulturze Zachodu*, Warszawa 1986.

⁴¹ Such mode of interpretation is talked about by E. Mandel, *Long Waves of Capitalists Development: A Marxist Interpretation*, London, New York 1995, p. 76-96.

In the field of logistics within far-reaching commerce it could be the phase of utilizing porters in tropical rainforests, camels in the desert or costal shipping in the sea routes. Such available means of transport would condition far-reaching commerce through millennia. The qualitative change was brought by improvement of communication between continents thanks to steamboats and railways, which happened in the middle of the 19th century.

- 2) the level of conjectural history (economic, political, cultural, social, military (for instance: Kondratiew's and Junglar's cycles)).
- 3) the level of occurrence history, for example political (nobility's or aristocracy's rule in the Second Polish Republic, or activities of democratic opposition in the 1970s in Poland). In the political reality and by using many author's research, these were waves of democratization: S. Huntington's (1828-1926; 1943-62; 1972...), P. Kennedy's hegemonic cycles (hegemony of Spain, Holland, England and the USA correlated with economic advantage).

These three relatively distant processes are activated due to a certain arrangement of social labour organized in order to utilizing the world of nature. The process of the longest wave encompasses types of relations between human population and natural environment set up with the intermediation of labour (economy). There are two phases within the history of the last 5000 years. Up to the industrial revolution world population was imprisoned in the Malthusian trap. Communities of hunters-gatherers lived in local ecosystems. Such was the fate of agricultural communities. They used different ways of uniting labour conditions with the direct manufacturer (means of production based on kinship, slavery or tribute). But with the industrial revolution and the birth of capitalistic means of production mankind found itself in the Meadow's catastrophe: a lot of people, less and less land and resources, bigger and bigger ecological mark, increase in biomass exploitation

and more and more endangered biodiversity and balance of the earth's ecosystem.

On the second level of this analysis there is the conjunctural history. It is a process of evolution of international systems' evolution, created through ecological conditions, and wider, structural (here: available material resources and means of transport). Here one distinguishes the phase of the Civilization of the Middle and its centre in Mesopotamia (3000-1500 BC – 500 BC). The next stage was the East-West system without hegemon lasting up to the geographical discoveries era. Then the world market was created organized mainly by English merchants. The West dominates militarily utilizing material resources, labour and resources of 'the peoples without histories.' As late as with the industrial revolution, which bound wage labour with industry equipped with new technologies (carbon revolution), the modern, market, capitalistic world economy is born.

The transition from one developmental phase of the researched structure or historical process (for example the role of climate and agriculture in determining the number of living people) to the next takes place in the result of a structural crisis. It then constitutes a developmental barrier, which is overcome by some societies, but by the remaining ones it becomes history, most often after the trauma of wars, epidemics, which is accompanied by religious movements deadening human consciousness.

4. The structure of knowledge about the world system.


To recognize bonds and factors explaining the process of world civilization's inception and turning points of its evolution, one must use the trans-disciplinary strategy. Its usage in research requires profound theoretical and empirical knowledge, which is a manifestation of the output of many academic disciplines. In simplified version this is shown by chart 2.

Thanks to the trans-disciplinary strategy there is an idiographic theory created. It restores an individual historical process of founding the world civilization, similarly to how natural sciences reconstruct earth's history. Yet in this process one can see the presence of some regularities of relations between nature and economical activities, type of economy and number of people in a population, level of life and the manner of redistributing national wealth – just as the regularities within the lives of various species, determined by environmental changes described in Darwin's evolution theory. For the needs of explaining a phenomenon one must use his/her general knowledge. It is necessary to understand regularities and relations between phases of the process and elements of evolving social structures. There is not one universal conception apart from assuming the knowledge of human and social structures created by subsequent generations of a given community. These structures later shape the community's life together with the local ecosystem. Although currently human is able to free himself from the local system, yet there are conditions on the level of the global ecosystem. When one wants to keep collective global goods, one needs to learn about their survival mechanisms. We gain such information from nature scientists (the element of the knowledge of nature). Next one must know what results stem from the economic activity of all mankind in the neoliberal order (the element of economic knowledge), and how inefficiencies of this order may be minimalized by co-operating states (the element of political science knowledge (international relations and global government), and what kind of change as regards style of consumption, diet, value system is required from particular individual (the cultural element). This is the essence of the trans-disciplinary strategy: combining terms, categories, theses formulated within different natural and social disciplines, in order to understand theoretical and practical problems, which are created by protecting and utilizing collective global goods.

According to the above deliberations, the knowledge structure about the world civilization is as follows:

- 1) knowledge of the place of biosphere in the earth system and the role of human population in the global ecosystem; on this level a researcher gains data on social metabolism, relations between economy and nature. He/she takes under consideration natural and technological conditions for social development. He/she must follow this pattern for geographical environment determines social development, which in turn mediatise mechanisms of this influence. The influence encompasses continental axis, climate type , environment type (biom), precipitation, day length, disease types, conditions for growing crops and breeding, species of wildlife; the influence of the area covered by a continent is described by the following regularity – the more communities, the more discoveries; this data is provided by earth science, ecology of systems, population ecology, human ecology, biogeography and anthropogeography (W. Smil, A. Crosby, J. Diamond, N. Eldredge, H H. Lamb, J. Lovelock, H. T. Odum, H. Rogall, P. Ward, N. Wolański);
- 2) system conception of human as a creation of anthropogenesis and anthrorevolution, physical anthropology (T. Bielicki, D. Buss, R. Foley, T. Kocowski, S. Pinker, A. Wierciński);
- 3) homo sapiens history, population genetics, historical demography (R. Malthus, L. Cavalii Sforza, A. Landry, A.C. Renfrew);
- 4) national economy (production, circulation, division of products etc.) and theories of circulation of capital, commerce, production chains, migration, workforce, the role of the metropolis; theories of indexation and accumulation of capital in all national economies; theories of historical phases of capitalist economy development (cycles, crises, production orders – empirical-historical, idiographic theories);
- 5) Theory of operational and system functions of states, theory of global government, theories of international politics;

Chart 2. The structure of knowledge regarding the world system: general and empirical-historical knowledge.



- 6) theory of hybridization of culture (U. Hannertz); theory of international communication, intercultural (A. Appadurai, W. Burszta, J. Clifford, E. Wolf);
- 7) concepts binding basic levels of functioning of societies; general theories (research programmes), connecting all levels of analysis: Braudel's concept of total history (global), Wallerstein's world-system, general knowledge steering the reconstruction of history made by global historians (Ph. Curtin, Fernandez-Armesto, M. Hodgson, W. H. McNeill, I. Morris).

But theory points only to a general direction. Within social sciences theories are of sketchy character, they function in research practice 'silently.' They are merely loose group of general statements, before being used practically they need to be specified and expanded. Within the at least 5000-year-long history of world civilization the steering level consists of three systems of statements – general and of historical generalization. They are:

- 1. theory of species nature of humans
- 2. theory of the polycentric and parallel evolution of agrarian civilizations
- 3. theory of world-system

Theory of species nature of humans is a generalized reflection on evolutionary biology, general and physical anthropology, as well as evolutionary psychology concerning human as biocultural species. In the biocultural perspective human constitutes a bio-psycho-socio-cultural whole. In this perspective *Homo sapiens* carries out both an internal expansion, developing abilities of its brain, and an external one connected to mastering local ecosystems. Among many curiosities of human behaviour, we must refer directly to three of them: human cognitive sphere, the process of socializing of an individual, and the role of tools (technology and energy). Thanks to its species nature human may expand internally on the individual level (through gaining knowledge of nature, practical skills and its dynamics). What leads to

this is cultural creating of new needs, especially the need to learn about the world and the need to sense the goal in one's life. The far-reaching expansion may also stem from that. Groups of humans adapt better and better to the ecosystem or expands to areas taken by other groups. It might be through peaceful means using persuasive tools, or through military strength (conquest). Thanks to the external expansion of certain human populations, the habitat of the whole species widens.

The species nature of human constitutes the constans of history, it also constitutes human, or biocultural way of historical existence, which in turn goes through different types of social systems. They are born through adaptations, which constitute an answer to structural crises, and can happen thanks to utilizing the potential of the brain. Crises may have different reasons: ecological challenges, malfunctions of social life organization, employing developmental opportunities through technological and organizational improvements, etc. After the Neolithic Revolution the agrarian civilizations became such system, after the Industrial Revolution - industrial societies.

Theory of the polycentric and parallel evolution of agrarian civilizations in Eurasia (Ph. D. Curtin, K. , , R. B. Wong, J. Goody, J. Goldstone, A. G. Frank, K. N. Chaudhuri, J.M. Hobson, J. Kochanowicz, W. H. McNeil). It is a fact, that 90% of its history mankind spent in communities of hunters-gatherers (hunter-gatherer economy). In this conditions species nature of *Homo sapiens* was established.

About 10000 years ago there was another qualitative breakthrough in this species' history. After the so-called Neolithic Revolution a social whole was created, which based on agriculture. Different crops grown in similar ecosystems (river valleys and 'vertical archipelagos') led to the birth of parallel structures, which were partially different as regards organization of social life (city-states, kingdoms, empires). Their base was natural economy – growing crops and animal breeding. Agriculture employed 80% of illiterate farmers

living on the edge of existence. With time and the development of taxes market and money were created. The exchange between the town and the country (village) was developed, and especially far-reaching trade of luxurious goods, and later big regional markets emerged. There were also technological means – technology for agriculture and print. The latter made it possible to convey and consolidate knowledge, as well as keep books (accounting) and deliver instructions to places located far away from the centre.⁴²

The Neolithic Revolution marked the beginning of constant tendencies in the process of organizing social life as well as human's life strategies. As Andrzej Wierciński points out one of these tendencies was the situation in which a member of a population was bound to the land, family and village.⁴³

In contrast to nomads, the relation with the local ecological niche became stronger. In the result of social stratifications the number of individual and intergroup conflicts grew. The opportunity of becoming wealthy thanks to the increase of the crop-growing areas created the need to hire more workers. The result of this was the birth of slavery. First slaves were recruited from prisoners of war.⁴⁴ The was the professionalization of social life going on, which was accompanied by the birth of social classes. Gradual growth of productivity of farmer's and craftsman's work gave birth to consumptive attitudes, first within the elites. The measure of human's value was to be a group of useful and luxurious things. Not only consumptive attitudes became common, but also autocentric. The functioning of agrarian civilizations was based on two structures: the exchange structure and the power one. They were regulated by tradition or the mechanism of redistribution. The latter was achieved by a system of taxes and forced labour. 'Higher social groups lived on wars and taxes, or redistribution.⁴⁵ Jacek Kochanowicz calls this way of

⁴² J. Goody, *Logika pisma a organizacja społeczeństwa*, Warszawa 2006, rozdz. II i III.

⁴³ A. Wierciński, *Magia i religia. Szkice z antropologii religii*, Kraków 1997, s. 34.

⁴⁴ See. L. Schumacher, *Niewolnictwo antyczne. Dzień powszedni i los niewolnych*, Poznań 2005, p. 30.

⁴⁵ J. Kochanowicz, *Trendy cywilizacyjne*, w: *Wymiary życia społecznego. Polska na przełomie XX i XXI wieku*, pod red. M. Marody. Warszawa 2002, p. 467. See also W. Kula, *Teoria ekonomiczna*

organizing social life ‘social ecosystems,’ because they wanted to conserve the order and hierarchy. Each person was to stay where he/she was born. The system was kept in relative homeostasis thanks to isolation and gradual introduction of innovations. Meanwhile the Malthusian mechanism played the main role. It provided balance between human and the ecosystem’s capacity. When the number of individuals in a population exceeded agriculture’s capacity, then epidemics, wars, natural disasters played their parts. In result the rhythm of agricultural civilizations’ lives constituted cycles of lean and golden years, returning every time to the original state. Even aspirations to control governments were legitimized by referring to the ‘perennial rights of the kingdom.’

With time cities developed in agrarian communities, as well as regional and far-reaching commerce. Art, science developed within the cities, there was technological progress, innovations in commerce and production organization. There was commercial exchange among civilizations, as well as cultural one, although they did not develop at the same rate. Inventions, religious movements, artistic products, pathogens were internationalized. Creative experiences of certain centres represented by science, technology, art, as well as religions, ideologies, forms of organization of social life rushed towards the world with merchants and their goods, in time becoming the output of the whole mankind. It confirms Elman Service’s, a renowned anthropologist, opinion, that societies do not evolve in order to go to wars, but rather to avoid them. What might lead to that is increase in mutual bonds and taking benefit from commercial exchange, co-operations and reliable treaties.⁴⁶

The third system of assertions is theory of world-system (F. Braudel, I. Wallerstein, S. Amin, G. Arrighi). It depicts a new social whole, whose

ustroju feudalnego, Warszawa 1962; K. Piesowicz, *Całkiem inna historia*. Warszawa 1987; J. M. Hobson, L. Weiss, *States and Economic Development. A Comparative Historical Analysis*, Cambridge 1995; M. Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, Vol.1, *A History of Power from the Beginning to A.d. 1760*, Cambridge 1986, ch.16, Paterns of world- historical development in agrarian societies, p. 518-543.

⁴⁶ E. R Service, *Origins of State and Civilisation: The Process of Cultural Evolution*, New York 1975, p. 61.

elements are old agrarian civilizations, which were previously connected only by commercial routes. It happened after the Industrial Revolution, but the beginning of the process was marked by crossing the oceans. It was then when human creativity (inventiveness) won, as well as entrepreneurship, first mainly within exploitation of resources and labour of 'savages' – who did not know Lord nor firearms. One field of the world system are relations and influences developed within it. Above all it is about economic relations, which establish hierarchical system of national societies. In the result of accumulation of wealth, innovation, military advantage, they are divided into the centre, semiperipheries and peripheries. There are, as Alain Bihr states, two phases in the process of the world system's genesis: internationalization and transnationalization.⁴⁷ In the former a big part in protecting and supporting national businesses is played by a state. In the latter, as a result of the birth of the world economic space, its role was diminished. There is currently a competition between regulative functions of states within the processes of protecting and facilitating reproduction of capital and big cities, regions, local governments, international organizations and global financial markets, as well as private transnational corporations.

Researcher's main tool is, within this strategy, the procedure of causative explaining. The breakthrough moments (qualitative changes) constitute the resultant of many developmental lines, many various social and natural processes. Human ideas and planes go through two main modes of history – the mechanism of the invisible hand (or the global effect) and the mechanism of planned action, usually with significant participation from a state as a leading instance. In almost every case of the qualitative change we have to do with the crucial influence of the ecosystem, controlling role of the state, human brain's creativity within the fields of technology and energy, and an open social conflict with the deficit of goods and economic crisis in the background. What is manifested there is the dialectics of chances and new developmental

⁴⁷ A. Bihr, *Nowomowa neoliberalna*, Warszawa 2008, p. 153-167. About merchant diaspora see Ph. D. Curtin, *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*, Cambridge 1984.

barriers. To beat a crisis situation requires many innovations – progress within technology and energy, political system innovations, beating ecological barriers, often an external expansion – it all requires activities from various groups of people within the current structural conditions. The conditions themselves constitute a complex structure: from external conditions to conditions present in a given political system; from ecological and economic conditions (hard) to conscious ones (soft). One needs to see any novum in the situation, for it gave birth to technological and institutional innovations and gave way to creative subjectivity. In short, one needs to look for reasons for breaking the continuity of the previous order and emerging of new strategies of the whole population's actions. In general factors and circumstances leading to the breakthrough social change create a rich mosaic. We have to simplify the picture of the researched reality in order to embrace the main developmental lines. We pass over less important factors and circumstances, in other words, we are doomed to the model explaining with strong idealization at the beginning. This introductory picture may be the benchmark for further research, where facts model interpretation, and interpretation enables getting to new facts. In this scope academic research is all about historical reconstruction of the causative processes network. According to Wesley Salmon, scientific explanation is about pointing to the place within the network where a given phenomenon belongs.⁴⁸ However two phenomena are causatively bound when they are bound by a chain of processes and interactions.

5. Civilizational convergence determinants in the last 5000 years.

The main theses came forth as a result of confronting historiographical material with historical dynamics concepts, which encompass the whole history of mankind. The more and more efficient control over nature, at least until wider consequences of the Industrial Revolution came to light, was accompanied by the process of integration of scattered agricultural centres. There is an ongoing debate over the interpretation of this process – was the

⁴⁸ W. C. Salmon, *Causality and Explanation*, Oxford University Press 1998, p. 50-67.

expansion of communities, which subdued their neighbours through military advantage, its driving power, or was the necessity of exchanging goods unavailable in certain ecosystems or not manufactured by local economies driving power the driving power. If the decisive role was played by the progress of exchanging goods, it begs the question concerning the participation of innovation and creativity of people in comparison to organizational and coordinational part of the state. Was it a gradual, cumulative process of the growth of labour's productivity, or rather new institutional and technological solutions were born beside the pain of structural crises. Did development require only a stroke of genius from humans' best weapon – the brain, or rather sweat-producing effort, and often – blood-producing one. To answer these questions, an analysis of breakthrough points of the world civilization development must be carried out, beginning from the anthropogenesis. The synthesising output must be based within the theory of fact selection and lines of explaining. According to J. Topolski, scientific steps create the following continuity: theory – selection of facts – explaining of facts with reference to the theory – explanatory narration.⁴⁹

The results of systematized reflection over the genesis and evolution of the world civilization might be presented within 18 following theses.

Thesis 1: Who? The role of merchants and cities

Within the polycentric interpretation of the process of overlapping of local civilizations' histories the main role was played by people living in cities, mainly merchants, later businessmen, today – financial specialists. They organized networks for exchanging goods, as well as, when the opportunity occurred, networks of ideas and (unwillingly) pathogens. Thus the starting point, at the same time the breakthrough point of the globalization process, is constituted by 'the birth of the city' and its population: merchants, members of professional groups (doctors, lawyers, teachers), shop owners, goods

⁴⁹ See also: J. Topolski, *Metodologiczna struktura syntez historycznych*, in: *Nowe idee współczesnej historiografii*, Poznań 1980, p. 154.

manufacturers – craftsmen and, last but not the least – businessmen. As it turned out, evolutionary breakthrough points reside in the humans' relations with nature (technology and energy) used in production, transport and transferring information. Breakthrough points like the Neolithic Revolution, crossing the oceans and industrialization lead to tightening relations among civilizations and, in consequence, to the birth of the economy-world and world civilization. This analytical perspective is a better way to reconstruct the globalization process than the existing paradigm of development, which distinguishes such periods of evolution as antiquity, feudalism and capitalism. The developmental line is created by innovations in trading goods and its balance within the relations between the West and East. At that time there appeared many developed instruments, such as trade broking, bank deposit, transaction insurance or financial engineering. Eventually the most important innovation proved to be the system of bank loans, which allowed to credit manufacturing and consumption. Its collateral was state tax revenues. What was decisive as regards product competitiveness made in different parts of the globe were local ecosystems and their conditions, traditions of productivity and practical knowledge, as well as organizational efficiency of societies (differences in productivity potentials), taking advantage of the state power. The middle class and merchants played the main part in the industrial productivity development and political democratization. The middle class used mass media, encouraged to develop secular science and sponsored fine culture. In agrarian societies the middle class was never dominating. Its role was to trade the agrarian surplus.

Thesis 2: How? Sea and land trade routes

The main sites within the network encompassing local civilizations were ports and cities located on trading routes. Currently their role is taken over by transport and informational infrastructure of the world economic space. Goods were transported via ports, especially on Indian Ocean. First factories and colonies were created. It gave a cosmopolitan character to the cities. What

accompanied the goods were innovations, religious cults, modern arts and crafts, as well as pathogens. It was a very convenient route for all. Apart from technological infrastructure, it was necessary to use intellectual means, first alphabet and writing, then money.

Thesis 3: The role of inventions, technology and energy

Convergence of technology and organizational enhancements has been assisting human development for ages. Their overlapping was stimulated by the development of information carriers (paper, print) and means of transport (ships, sailing). Some local civilizations became the pioneers of innovations – and for both short and long terms – gained relative advantage (China, India, Arabic-Islamic civilization), they could also experience downturns (China and India). What mattered for Europe except for colonial conquests were alphabetical writing, printing press and paper (Chinese inventions). In this perspective two moments became momentous: the invention of agriculture and the Industrial Revolution, or utilizing new sources of energy in manufacturing processes (steam engine, combustion engine, electric motor, nuclear energy) and production mechanization. To this group of changes one may qualify the birth of a factory into the capitalist system. Innovations here encompasses: ownership relations of production factors, organization of workforce, division of labour, quality control, standardization of spare parts.

Thesis 4: East or West?

This issue is subject to a big debate concentrating around the individuality of development paths of the East and West, or convergence and parallelism – the debate on the so-called ‘great furcation.’ Arguments and facts in the book as well as in the world history representatives’ works state that the concept of parallel development in Eurasia is correct. Above all the East and West share the beginning in the Neolithic Revolution, which occurred in analogous ecosystems, and which used a similar set of tools, techniques of growing different crops. They also had a common tributary system. But in

contrast to the agrarian Europe with its feudal system, cities developed quickly in the East (Bangkok, Chang'an, Damascus, Baghdad, Sukhothai, Palembang). It is important because the city delivered products that widened the frontiers of economy and technological progress. In China for example it was manufacturing books, silk, bronze and porcelain. Knowledge systems, as well as trade spread on the East-West axis. Technological diffusion in the Middle Ages went from China via India, Persia, which was also a centre for innovation. Such was the route for foundry processes, paper (Silk Road) or printing techniques (printing press, woodcut).

Thesis 5: Crossing the oceans

The crucial thing connected with the birth of the world civilization was crossing the oceans. Many factors led to this: progress in shipbuilding, organizational role of the state and military advantage, financial support from merchants, poor European nations being located on the coast of the Atlantic. The result of crossing the oceans were exchange of human populations, plants, animals and pathogens, or transition from existence in local ecosystems to human population as a whole. It brought about the Western domination, utilizing resources, workforce and manufactured goods to accumulate wealth in the main cities.

Thesis 6: Why Europe?

Another debate is on the source of European domination, at least within the last two centuries and the role of either capitalism, or European military advantage. The answer from world history representatives, in the light of rich factual literature, is also convincing. It was the military advantage, based on thousand-year long rivalry among European states and nations, possessing relatively stable position on the map of this big Eurasian peninsula.

Thesis 7: When did the 'great furcation' occur?

The 'great furcation' occurred in the 19th century. What led to this were the achievements of the first and second Industrial Revolution: technology, energy and market, which then accomplished qualitative advantage. It was not possible without economic penetration (domination and colonialism, free-trade imperialism) which was supported militarily (europocentrism and racism). As regards China, contrary to opinions of bridling influence of Confucianism and emperor's policies since 9th century there occurred the expansion of trade towards the coast and in the south-east. Far-reaching trade developed as well, helped by technology and sea infrastructure. Up to the Tang dynasty there were foreign merchant associations. They were started by the Ming dynasty in 14th century. Since then merchants were interested in selling goods in the interior. That is why the East (first Japan – Meiji modernization) absorbed the technological output of the West so quickly, integrating it with its own social culture (for example Japanese system of management).

Thesis 8: Capitalism vs industrialization and modernity

While analysing the world system, its structure and genesis, it is necessary to differentiate modernity (change of lifestyle, democratization, the role of education), capitalism (profit-making production, utilizing labour and technology) and industrialization (energy, technology, mechanization of production, new model of growth). The capital belongs to an entrepreneur (merchant), which serves as means to multiply wealth. Connecting two mechanisms – the capital – not necessarily coming from merchants – and mechanized factory production brought about a transformation, or appearance of workforce which did not possess its own means of production. But the phenomenon of capital accumulation as a result of 'exploitation' of labour existed as early as the pre-industrial systems (for examples when agrarian terraces were built). According to Goody, 'economic growth itself is definitely not the product of the 18th century Europe, even if there was an increase in

speed and reach of the accumulation.⁵⁰ Urbanization was also not a uniquely European feature, as well as the 19th century capitalism. Thus not only in the cities of the northern Italy the liberty-seeking bourgeoisie appeared. The process was present in the whole world.

Thesis 9: The Industrial Revolution's genesis

The direct reason for the Industrial Revolution to take place was the necessity to compete the oriental import, producing goods for the needs of the world market. A very important part was played by 'weapons and sails' (C. M. Cipolla). What was also necessary was technology. The Industrial Revolution required huge investments, necessary to build machines (the money came from rich entrepreneurs or partnerships among such people). Since the Bronze Revolution where existed free labour force, but the Industrial Revolution lead to dependency of a significant part of production and distribution system on labour.

Thesis 10: Rate

All changes came into being gradually and were connected with alterations in production techniques. The latter were often enhanced by introduction of simple technical devices. Gradually merchants and entrepreneurs, 'the money people,' gained more importance in production processes. Transcontinental trade grew rapidly in the era of geographical discoveries, after American resources reached Europe, and after the discovery of the route to India and China, yet the expansion was additional to the trade routes that had previously existed (ancient routes for Eastern spices, silk and other fabrics. That is why great merchant fortunes appeared early in India, the Middle East and China, and Indian merchants went to the South China Sea as early as 14th century (B. Avari, I. Habib, K. Pomerantz).

Thesis 11: Periodization of the genesis process

⁵⁰ Tegoż, *Kapitalizm i nowoczesność*, dz. cyt., s. 183.

Consequently to the presented interpretation of the history of the last 5000 years goes the following periodization of the process of integration of different local civilizations. We use two methods of division. The first is division due to the level of economic development (energy and technology, and the way of utilizing labour). Then one can say of the pre-agrarian, the agrarian and the industrial eras. The second method is constituted by the reach and mechanisms of integration of civilizational concentrations centres which are located far from one another. We distinguish a few centres of agrarian civilizations – The Civilization of the Middle, and the East-West System, the world market and economy, and the phase of the world civilization, or the world market society after the Industrial Revolution. Neoliberal globalization is the last stage of integration of natural resources, labour and markets of the whole ecumene in order to valorize the capital. We can then distinguish the following phases of creating the world civilization:

- I) from anthropogenesis to the Neolithic Revolution (pre-agrarian era): between 6-5m and 8-3k BC;
- II) from the Civilization of the Middle and the East-West System to the world market (agrarian era with growing role for far-reaching trade): between 3-1,5k BC to 15th/16th century, or crossing the oceans;
- III) from the world market to the capitalistic economy-world after the Industrial Revolution in England in 18th/19th century; this period encompasses phases of internationalization and of neoliberal globalization, they are differentiated by the role of state, either active in supporting national businesses on the world market, or only assisting international financial institutions in the second phase. This period also covers structural crises of the market economy (1873-86, 1933-39, 1974, 2007/8 -), and also two centuries of Western domination;
- IV) structural crisis of global capitalism in the neoliberal version – towards the constant development civilization? (2007/8-?).

Thesis 12: The role of intercepting the surplus and the role of europocentrism, racism and imperialism

The permanent social problems in human history were: the division of economic surplus, repossessing work output of others (inventions, natural resources, eventually the problem of progressive tax, inheritance tax, capital transfers tax). Until the colonial era there also existed the equality and interdependence of merchant cultures, which overlapped one another. It's the Smith's world. As late as after crossing the oceans the military dominance of the West appeared, and with it 'plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves and subduing peoples in colonies' (K. Marks). This is the Atlantic system. One side could use firing weapons, later – nuclear bomb, the other could not.

Thesis 13: Imprisoned within the ecosystem

Ecological problems are still a challenge to mankind as one of natural species. Up to the Industrial Revolution mankind stayed within the Malthussian trap. It is not true that man became the master of nature. Throughout human history the only thing that changes is the level of dependence. The Industrial Revolution, thanks to machines, enabled access to new energy sources, 'energetic slaves' multiply the productivity of human labour. Yet carbon and oil, used to propel the machines, deplete, and their usage pollute the environment. The new challenge is then the necessity of shifting the economy to the alternative energy sources. Human organism is a part of nature, too – it is subjected to metabolism, division of cells. Only the development of medicine allowed the human population to grow rapidly. This growth is accompanied by the increase in economic activity, it also leaves ecological mark, exceeding the capacity of the biosphere. This is a new trap – the Meadows' trap. Again there is a need to have a strategy of permanent development and stabilizing the number of human population in order to facet these problems: famine, drinking water deficit, fertile land deficit due to excessive grazing, cutting tropical forests, greenhouse effect, climate

disturbances. Certain national societies freed themselves from the conditions of local ecosystems, yet it was achieved through becoming dependent from the global ecosystem. Thus in human history there were two traps – the Malthussian one and the Meadows one. In the agrarian community the consumption barriers were: going away from cold, famine, fertile land limitsations, wood and natural disasters. In the industrial community the challenges are: barrier of demand, limited by salary income (hence the recessions and overproduction and underconsumption crises), financial crises, as well as developmental disproportions among states. Another barrier is the permanently increasing ecological mark, the necessity of departing from economy based on hydrocarbons in order to maintain balance in the global ecosystem. For human con not live without nature.

Thesis 14: The mechanism for change – the role of structural crises

Challenges of ecosystem and problems stemming from different productivity potentials of societies required answers in the shape of technological and organizational innovations, as well as changing the strategy of operation. And all this in the background of the existing social culture, consolidated mentality and lifestyle. Human as nexus of social labour uses its creative brain in searching for the strategy of adapting to the existing structural conditions (nature and existing social organization). In the process of adaptation it experiences structural crises, it goes through a narrow pipe in search for new Beringia. The constriction of biomass reached its natural barrier. The mechanism of qualitative change occurs in cases of structural crises. It's then when the dialectics of chances and new barriers of development spears. To use these chances one needs creativity within technology and energy, which attracts changes in production organization (proprietary relations and division of additional value). Union of labour and life beats one barrier, and next there is another one on the way in the form of accumulated effect of usually unexpected and far-reaching results. There are

always natural barriers to beat (for example a man who lives longer is more likely to get cancer).

Thesis 15: The role of the state

Within processes of qualitative change the organization of state plays the role of a steersman of the new institutional order, beginning at the Neolithic Revolution. In the developed phase of globalization, the steersman system may be only a form of global government. The search for the institutional shape for the world government is still on. It is one of the global problems of modernity, at the same time one of main challenges to political sciences. The state is then a necessary ingredient for the qualitative change to occur. Its role divides the period of the world system into two phases: the phase of internationalization, when the state directly regulated national capital and economy, and the phase of transnationalization, where the role of the state was taken over by international organizations and corporations (global government).

Thesis 16: Inevitability of structural crisis of the neoliberal globalization

Human population divided into local civilization and national communities found itself in the phase of another structural (or system) crisis: it must beat technological barriers (energy), institutional (global government) and social (adjusting mechanism of global capitalism to the needs of ageing societies of the North and poverty and global underdevelopment of the South). This problem will be resolved – if one may anticipate on the basis of knowledge of history course determinants – when climatic, food, resource wars and periods of recession and growth are over. Braudel put forward a question if the crisis of 1970s marked the beginning of another structural or system crisis. The period of open phase of the next structural crisis might be foreseen for the next 30-40 years, or in the middle of 21st century.

Thesis 17: Ecosystem and social effects of casino capitalism

The axis of the modern economy-world is capitalism in the neoliberal globalisation phase. Correcting its functional mechanisms in the transnational scale will require co-operation and international coordination (financial, Basel III, liquidation of tax havens) and qualitative changes in relations between the state and financial market (taxation subjected to satisfy the needs of ageing population and solving existential challenges from the world civilization).

Thesis 18: Global Keynesianism as the base for permanent civilization's development

In the face of common long-term crisis a radical reconstruction and the change of economic strategy, as well as the change of production order or system of regulation will be allowed: from the national perspective to the global one. It will give the opportunity to create a new formula for the alliance between the financial and production capital, workforce and the state on the scale of national societies and the new world order – the global Keynesianism in the civilization of permanent development.

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