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Turkey and the European Union:
the Saga of the 50 Years-Long Accession Negotiations

Abstract

The EU-Turkey relations date back to 1960s when the European project started. With the Ankara Agreement of 12 September 1963, Turkey became an Associate member of the European Economic Community which was then an economic organisation from which today's EU emerged.

The EU's December 1997 sidelining of Turkey's application for full membership turned the direction on 3 October 2005 and Turkey begin its accession negotiations with the EU. Since then there is still ongoing debate based on cultural, economic and political assessment whether Turkey will fit to be a member of the EU. From the perspective of the institutional norms of Copenhagen criteria, the EU could possibly embrace all countries, regardless of culture, religion and historical background. The EU's uncompleted institutional structure gives rise some spatial, temporal and thematic scopes which introduce some new accession criteria such as European state, European identity, absorption capacity, open-ended process and approval of the member states which will make more complicated Turkey's full membership bid to the EU.

Despite Turkey's institutional reforms which bring the country that much closer towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and its dynamic economy which makes Turkey as the second country that fits the Maastricht criteria in Europe, European politicians and citizens remain deeply divided on Turkey's accession bid to the EU as a full member. As a consequence, the alternative accession proposals which depreciate the full membership of Turkey are argued by the EU's core members.

The purpose of this article is to answer the vague accession criteria, the different accession proposals towards Turkey and explain the new bargaining position of Turkey for its accession bid to the EU. The exclusion of Turkey from the EU's enlargement process will be evaluated by different theoretical approaches which constitute the interplay of the liberal intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism and path dependency process, rationalist approaches and sociological institutionalism.

Keywords: *Russian minority, minorities, Estonia, Russia*

Introduction:

One of the 'founding fathers of Europe', Jean Monnet's basic idea was that there is always some common interest among people, whatever their differences are. And, he believed that common interest needed to be defined and organised. For Jean Monnet, the point was not to create coalitions of States, but to bring together the peoples.¹ Monnet's ultimate objective was peace and understanding among men. His answer for the problems was to unite human beings and nations by proposing to them some common task in which they see their own interest and forget their differences.² Today, the foundation ideology of the European Union (EU) has changed tremendously since the EU polity reflects controversial issues concerning cultural, religious and ethnic identities. Since Turkey began its accession negotiations with the EU on 3 October 2005, there is still ongoing debate based on cultural, economic and political assessments whether Turkey will fit to be a member of the EU. The principles of the EU has been changed since 1960s when Turkey's aspiration to be a full member of the EU started. The evolution of the EU can be described with the related articles of its treaties:

The preamble of the Treaty of Rome (1957), which is an unprecedented round of soul-searching of the countries of Europe blended with their traumas of the past and dreams of the future reads, *'Resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts'*.³

The 'Copenhagen criteria' established in 1993 define conditions for admission to full membership to the EU in three categories. *First, an achievement of a country's commitment to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;*

¹ Pascal Fontaine 'Jean Monnet, Actualité d'un bâtisseur de l'Europe Unie' in Jacqueline Grapin (rev.), *European Affairs*, <http://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/190-european-affairs/ea-december-2013/1829-jean-monnet-actualite-dun-batisseur-de-leurope-unie-by-pascal-fontaine>(accessed:17.12.2014)

² 'What Jean Monnet Wrought', *Foreign Affairs* (editorial), January 1977, Vol.55, Issue 2, pg-632-633. <http://eds-1b-1ebscost-1com-1ebSCO.han.buu.uu.edu.pl/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=1698440b-1f8a-4d9a-9109-0003f794443a%40sessionmgr112&vid=6&hid=122>(accessed:09.02.2015)

³ Treaty Establishing the European Union Community as amended by Subsequent Treaties, ROME, 25 March 1957, Preamble, <http://www.hri.org/docs/Rome57/Preamble.html>(accessed:06.12.2014)

*second, the existence of functioning economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; third, evidence that the country is able to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.*⁴

The Maastricht criteria ratified in 1993 assumes to sustain the EU in the future and assumes sustainable convergence necessary for European Monetary Union (EMU) in five points: *1. an inflation rate no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three countries with the lowest inflation rates; 2. nominal long-term interest rates not exceeding by more than 2 percentage points those for the three countries with the lowest inflation rates; 3. no exchange rate realignment for at least two years; 4. a government budget deficit not in excess of 3 percent of each country's GDP; 5. a gross debt to GDP ratio that does not exceed 60 percent.*⁵

The EU stipulated such broad liberal-democratic institutional criteria in order to avoid much more controversial issues concerning cultural identities. European identity is not a given thick cultural or historical coating.⁶ It is unfortunate to experience a deep conflict between liberal-democratic institutional criteria and norm based criteria within the member states.

The EU's unique and uncompleted institutional structure gives rise to some vague criteria such as 'any European state' and 'European identity'. Because of the vague criteria, Turkey's accession to membership seems to be the most difficult and the most tangled issue during the periods of expansion. The article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), entered into force on 1 December 2009 reads, '*Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to*

⁴ Copenhagen Criteria 1993, European Commission-Enlargement-Accession criteria, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria> (accessed:14.12.2014)

⁵ Panos C. Afxention, 'Convergence, the Maastricht Criteria, and Their Benefits', *The Journal of World Affairs*, Winter/Spring 2000-Vol.VII, Issue 1, pg.249. <http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ353/tesfatsion/MaastrichtConvergenceCriteria.Afxentiou.pdf> (accessed:30.01.2015)

⁶ Seyla Benhabib, 'Is European Multiculturalism a Paper Tiger', *Philosophia Africana*, Vol.8, No.2, August 2005, pg. 112.

become a member of the Union.⁷ Article 2 of TEU reads, *'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail*.⁸ And, the preamble of the Treaty on European Union reads, *'RESOLVED to implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defense in accordance with*

the provisions of Article 42, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world.⁹

Furthermore, the internal dynamics which were introduced into the EU's literature on 12.10.2005 by the Negotiating Framework with Turkey of the Council of the European Union bring the argumentative notions such as absorption capacity, open-ended process and approval of the member states' citizens. The point 2 of the Negotiation Framework which highlights the national preferences of the member states reads, *'As agreed at the European Council in December 2004, these negotiations are based on Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed before hand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of*

⁷ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, pg.43. file:///C:/Users/----/Downloads/QC3209190ENC_002.pdf (accessed:08.12.2014)

⁸ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, pg.17. file:///C:/Users/----/Downloads/QC3209190ENC_002.pdf (accessed:08.12.2014)

⁹ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010. pg.16. file:///C:/Users/----/Downloads/QC3209190ENC_002.pdf (accessed:08.12.2014)

*membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.'*¹⁰

The terms such as 'any European state', 'European identity', accompanied by the debate having a new turn with the continuous declarations of the former French President Nicholas Sarkozy that "Turkey does not belong to Europe"- "Turkey not fit for EU accession"¹¹ raise questions like: What is the definition of a European state? What is the European identity? Similarly, the terms such as 'absorption capacity', 'open-ended process' and 'approval of the member states' citizens' raise doubts whether the institutional criteria or enlargement preferences play role on Turkey's accession bid to the EU. And also, other forms of different accession alternatives proposed to Turkey by Germany in March 1997 and supported by French and Austrian governments cause the failing of EU's commitment to keep the very essence of the integration process against a candidate country.

The main purpose of this article is to answer to these questions, and referring to Jean Monnet's ultimate objective it will search whether the EU and Turkey can find some common task in which they see their own interest which lead them to cooperate together joining their forces to build a more prosperous common future. In order to give the answers for those questions, the article will proceed as follows: First, the rejection of Turkey's EU accession bid will be analysed from different theoretical approaches. Second, the long path of Turkey's accession to the EU will be examined along with the deadlocks from both parties. This will be followed by an exploration of double standards and discriminatory practices which depreciate the full membership of Turkey. The insuing section will examine the public support of both Turkey and the EU members for Turkey's accession to the EU, and will follow to

¹⁰ Presidency Statement with the Consent of the Council, 12.10.2005, 12823/1/05 REV1-Accession negotiations with Turkey, Annex II-Principles governing the negotiations. http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/NegotiatingFrameowrk/Negotiating_Frameowrk_Full.pdf (accessed:05.12.2014)

¹¹ "Türkiye'nin yeri Avrupa değil" *CNN Türk*, May 23, 2007 and "I do not think that Turkey has a place in Europe" - *The Washington Institute*-Winter 2007 and "Turkey not fit for EU accession", *Deutsche Welle Akademic*, 26.02.2011 <http://www.dw.de/turkey-not-fit-for-eu-accession-sarkozy/a-14875593> (accessed:08.12.2014)

evaluate the official position of Poland in which popular support is the highest among the EU's member countries towards Turkey's membership to the EU.¹² Finally, Turkey's importance will be explained highlighting its economic strengths, its strategic role as an energy hub in the context of Europe's efforts to diversify its energy supplies,¹³ its geography which requires an intense cooperation within the EU to fight 'a common enemy of extremist terrorism'.

1. The interplay of theoretical approaches concerning Turkey's EU accession bid

Turkey's aspirations to be a full member of the EU since 1960s has become a highly contested issue. In the same line, the theoretical explanation of Turkey's EU accession embraces the contested and competing area of a range of theoretical perspectives. It is no doubt that the conceptualization of the 50 years-long accession negotiations to be a full member to the EU can not be elaborated by relying upon only a single theory. Because the position of Turkey creates a unique case and when its inclusion into the negotiation is in question, different theoretical approaches such as liberal intergovernmentalism, historical institutionalism and path dependency process, rationalist approaches and sociological institutionalism are intertwined.

The Austrian and French governments approach to go to referendum can be explain by 'two-level game'. As Robert D. Putnam puts it 'domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled' and 'governments can be conceptualized as strategic actors' in two-level games. Unlike the "Second Image" or "Second Image Reversed," the two level approach recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.¹⁴ From this theoretical approach,

¹² Emre Hatipoğlu, Meltem Müftüler Baç and Ekrem Karakoç, 'Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey's EU accession, Turco-skepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level-Analysis', *MAXCAP Working Paper*, No:4, July 2014, pg.9. http://maxcap-project.eu/system/files/maxcap_wp_04_0.pdf (accessed:08.12.2014)

¹³ Adam Szymański, 'Religion as an Unofficial EU Membership Criterion: The Case of Turkey', in Adam Szymański (ed.) *Turkey and Europe-Challenges and Opportunities*, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, 2012, pg.99-100.

¹⁴ Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games', *International Organisation*, Vol.42, No.3, Summer 1988, MIT Press Journals, Cambridge, MA-USA, 1988, pg.427-460.

the assumption is the EU governments refer to referendums in order to realize potential political gain in two level context of their respective countries. In the context of Turkey, the referendum decision taken by Austrian and French governments is considered as a strategic weapon. To go to referendum would be a good strategy for the governments who are opposing Turkey's accession to the EU in order to have a diplomatic leeway vis-à-vis Turkey. Their bargaining position would be stronger with the negative result of referendum in the countries where public opinion was already shaped by the official administrators not to allow Turkey to join into the EU.

The national governments of the EU are favoring the 'intergovernmentalist view' insofar as it permits them to control over domestic affairs and to attain their goals otherwise unachievable.¹⁵ The core of liberal intergovernmentalism presents three essential elements: the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.¹⁶ From this starting point, the process of enlargement can be explained by the egoistic interests and cost-benefit calculations of the member states. The exclusion of Turkey during the process of accession negotiation in 1997-Luxembourg Summit is a good example of national preferences of the member states.¹⁷ The EU's acceptance of Turkey's candidacy in 1999-Helsinki summit can be explained by the opposite theoretical approach which is historical institutionalism and path dependency process. Historical institutionalism does not believe that humans are simple rule followers or that they are simply strategic actors who use rules to maximize their interests as rational choice institutionalists defend. For historical institutionalists, history is not a chain of independent events and

¹⁵ Andrew Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Basic Blackwell Ltd, Vol.31, No.4, December 1993, pg.507.

¹⁶ Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power', pg.480.

¹⁷ Meltem Müftüler-Baç&Lauren McLaren, 'Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey', *Journal of European Integration*, Vol.25,2003,pg.19-20.

there is a temporal dimension of the events.¹⁸ The commitment of the EU for Turkey's membership bid with the 1963-Ankara Association Agreement is a good example of path dependency process. Because it was once decided more than half century ago, it would not be easy to expel Turkey out of the EU taking into consideration the temporal dimension of the event and the interdependence of the variables.

EU enlargement processes have been generally established on value-based, rights-based and utility-based arguments.¹⁹ Whenever a rationale for admitting Turkey was occurred, it was explicitly binded to the utility-based arguments defined in terms of security. As Sjursen pointed out Turkey has been perceived as a security provider at the door of the EU, playing a constructive role in common efforts to contribute to peace and stability in the region. "*We want a stable, Europe-oriented Turkey (Werheugen 1999)*" and "*Turkey's importance stems from its strategic position (van den Broek 1993b)*". "*There is general recognition of Turkey's importance to the Union....Turkey's geo-strategic position and its steadfastness over decades as a secular, Moslem country...reinforces its position as a valued neighbour in a sensitive region (van den Broe 1997f)*". "*The European Union and Turkey are linked in a strategic partnership. We need Turkey as a reliable partner in foreign and security policy (Verheugen 2000a:4-5)*".²⁰ This can be explained by rational choice theory. Whenever Turkey's accession is in question, rationalist approaches stand in the forefront.

Furthermore, some vague criteria like 'European identity' and 'cultural values' are contrasts to Copenhagen criteria such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. These universal

¹⁸ Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds.) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences-A pluralist Perspective*, (Cambridge University Press, 2008) pg.128.

¹⁹ Helene Sjursen, 'A Certain Sense of Europe? Defining the EU through enlargement', *European Societies*, 14 (4) 2012, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, pg. 503-504. <http://eds-1a-1ebscohost-1com-1ebsco.han.buu.uu.edu.pl/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=94&sid=3656fc9b-3527-48af-aad2-281e425139a3%40sessionmgr4003&hid=4102> (accessed:02.02.2015)

²⁰ Helene Sjursen, 'Enlargement and the nature of the EU polity', in Helene Sjursen (ed.) *Questioning EU Enlargement, Europe in search of identity*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Abingdon, Oxon, 2006, pg.12-13.

qualities connote that EU should embrace all countries, regardless of religion, identity and historical background. In case of Turkey, the opposition of the EU vis-à-vis Turkey's membership stipulating 'cultural values' can be defined as the rational strategy of EU's core members. Such ambiguous criteria seem to be served as an instrument for pursuing a particular policy goal to conceal the utility-maximizing behaviour under a rational strategy by the EU's core members. This can be explained by sociological institutionalists' argument that utility-maximizing behavior may be considered as a subform of value-guided behaviour. And conversely, rational choice theorists argue that invoking of ideas and values subsume a rational strategy.²¹

The EU has been experiencing copious institutional changes stemmed from its uncompleted institutional structure. The new rules of institutional changes were not present when the EU started negotiations with Turkey. And consequently, the debate on Turkey's accession did not cover the future institutional changes which are imposed on Turkey. This can be explained by rational choice institutionalism that defends the institutions shape the patterns of incentives and sanctions available to individuals making decisions, and it argues institutions are important because they frame the individual's strategic behaviour. They follow rules because individually do better when they do so. They cooperate because they get more with cooperation than without it.²²

The theoretical explanation of Turkey's 50 years-long saga to be a full member to the EU can not be elaborated by relying upon a single theory. Turkey's unique case encompasses the interplay of all above mentioned approaches.

II - The long path of Turkey's accession to the EU

When the European integration project gained momentum with the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, which established the European Economic

²¹ Adrienne Heritier, 'Causal explanation', in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds.) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences-A pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2008) pg.66.

²² Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism', in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds.) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences-A pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2008) pg.125-126.

Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Turkey sought to participate in it. Turkey became an Associate member of the EEC on 12 September 1963, concluding the Agreement establishing an association between the EEC and Turkey in Ankara. Thus, the long journey of Turkey's aspiration to be a full member of the EU started. At that time, the EEC was an economic organisation and its first body from which today's EU emerged was the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which came into being in 1952 with the aim of managing the coal reserves collectively by the former enemies Germany and France that they should no longer oppose each other but join together. The aim was to change the enmity into cooperation in order to avoid further conflict over the raw material. At this point, the then EEC was an economic organisation and the *acquis communautaire* along with some other recent criteria for membership were not existed.

II.1 - Ankara Association Agreement (12 September 1963)

The Ankara Agreement envisaged the progressive establishment of a Customs Union which would bring the member states of the Community (the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of France, the Republic of Italy, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands) and the Republic of Turkey closer together in economic and trade matters. During the period 1963-1970 the EEC provided Turkey a loan worth 175 million ECU. The trade concessions granted to Turkey under the Agreement was not as effective as expected. Yet, the EEC's shares in Turkish imports rose from 29% in 1963 to 42% in 1972.²³ Although the Article 19 of the Ankara Agreement reads, '*The Member States of the Community and Turkey undertake to authorize, in the currency of the country in which the creditor or the beneficiary resides, any payments or transfers connected with the payment of goods, services or capital, and any transfer of capital or earnings, to the extent of the movement of goods,*

²³ Ministry of EU Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/?p=1&l=2> (accessed:09.12.2014)

services, capital and persons between them has been liberalized pursuant to this Agreement;²⁴ it excluded Turkey from the EEC decision-making mechanisms and most importantly precluded Turkey from recourse to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for dispute settlement.²⁵

II.2 - Customs Union of Turkey with the EU prior to its full integration

With the Ankara Association Agreement, Turkey has had the longest association with the EU among the candidate countries. According to the Additional Protocol which was signed on 13 September 1970, the EEC would abolish tariff and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey (with some exceptions including fabrics) upon the entry into force of the Protocol, whereas Turkey would do the same in accordance with a timetable containing two calendars set of 12 and 22 years. The Additional Protocol envisaged *the free circulation of natural persons between the Parties in the next 12 and 22 years*.²⁶ The final phase of the relations between Turkey and the European Community (EC) under the Ankara Association Agreement, as foreseen was to achieve the EC-Turkey Customs Union which entered into force on December 31, 1995. The scope of this customs union, based on the status of goods in free circulation was however limited to only industrial and processed agricultural products.²⁷ With the entry into force of the Customs Union since the beginning of 1996, Turkey abolished all duties and equivalent charges on imports of industrial goods from the EU and consequently the third countries with which the EU has signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). While the goods of these third countries can freely enter Turkey due to the FTAs, Turkey cannot export

²⁴Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC) 24.12.1973, NR.C113/2 [s.1]. "Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey", <http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/agreement> (accessed:11.12.2014)

²⁵ Article 25 of the Ankara Agreement, (The article 25/2 reads, "The Council of Association may settle the dispute by decision; it may also decide to submit the dispute to the Court of Justice of the European Communities or to any other existing court or tribunal.") <http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/agreement> (accessed:11.12.2014)

²⁶ Ministry of EU Affairs Republic of Turkey, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/?p=1&l=2> (accessed:09.12.2014)

²⁷ European Commission-Taxation and Customs Union. Turkey: Customs Union and preferential arrangements. a)General introduction http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/customs_unions/article_414en.htm (accessed:11.12.2014)

its goods to these countries. This inequality creates serious unfair competition against Turkey depending on the competition capacity of the third countries. This asymmetry helps to shield the EU's economy from the competition of Turkey. Thus, Turkey has become the only country that realised a Customs Union on industrial and processed agricultural products prior to full membership to the EU for which no other EU accession candidate agreed to it. Ankara agreed with the hope to gain faster accession to the EU via the foreign trade union. However, EU's commercial policy towards third countries brought diversities to Turkey's commercial activities. According to 1997 figures, Turkey's share in total EU exports is 3.1% while Turkey's share in total EU imports is 1.8% which was almost two fold at the expense of the latter.²⁸ Although Turkey has been the only country having the customs union with the EU prior to its full integration with the EU, it has demonstrated that Turkish economy was able to withstand EU competition, despite predictions to the contrary.²⁹ This unequal trade partnership also signified that Turkey became a growing market at the last decade of the 20th century and continues to be a regional power in the first quarter of 21st century. Turkey is still keeping its word for this costly asymmetric association on the second decade of the 21st century without a membership guarantee.

II.3 - Bestower Agreement could not help to resolve the stalemates during the enlargement periods:

The Ankara Association Agreement can be considered as a bestower agreement for Turkey's candidate status to the EEC. The article 237 of EEC Treaty stipulates: *"Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty*

²⁸ Ministry of EU Affairs Republic of Turkey, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/?p=1&l=2> (accessed:09.12.2014)

²⁹ Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tradeagreements&bolum=fta®ion=0> (accessed:12.12.2014)

necessitated thereby shall be object of an agreement between the Member states and the Applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements." ³⁰ Since this article of the EEC Treaty stipulated that member states and applicant state would have determined the "*conditions of admission*", it was clear that full membership of Turkey to the EEC might be foreseen if and when both parties could fulfill their obligations of membership without stipulating some other criteria for joining to the EU, as it was laid out in the Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement which reads, '*As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community*'.³¹ Although it was a good beginning, the relations between Turkey and EU experienced a lot of bottlenecks and in some points the stalemates. The difficulties sometimes stemmed from the perceptions of both Turkish and EU sides against each other.³²

II.4 - The difficulties from the Turkish side:

The years from 1960s to 1980s were representing the political polarisation that carried Turkey to the military coup on September 12, 1980. The radical left and the radical right were strictly opposed to the European Commission (EC). In the eyes of radical left the EC was an appendage of American imperialism. For the Islamists linked with the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP), the EC was a "Christian Club". The discourse

³⁰ Karolina Ristova-Aasterud, 'The legal aspects of the EU accession procedure and its implication for the EU Eastern enlargement (from the EU founding treaties to treaty of Amsterdam)', *Iustianianus Primus Law Review* Vol.1:1 (2010), pg.2-3. <http://www.law-review.mk/pdf/01/Karolina%20Ristova-Aasterud.pdf>(accessed:10.12.2014)

³¹ Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC)24.12.1973, NR.C113/2 [s.1]. "Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey", <http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/agreement> (accessed:11.12.2014)

³² Meltem Müftüleri-Bac and Lauren McLaren, 'Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey', *Journal of European Integration*, Vol.25, Issue:1, pg.17-30, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0703633031000077181> (accessed: 25.11.2014)

of the ethnonationalists connected with the National Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) towards to the EC, was the combination of the 'anti-imperialism' and 'anti-Christian Club'. According to the latter's view, the EC-membership of Turkey would offer the European states a historic opportunity to weaken the country provoking the minorities to rebel against the Republic of Turkey and bring it to the brink of Sèvres.³³

II.4.a - Sèvres syndrome:

The Treaty of Sèvres has been a traumatic past experience in the collective memory of Turks. Encyclopaedia Britannica quotes the Treaty of Sèvres as such, "*The Treaty of Sèvres, (Aug.10, 1920), post-World War I pact between the victorious Allied powers and representatives of the government of Ottoman Turkey. The treaty abolished the Ottoman Empire and obliged Turkey to renounce all rights over Arab Asia and North Africa. The pact also provided for an independent Armenia, for an autonomous Kurdistan, and for a Greek presence in eastern Thrace and on the Anatolian west coast, as well as Greek control over the Aegean islands commanding the Dardanelles.*"³⁴ Although the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923) could not prevent Turks to perceive Europeans who consider Turks as the illegitimate invaders and occupiers European-Christian lands and the oppressors of European-Christian people. Consequently, Europeans are considered that they will expel Turks and give their own territories to their rightful owners, Armenians, Greeks and Kurds. At the end of 18th and in the beginning of the 19th centuries, the Ottoman Empire threatened by Russia to realize its plan to replace Istanbul, and also threatened by Habsburg to conquer the Balkans strengthened the

³³ Hakan Yılmaz, 'Euroscepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites, and Public Opinion' in Susannah Verne (ed.), *Euroscepticism in Southern Europe A Diachronic Perspective*, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, Printed and bound in Great Britain, 2012, pg.185-208

³⁴ Treaty of Sèvres, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/536839/Treaty-of-Sevres> (accessed:12.12.2014)

perceived conception of Turks about Europeans.³⁵ Therefore, the requirements about the individual and minority rights which are part of the '*conditions of admission*' to the EU are perceived like the secret agenda to achieve by the *acquis communautaires* what the Europeans failed by force which was crowned by the Treaty of Sèvres.

II.4.b - Turkish political parties' opinion about the EU:

Between 1975-1977 the radical right parties formed a coalition with the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) which was the major center-right party, and later on supported the minority government of AP at the Parliament in 1980, during these two periods they had a huge power to block any attempt to converge Turkey to the EU. The center-left Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) which was in power during January/1978 – October/1979, influenced by increasingly rising popularity of left-wing anti-imperialist ideas in public opinion, in October 1978 declared to suspend unilaterally Turkey's obligations laid out in the 1963-Ankara Association Agreement. After the short period of ruling of minority government of the Justice Party, with the military intervention of 12 September 1980 the relations between Turkey and Community had come to a virtual freeze, as the EU refuses to have association agreements with non-civilian governments. After multiparty parliamentary elections on November 6, 1983 Turkey applied for full membership of the Community on 17 April 1987 on the basis of the EEC Treaty's article 237. The answer was concluded two and half years later on 17 December 1989. Turkey's application was not rejected outright, but prevented by the EC's internal problems such as Single Market and integration process of its three new member states (1981-Greece, 1986-Portugal and Spain).³⁶

³⁵ Halil İnalcık, 'Turkey and Europe: A Historical Perspective', *Turkey and Europe in History*, Eren Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2006, pg.100-113

³⁶ Ministry of EU Affairs Republic of Turkey, <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/?p=1&l=2> (accessed:09.12.2014)

III - The difficulties from the EU side-The official position of Germany against Turkey's membership to the EU

Turkey's application which had been waiting for ten years, was turned down in December-1997 Luxemburg Summit, despite its successful completion of the Customs Union with the EU. The most important evidence for Turkey's exclusion from EU integration due to cultural difference was the declaration of the Christian Democrats led by the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the meeting of the Christian Democratic Forum in March 1997. Helmut Kohl and other Christian Democrat Leaders declared that they do not see Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. Instead they supported a strengthened cooperation between the EU and Turkey, without a bid of membership.³⁷ In response to the Luxemburg decision Turkey froze all political dialogue with the EU and declined to participate to the European Conference which was held in March 1998.

III.1 - Cyprus problem and the deadlock

It is quite interesting that the European Council excluded Turkey at the 1997-Luxembourg Summit and started accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus as if it was the representative of the whole island. Turkey declared that it would integrate Northern Cyprus with mainland Turkey. Although the tensions between Turkey and the EU were in the peak, the Turkish public support for EU membership was found to have significantly increased, up to about 62% by May 1998 comparing about 55% in spring 1996.³⁸ This fact should have had been taken into consideration by the EU that the public support to the EU was still increasing and Turkish people was eager to adopt the *acquis*. The EU inherited the Cyprus problem by accepting Greek Cyprus against the United

³⁷ Zeki Kütük, *Turkey's Integration into the European Union-The Dynamics and Determinants of a Dilemmatic Relationship*, Turun Yliopiston Julkaisuja-Annales Universitatis Turkuensis, Sarja-Ser.B Osa-Tom.258, Turun Yliopisto-Turku, 2003, pg.159-160.

³⁸ Ali Çarkoğlu, 'Societal perceptions of Turkey's EU membership, Causes and consequences of support for EU membership', in Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (eds.) *Turkey and European Integration-Accession Prospects and Issues*, Routledge Taylor&Francis, London, 2004, pg.22.

Nations (UN) Security Council formula. According to this formula “Matters related to the membership of the federal republic in the European Economic Committee will be discussed and agreed to, and will be submitted for the approval of the two communities in separate referenda.”³⁹ In fact, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan call on 29 June 1999 was trying to use the possibility of the EU accession as a catalyst for settling the Cyprus problem. Kofi Annan’s 2002 plan proposed two years to the both parties in order to study the plan of re-unification. The Turkish Cypriots voted yes (64,91%), the Greek Cypriots voted no (75.83%). The Republic of Cyprus was allowed to join the EU on 1 May 2004 as part of divided island. By including Greek Cyprus into the enlargement process before settling the Cyprus problem, the EU did not only disregard the Annan Plan-the U.N. formula for a unified Cyprus, but also implicitly paved the way for the deadlock. The Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) community was left out and continues its existence as an ostracized community, because of the political embargoes and trade restrictions the TRNC could not develop its own economy.⁴⁰ The rejection of the UN plan for the reunification of the island by the Greek Cypriots was transmitted by Niels Kadritzke in May 2004 edition of *Le Monde Diplomatique* as such: “Cyprus: saying no to the future. This Greek chauvinism means the island stays divided, though its entry to Europe would have helped reunification.”⁴¹ The EU, in order to encourage the Turkish Cypriots to vote for a solution in the 2004 referendum, vowed that even if the Greek Cypriots rejected the U.N solution, the Turkish Cypriots would not be left in the cold.⁴² But ever since the referendum, the Turkish Cypriots was neglected. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot administration has learnt that it could scorn proposed settlement

³⁹ Kütük, *Turkey’s Integration*, pg.157.

⁴⁰ Olga Campbell-Thomson, ‘Pride and Prejudice: The Failure of UN Peace Brokering Efforts in Cyprus’, *PERCEPTIONS*, Summer 2014, Vol.XIX, No.2, pg.74-76.

⁴¹ *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English Edition LMD, May 2004, <http://mondediplo.com/2004/05/07cyprus> (accessed: 14.12.2014)

⁴² Barçın Yinanç, ‘EU is the culprit for Turkish-Russian energy rapprochement’, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 22 January 2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-is-the-culprit-for-turkishrussian-energy-rapprochement.aspx?PageID=238&NID=77265&NewsCatID=412> (accessed:22.01.2015)

plans without any loss of the privileges it has been granted by the international community.

III.2.a - Suspension of the negotiations between Turkey and the EU, by the Council

The Cyprus problem continued to produce a stalemate for Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU. In the 14/15 December 2006 Summit, the European Council endorsed the Conclusions on Turkey adopted by the Council on 11 December 2006⁴³ which reads, *'As concerns Turkey, the Council decided in particular to suspend negotiations on eight chapters relevant to Turkey's restrictions with regard to the Republic of Cyprus, and will not close the other chapters until Turkey fulfils its commitments under the additional protocol to the EU-Turkey association agreement, which extended the EU-Turkey customs union to the members states, including Cyprus, that joined the EU in May 2004.'*⁴⁴ The Cyprus issue reflects one of the most important double standards of the EU towards Turkey's integration to the EU as it was towards Turkish Cypriot's accession to the EU.

III.2.b - 1999-Helsinki Summit and Turkey's candidacy status to the EU

In December 1999, according to the article 12 of the Enlargement Process of the Helsinki Summit Presidency Council, Turkey became as a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.⁴⁵ After the Helsinki Summit's decision the Turkish government passed a National Programme for the Adoption of Acquis (NPAA), and on 3 October 2001 the Turkish Parliament accordingly adopted 34

⁴³Council of the European Union, Concl.3-16879/1/06-Brussels,12 February 2007 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf (accessed:14.12.2014)

⁴⁴ Council of the European Union, 16289/06 (Presse 352), 11.XII.2006 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/92122.pdf (accessed:14.12.2014)

⁴⁵ Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell_en.htm#b (accessed:24.01.2015)

amendments to the Constitution necessary to meet the Copenhagen criteria, mainly the ‘sensitive issues’ such as abolition of the death penalty, more liberal legal rights to Kurdish-speakers, more freedom for the use and study of Kurdish which previously had been prohibited. The NPAA also expanded freedom of expression, curtailment of the power of the military, transforming the notorious National Security Council into an advisory board, release of political prisoners, and the growth of civil society. During the first and even the second term of the Muslim conservative party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), remarkable reform processes were conducted. Turkey has adopted so far 326 primary and 1730 secondary legislations to ensure alignment with the EU acquis.⁴⁶

III.3.a - The EU’s ambiguous criteria for Turkey’s accession to the EU

The EU’s traditional approach of Turkey’s membership bid has been based not only on Copenhagen criteria, but mostly on vague criteria such as cultural, religious and Islamic identity.⁴⁷ Because the vague criteria are not based on institutional norms, over time it is inevitable that they will be used as political tools. For example, after the September 11th 2001 event, the religion issue became Turkey’s asset as Joschka Fisher, German’s former Foreign Minister, pointed out *‘to modernize an Islamic country based on the shared values of Europe would be almost a D-Day for Europe in the war against terror, because it would provide real proof that Islam and modernity, Islam and the rule of law...(and) this great cultural tradition and human rights are after all compatible’*.⁴⁸ The same religion was conversely interpreted by another official, Frits Bolkestein, Dutch European commissioner for Internal Market and Services during 1999-2004. Recalling the history and

⁴⁶ Turkey’s new European Strategy, *Republic of Turkey-Ministry for EU Affairs*, pg.11. http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/pub/turkeys_new_eu_strategy.pdf (accessed:18.02.2015)

⁴⁷ John Redmond, “Turkey and European Union: troubled European or European trouble?”, *International Affairs*, Vol.83, No.2, March 2007, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pg.305-308.

⁴⁸ Robert Kagan, ‘Embraceable E.U.’, *The Washington Post*, 5 December 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A34023-2004Dec3.html> (accessed:13.12.2014)

underlining the Christendom, he objected Turkish membership bid to the EU “*Islamisation of Europe*” should Turkey join the union, “*The relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain*”.⁴⁹ Yes, what was “in vain” was the Polish King Sobieski’s last minute attack to turn the second Ottoman effort to seize Vienna.⁵⁰ King Sobieski relieved his Habsburg neighbor in 1683, and as a response Austria partitioned his country, Poland, the next century three times in 1772, 1792 and 1795 with the other two European powers, Prussia and Russia.⁵¹

Similar discourse was also raised by the former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing who said in 2004 that the accession of Turkey to the EU would signal “*the end of the EU*.”⁵² It is ironically seems that Mr. d’Estaing would be the witness of “*the end of the eurozone*” in his lifetime. The economists argue that every necessary precautions should be taken in order “non pas pour sauver l’euro, mas pour sauver l’Europe (*not to save euro, but to save Europe*).”⁵³ Mario Draghi, head of the European Central Bank (ECB) has just announced that a programme of quantitative easing (QE) will begin in March 2015.⁵⁴ According the Economist, the QE package could cause the

⁴⁹ Ian Traynor, ‘In 1683 Turkey was the invader. In 2004 much of Europe still sees it that way’, *The Guardian*, 22 September 2004, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/22/eu.turkey> (accessed:27.01.2015)

⁵⁰ The author considers that the religion should not be politicised, the references to religion would not serve to the benefit of both parties, and the politicians should avoid to use sensitive issues in their speeches. She did therefore not mention that, ‘King Sobieski participated to the war upon the appeal made by Pope Innocent XI. for a Christian Crusade’. The author also reminds that religious references could generate a big outcry among the people as it recently happened in the U.S. when the President Obama referred to the Crusades in his speech at the National Prayer Breakfast on 5 February 2015. President Obama’s sentence was that people also “committed terrible deeds in the name of Christ”. (See Michale D. Shear, ‘Obama, Trying to Add Context to Speech, Faces Backlash Over Crusades’, *New York Times*, 6 February 2015)

The politicians should also think of the other side of the coin which was put by the former U.S. President Bill Clinton, at his speech in 1999 Prayer Breakfast: “People have claimed repeatedly that it was God’s will that they prevail in conflict. Christians have done it since the time of the Crusades... No faith is blameless in saying that they have taken up arms against others of other faiths, because it was God’s will they do so” (See Ruth Marcus, *The Washington Post*, 5 February 2015)

⁵¹ Norman Davies, ‘Heart of Europe-A short History of Poland’, *Oxford University Press*, Oxford, 1987, pg.304.

⁵² Traynor, ‘in 1683’, *The Guardian*, 22 September 2004, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/22/eu.turkey> (accessed:22.01.2015)

⁵³ Wolfgang Streck, ‘L’Europe doit abandonner la monnaie unique’, *Le Monde*, 3 March 2015, pg.16.

⁵⁴ Paula Subacchi, ‘Will Quantitative Easing Work for Europe?’ *Newsweek*, 27 January 2015 <http://www.newsweek.com/will-quantitative-easing-work-europe-302405> (accessed:28.01.2015)

political damage in Germany and turn out to outweigh the economic benefits. The rise of the anti-euro Alternative for Germany (AfD) party would not make the ECB's decision easy.⁵⁵ In other words, Germany on board, some members of the EU don't want to share the burden of the others. The rejection of burden-sharing by some EU members rise some questions: 'where is the unity in the absence of prosperity' and 'where is the European identity' which is one of the alleged binding credentials of the EU for which Turkey has been excluded since 1960s?

When some EU countries have been struggling financial difficulties since 2008, Turkey has been consolidating its economic dynamism. Although Turkey's economic situation was impressively getting well comparing to 2000s, and having majority of its population backing the EU accession, the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Védrine told the Canadian Review in 2012: *"There is a question mark about the geographical extension of Europe, Turkey might not be among the new two or three new members. Even the treaty of accession will have been signed with Turkey, it is not clear whether it will be ratified by every country."*⁵⁶ The term of 'geographical extension of Europe' unequivocally raises the question about the Europe's geographical borders? If geographical borders define to be a 'European country' and political discourses such as 'Turkey is not a European country', what would it be the justification of Greenland's membership which left the European Economic Community in 1985, after six years of its accession to the EU in order to keep its fishing grounds from the European rules?

The ambiguous concepts like culture, religion, identity are not compatible with the 1993-Copenhagen Criteria which are formed by political and economic criteria beside the administrative and institutional capacity of the

⁵⁵ 'Charlemagne-Berlin v Frankfurt-Tensions are rising between Germany and the European Central Bank', *The Economist*, 24 January 2015, pg.21-25.

⁵⁶ Pierre Verluise, 'Géopolitique des frontières européennes (extract). Elargir, jusqu'où? ESKA 2014', *Diploweb.com, revue politique, articles, cartes, relations internationales, Union européenne, Pays candidats*, 21 April 2013, pg.10.

candidate country to implement the *acquis* (see pg.1&2). The concept of culture once was used to explain differences between societies. If culture is considered as the relationship of the individuals in a society, could it be possible to talk about the unique culture in the EU formed by the dissimilar societies? Is there any tangible definition of the culture? If culture is the value differences at the individual level, will be the inter-subjective knowledge at the collective level. Furthermore, it is particularly difficult to outline the cultural borders of Europe with respect to the eastern part and the Balkan territory. Historically, Turkish culture has had a profound impact over much of Eastern and Southern Europe where once was ruling the Ottoman Empire, today almost thirty independent states of much of them are established in Europe. Naturally, the historical, cultural and commercial relations of people living on those territories were inextricably entangled with the Ottoman Empire since the fourteenth century.

III.3.b - Some argumentative notions contrary to the Copenhagen criteria:

With the French and Austrian governments' decision to hold referenda on Turkey's accession diverted the issue to the completely different scene in which there is another player, the citizens of the EU's member states. Negotiation Framework (Luxembourg, 3 October 2005) brought new transitional measures in front of Turkey such as *'Turkey's acceptance of the rights and obligation arising from the *acquis* and may, exceptionally, give rise to transitional measures.'* And furthermore the safeguard measures represent the utmost discrimination against Turkey for the accession process. The related passage of the article 12 reads: *'Long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangement or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures, may be considered. The Commission will include these, as appropriate, in its proposals in areas such as freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agricultural. Furthermore, the decision-taking process regarding the eventual establishment of freedom of*

movement of persons should allow for a maximum role of individual Member States'.⁵⁷ These new elements make the Turkish accession to the EU more political than the technical procedures of the adoption of the EU acquis. Turkey definitely will fulfill all its obligations vis-à-vis the EU acquis, but it seems that the EU acquis are not necessarily enough for Turkish EU accession. The national preferences of the Member States in another word the public support of the Union will determine Turkish accession to the EU. Therefore the former President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso declared on the opening speech of the accession negotiation with Turkey: "Europe must learn more about Turkey. And Turkey must win the hearts and minds of European citizens. They are the ones who at the end of the day will decide about Turkey's membership."⁵⁸

III.4 - Public opinion in Europe for the support to Turkey's accession to the EU:

Because the new safeguard measures will have decisive influence on the membership of Turkey, let's look at the recent survey of MAXCAP⁵⁹ (July 2014) on the determinants of European public's attitudes to Turkey's accession to the EU indicates:

i) The national politicians are playing an important role in shaping public's view on Turkish accession.

ii) The support of European public is depending on whether they will win or lose. The economic and security benefits Turkey's membership would bring to the EU is important for a European citizen who immediately favors for the extension of the European market. Security wise, Turkey's accession would strengthen the EU's southeastern flank as it was during the Cold War. Foreign

⁵⁷ Negotiation Framework (Luxembourg, 3 October 2005), article 12 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf (accessed:08.01.2015)

⁵⁸ European Commission, ref:ECO5-322EN, date:3 October 2005 http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_5088_en.htm (accessed:28.01.2015)

⁵⁹ Emre Hatipoğlu, Meltem Müftüler-Baç and Ekrem Karakoç, 'Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey's EU Accession, Turco-Skepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis', *Maxcap (Maximizing the integration capacity of the European Union) Working Paper Series*, No.4, July 2014, pg.6-26.

policy-wise, Turkey's accession to the EU will promote the EU's role as a peace-builder in its near-abroad.

iii) Turkey's well-being in the EU is perceived at the cost of EU's well-being. European public is regarding Turkey's accession to the EU from the utilitarian perspective.

iv) The data from the same survey shows that individual's own well-being and conception of material gain among the European citizens enter into equation with their emphasis on common values and identities.

'Social capital' idea is that societies can generate norms and practices of trust and cooperation, which over time will strengthen each other by their positive results.⁶⁰ From this departing point, European public perceives the candidate countries as being 'like them', not 'others' who may threaten their material well-being and moral values. Along this line, the accession of Turkey to the EU is considered by the European citizens as new and different culture entering into their realm and consequential effect of this perception is the 'fear' from such new cultures.

III.4.a - The role of the national politics for shaping public's view on Turkish accession to the EU.

Another finding of the survey is that in EU member states where Turkish migrants are relatively few, the norm-based ideational factors matter less. Unlikely the norm-based factors matters more in the EU countries with large Turkish immigrant populations.⁶¹ The same survey also indicates that the citizens of the EU's new member states in Central and Eastern Europe don't think that Turkey's accession to the EU will create problem due to cultural, historical and religious factors. This result of MAXCAP reveals that the national politicians are playing an important role in shaping public's view on

⁶⁰ Michael Keating, 'Culture and social science', in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds.) *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences-A pluralist Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pg.105.

⁶¹ Hatipoğlu, Müftüler-Baç and Karakoç, 'Explaining Variation', pg.23.

Turkish accession. Therefore it would be plausible to evaluate the official position of Poland in which popular support is the highest among the EU's member countries towards Turkey's membership to the EU. According to data from EuroBarometer '79.3.2013' Poland is the most favorable country for Turkey's accession to the EU with the highest support 54% and with the least opposition 31% among the EU's member countries.⁶²

III.4.b - The evaluation of the official position of Poland:

What could the main reason be behind the Polish public attitude? Is it 600 years old diplomatic relationship between these two countries? Or when the whole Europe forgot about Poland, the Ottoman sultans remembered it? Or did the levelheaded Polish elites' discourses have shaped Polish public's view different than the other European publics being shaped by elite driven decision making process in Europe? Or did bilateral agreements have impact on the Polish public's opinion? The most important bilateral agreement is the 'Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Poland' which was signed on November 3, 1993.⁶³ This treaty confirms both parties commitment to all bilateral instruments which remain in force, particularly to the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Poland of July 23, 1923. By signing the Treaty of Friendship in 1923, Poland was one of the first countries that recognized the young Turkish State even before it became a Republic and in this way Poland proved that it did not forget the Ottoman Empire's faithfulness that never recognized the partitions of Poland by Austria, Prussia and Russia for 123 years. The article 3 of the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement reads: *'The Parties shall strive to transform Europe permanently into a continent where human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the basic principles of democracy and justice are respected. To attain this goal they shall cooperate within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of*

⁶² Hatipoğlu, Müftüler-Baç and Karakoç, 'Explaining Variation', pg.9.

⁶³ Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Poland. Done at Warsaw on 3rd day of November 1993.

Europe and other international organizations.' Turkey, a NATO member since 1952 helped Poland to be accepted as a NATO member in 1999. Poland, on its part, as his obligation within the framework of the article 3 has been supporting Turkey's accession to the EU since its own accession to the EU in 2004. However, Poland's efforts even during its six month-long presidency of the Council of the European Union during July- December 2011 have been largely ineffectual. Although some rejection for Turkey's EU accession happened from the political parties (Prawo I Sprawiedliwosc-PiS, Liga Polskich Rodzin-LPR) after 2005 parliamentary elections, in general, the main attitude of Polish decision makers primarily was over Ukraine's to support Turkish EU bid.⁶⁴ One of the key objectives of Poland's 'Eastern Policy' has been for the EU to develop intensive relationship with Ukraine since 1990s, in order to integrate it more closely with the West. Poland's 'Eastern Policy' will help not only its national security, but also will be a political tool to achieve its geopolitical objective of reducing the influence of Russia in the region. It is known that Poland has linked Ukraine's EU accession with Turkish membership of the EU.⁶⁵ Poland's direct or indirect support for the Turkish accession bid to the EU has been appreciated by Turkey since its accession negotiation officially began on 3 October 2005. Even before the official accession negotiation started, Poland did not accept the Austrian proposal regarding a privileged partnership as a substitute for full membership of Turkey to the EU. Jan Truszczyński, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that no solution other than membership with full rights will be accepted by Poland in July 2005.

Poland had been always supported by Turks, not only during the Ottoman Empire, but also during the World War II. When the Ambassador of Hitler, Von Papen, requested the Polish Embassy building in Ankara when Poland was occupied by the Nazis, the then President of young Republic of Turkey, İsmet Pasha did not accept his request with such words: "We have a

⁶⁴ Wojciech Forysinski, Przemysław Osiewicz, 'Conference paper presented at the third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics', İstanbul, Turkey, 21-23 September 2006, pg.1-4

⁶⁵ Aleks Szczerbiak, *Poland within the European Union- New awkward partner or new heart of Europe*, Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, Oxon, London, 2012, pg.88.

traditional friendship with Poland. In the past, during the partitions, Turkey waited 150 years for the arrival of the Polish ambassador, and now Turkey will not meet your request.⁶⁶ Thus, Ambassador Von Papen watched the Polish flag during the World War II.

In return, Turkey's attitude towards Poland finds its affirmative response in the eyes of Polish People. For example, a survey made by Washington-based research institute the German Marshall Fund in 2004 asserted that Europeans are deeply confused and 'many Europeans are ambivalent' at the prospect of a Muslim country of 70 million joining the Union. According to the same source, although the Poles are eternally proud of saving Christendom from Islam in 1683, the Polish priest tending the Vienna church said "Back then, the Turks had to be defeated. It was necessary. Now it's different. We need to be all one big family. Of course Turkey is European. Of course they should be in the EU".⁶⁷ The historical ties between Turkey and Poland and the role of the national politicians are supporting the results of the survey.

III.4.c - Proposals of different accession alternatives to Turkey by the triad of Germany, France and Austria

Germany's alternative accession proposals supported by the French and Austrian conservatives such as 'privileged membership', 'extended association membership', 'European economic area plus' are ambiguous. Political dimension behind these accession alternatives is based on the exclusion of Turkey from the decision-making process; economic dimension is to strengthen customs union and EU security and defence policy with Turkey.⁶⁸ The conditions of the asymmetric association under the name of the customs union

⁶⁶ <http://poltub.com.tr-May 2014>, (accessed:28.01.2015)

⁶⁷ Traynor, 'in 1683', *The Guardian*, 22 September 2004, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/22/eu.turkey> (accessed:22.01.2015)

⁶⁸ Cemal Karakas, 'EU-Turkey: Integration without Full Membership or Membership without Full Integration? A Conceptual Framework for Accession Alternatives', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.51, No.6, 2013, pg. 1067-1068.

between Turkey and EU, at the expense of the latter are explained under the sub-division II.2 (see page 8). Other forms of different accession alternatives such as the 'gradual integration/membership, 'full membership minus' have also discriminative characters against Turkey since it will shoulder the burden on the field of trade relations but without free movement of Turkish businessmen/citizens, and on the field of foreign and security policy without having the right to participate in decision-making process.

Although this kind of discriminative proposals other than full membership are not written in the EU documents (Treaty of Rome and Copenhagen Criteria), the allusions of the 'absorption capacity' of the EU and 'open-ended negotiation' are implicitly describing the EU's formula "highest economic and security profit-minimum cost" at the expense of Turkey.⁶⁹ The proposals reducing the full membership degree of Turkey with the unbearable costly conditions of adopting the EU *acquis* raise questions about the trustworthiness and the credibility of the EU.

IV - New bargaining positions of Turkey:

IV.a - Turkey's economic performance versus unimpressive performance of the EU:

Now, let's look at the economic situation in Turkey whose membership bid has been also evaluated on its economic assessment as well. December 2014 edition of 'Eurostat Statistics Explained' presents consolidated data for 2011, 2012 and 2013. Volume indices per capita, 2011-2013 (EU-28=100) give to Turkey in 2011, a score of 51% of GDP per capita, ranking it above Bulgaria (44) and equal to Romania (51), below Poland (64) and a long way behind France (108), Germany (122), Luxemburg (265). In 2012, GDP per capita in

⁶⁹ Beril Dedeoğlu ve Seyfettin Gürsel, 'EU and Turkey: The Analysis of Privileged Partnership or Membership', pg. 3. http://betam.bahcesehir.edu.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/EU-and-Turkey-The-Analysis-of-Privileged-Partnership-or-Membership_final.pdf (accessed:19.02.2015)

Turkey is 52%, in 2013 53%.⁷⁰ In 2005, GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (EU-27=100) was 10 percentage points below its 2011 level. Pierre Verluise, Director of the geopolitical Website Diploweb.com., points out that the economic crisis shakes up the status quo and helps Turkey to close the gap. While the EU's performance was unimpressive: 2.1% GDP growth in 2010; 1.5% in 2011; with zero growth forecast for 2012, Turkey has reported significant improvement: 9% of GDP growth in 2010; 8.5% in 2011; 3.3% in 2012. He argues that while the EU is slowing Turkey is gaining momentum. The gap is being cut back faster than could have been envisaged prior the crises.⁷¹

From 2013 to 2023, GDP growth rate in Turkey 5.5% and 1.8% in the EU, with 0.2% annual population growth in the EU and 1.1% in Turkey would allow the latter to reach close to half of EU per capita income by 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey.⁷² Above given facts on the economic developments in both Europe and Turkey signify that the economic dimension of the EU-Turkey relationship has changed fundamentally. Turkey is getting much closer to being an "average" European country.

IV.b-Turkey's important role in its region and in its wider neighbourhood

Millions of people fleeing from Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) are accepted into Turkey. Turkey is hosting 1.700.000 Syrians and spent US\$ 6 billion so far. Conversely, the total number of Syrian refugees in Europe is 130.000 and international community's financial contribution is just US\$ 300 million. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres declared that Turkey had become the country hosting the largest number of refugees in

⁷⁰ GDP per capita, consumption per capita and price level indices, *Eurostat Statistics Explained*, December 2014, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/> (accessed:25.01.2015)

⁷¹ Verluise, '*Géopolitique des frontières européennes*', pg.1-6.

⁷² Kemal Derviş, 'Turkey and Europe, a New Perspective', *Global Turkey in Europe*, November 2012, Policy Brief 03, pg.3.

the world amid a staggering growth in displacement from Syria.⁷³ According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report-2014, Turkey provided US\$ 1.6 billion for humanitarian emergencies, making it the third largest government donor of official humanitarian assistance after the United States and the United Kingdom, which gave US\$4.7 billion and US\$1.8 billion respectively. Turkey even surpassed Japan and Germany, which provided US\$ 1.1 billion and US\$ 949 million respectively.⁷⁴ The humanitarian assistance given by Turkey corresponds to 0.21 percent of its gross national income which ranks Turkey top of the list of donors. The same figure is 0.03 percent for the U.S. and 0.07 percent for the U.K. The most remarkable point is that Turkey has been “ethnic, religious and sect blind” when providing assistance to the people having fled into the country from its neighbouring countries.⁷⁵

While Turkey is fulfilling its collective humanitarian responsibility to protect people fleeing from ISIL, is also preventing the instability caused by this migration from spreading to Europe. Turkey’s conscientious policy that requires devotion and self-sacrifice should not be considered by international community that Turkey is Europe’s buffer state that has long been imposed on it. Another challenge for Turkey is the foreign fighters travelling to join Islamist militants in Irak and Syria. On January 2015, at a one-day conference in London, UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond has praised Turkey’s effort to stop the flow of foreign fighters on the sheer length of the border between Turkey and Syria, which is over 800 kilometers.⁷⁶ Turkey, having already signed readmission agreement with the EU on 16 December 2013, facilitates the EU countries’ borders problems as well. Turkey is also continuing to

⁷³ *Hürriyet Daily News* (editorial), New York, 28 February 2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-urges-worlds-help-on-syrian-refugees-as-spending-reaches-6-billion.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78951&NewsCatID=359> (accessed: 28.2.2015)

⁷⁴ Global Humanitarian Assistance Report-2014, pg.4, <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GHA-Report-2014.pdf> (accessed: 24.02.2015)

⁷⁵ Turan Yilmaz, ‘Turkey ranks 3rd generous donor country’, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 3 October 2014, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-ranks-3rd-most-generous-donor-country.aspx?pageID=238&nID=72519&NewsCatID=510> (accessed: 24.02.2015)

⁷⁶ ‘UK praises Turkey’s efforts to stem flow of foreign fighters’ (World International), *Hürriyet Daily News*, 23 January 2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/uk-praises-turkeys-efforts-to-stem-flow-of-foreign-fighters.aspx?pageID=238&nID=77348&NewsCatID=359> (accessed: 24.01.2015)

participate in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and recently contributed to EU Mission to the Central African Republic (EUFOR CAR) and EU Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya).⁷⁷

IV.c-Turkey's contribution to the EU's energy supply security:

Since January 2006 the energy crisis between the EU countries and Russia changed the EU's post Cold War attitude towards Turkey. Turkey's geopolitical position which was regarded as a significant asset for European security during the Cold War era, was not as important as it was after it. The EU's new understanding of the security after the post Cold War has been changed with Russia's advantageous position in the energy markets converting it into its foreign policy, attempting to gain power in the Central and Eastern European countries. The EU, in order to keep its unity and future, has adopted a new policy to diversify energy sources and routes not to be depended widely to Russia. The EU realized that it can only by pass Russia with the energy resources of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Iraq through Turkey. Since the energy security and the geopolitics are tightly intertwined, Turkey's geographical location in close proximity to more than 70% of the world's proven oil and gas resources gained importance.⁷⁸ Turkey, forming a natural energy bridge between the source countries, the Middle East and Caspian basin, and consumer markets, stands as a key country in ensuring energy security through diversification of supply sources and routes.

Turkey has a dual role with its east-west links and Russia's interest in Turkey's role in the north-south corridor to bypass Ukraine.⁷⁹ Russia's interest was announced by Putin's surprise move that Moscow was scrapping the South Stream gas pipeline that was set to pass through Bulgaria, citing EU objections as the reason. Putin said the alternative pipeline would run through

⁷⁷ European Commission Turkey Progress Report, 'Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015', October 2014, pg.1

⁷⁸ Burak Bilgehan Özpek, 'Securing energy or energising security: the impact of Russia's energy policy on Turkey's accession to the European Union', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 2013, 16, pg. 358-359.

⁷⁹ Mehmet Efe Biresselioğlu, *European Energy Security-Turkey's Future Role and Impact*, Palgrave Macmillan Publishers Limited, UK, 2011, pg.89.

Turkey and end in a hub near the Greek border during his one day visit to Ankara on 1 December 2014. The cancelled South Stream pipeline had been intended as a southern complement to the Nord Stream pipeline, which links Russia and Germany, bypassing the Baltic states. The EU leaders said that this decision would both increase European dependence on Russian gas and leave Ukraine dangerously exposed to Russian cut-offs as it was happened in 2006 and 2009.⁸⁰ The EU leadership's plan for energy union to knit together national systems seems to be hard because of the way the 28 member countries want to keep their sovereignty over national energy systems, since the EU energy governance structure is designed to have one single European governance system to coordinate national policies and oversee physical and economic integration.⁸¹ The close ties between Hungary and Russia show the fracture among the EU. Hungarian Prime Minister Mr. Viktor Orban announced that a 'political agreement' on a new gas deal was reached with Russian President Vladimir Putin's one-day working visit to Hungary on 17 February 2015.⁸² The autocratic drift of Mr. Orban caused uneasiness around the EU already in July 2014 when he declared that Hungary would remain a democracy but become an "illiberal state". Hungary has already taken a loan from Russia to renew its old nuclear power plant.⁸³ The past efforts to create a unified energy policy have also showed the deep division between the two core countries of the EU, France, which relies on nuclear technology for its power, and Germany, which is phasing out its reactors.⁸⁴ This creates an irony for the cooperation in the coal and steel sectors, which was originally intended more than half a century ago to create a European Union.

⁸⁰ Michalel Birnbaum, 'Putin cancels new natural gas pipeline to Europe in surprise move', *The Washington Post*, December 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/putin-cancels-new-natural-gas-pipeline-to-europe-in-a-surprise-move/2014/12/01/c1955c90-73ee-11e4-95a8-fe0b46e875> (accessed:01.12.2014)

⁸¹ European Voice, Vol.21, No.7,19 February 2015, pg.11.

⁸² Pablo Gorondi, 'Hungary says agreement reached on new gas deal with Russia', *Associated Press*, 17 February 2015, <http://news.yahoo.com/hungary-says-agreement-reached-gas-195901828.html> (accessed:20.02.2015)

⁸³ 'Hungary and Russia, The Viktor and Vladimir show' (editorial), *The Economist*, 14 February 2015, pg.21.

⁸⁴ James Kanter and Stanley Reed, 'E.U. leadership pushes for energy union', *International New York Times*, 26 February 2015.

On the other hand, Turkey stands equal to all possible projects that serve the EU energy supply security with its potential balance between Western and Russian interests could make it the major energy route in the Greater Caspian Sea regional matrix. Turkey does not want to use its geopolitical position as a weapon against any other country, but become a centre of attractiveness for pipelines and other energy projects. Turkey's aim is to create interdependencies among the countries in the region to prevent any possible conflicts among them.⁸⁵

Europe's efforts to diversify its energy supplies uninterruptedly and securely is possible through Turkey. This fact is overlapping with the European public's focus on material benefit when Turkey's accession to the EU is in question. Turkey's future accession to the EU will ensure reliable delivery of oil and gas. Consequently, the EU with Turkey can become a competitive player not only economically, but also politically in the world.

IV.d - Progress made by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria:

i. Energy can be a facilitator to solve the long-standing Cyprus issue.

The recent findings of fossil fuel near the island can indeed be a significant opportunity for a long-sought solution. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu remarked in his speech at the 22 November 2014 closing session of the sixth Atlantic Council Energy and Economic Summit in Istanbul, *"Everyone will gain in Cyprus if both sides accept that natural sources around the island belong to all sides. Peace should be achieved without delay."* And he called for restarting negotiations over the long standing

⁸⁵ Süleyman Elik, *Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011, Conceptualising the dynamic of politic, religion and security in middle-power states*, Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, UK, 2012, pg.158.

*problem, “Let’s use this opportunity for the solution of this issue”.*⁸⁶ The findings of fossil fuel should be used first of all for the solution of Cyprus issue, then for the prosperity of the region. If both sides concur with Monnet’s proposal focusing on their mutual interests, energy can be a facilitator to solve the problem.

ii. Settlement process aiming at a solution of the Kurdish issue and its inevitable contribution for the protection of human rights in the country.

In 2004, the Turkish parliament adopted a law to ‘bring a stronger legal foundation to the settlement process’, which strengthens the basis for the settlement process and makes a positive contribution to stability and protection of human rights in Turkey. In 28 February 2015, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) has announced at a historic joint press conference with the government representatives a call by the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) to hold a conference to discuss disarmament in Turkey. Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan said that silencing arms would contribute into democratic development at the same joint press meeting.⁸⁷ This call means that the PKK will lay down arms during the process. Both parties want a ‘reinforced cease-fire’ and the withdrawal of PKK militants before June 7 election. The settlement process is not an easy issue to solve immediately as we have already seen the examples in cases of ETA, in Spain and IRA, in Ireland. It will take time, but every affirmative initiative is important for the political solution. The overwhelming majority of Turkish people is supporting the settlement process.

⁸⁶ “Turkey will be the primary user of Cyprus gas, PM Davutoğlu says” (editorial), *Hürriyet Daily News*, 22 November 2014, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-will-be-the-primary-user-of-cyprus-gas-pm-davutoglu-says.aspx?PageID=238&NID=74673&NewsCatID=510> (accessed:23.11.2014)

⁸⁷ “Turkish government, mediator party mark start of Kurdish talks toward political solution, disarmament” (editorial), *Hürriyet Daily News*, 28.02.2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-mediator-party-mark-start-of-kurdish-talks-toward-political-solution-disarmament.aspx?PageID=238&NID=78999&NewsCatID=338> (accessed:28.02.2015)

IV.e - The support of Turkish public for EU membership:

The surveys indicate that Turkish people supported for EU membership with 62% even during 1998 and much of 1999 when the tensions between Turkey and EU peaked. On 3 October 2001, when the Turkish parliament adopted 34 amendments to Constitution necessary to meet the Copenhagen criteria, the public support was nearly 75%. In 2003, when the new variables concerning 'sensitive issues' (see pg.12) and the impact of leadership in guiding mass support for EU membership were into account, Turkish voters surprisingly showed that the degree of Euro-skepticism ceases to have a significant negative impact, while pro-EU attitudes continue to have a significant positive impact on the likelihood of voting in support of EU membership.⁸⁸

In December 2014, a 'Survey of Social-Political Tendencies in Turkey' conducted by Kadir Has University presented the support for the EU membership rose 20% which is a rise from 51.8% in 2013 to 71.4% in 2014.⁸⁹ It is very interesting to see the public support for the EU membership among the Turkish people is still 71.4% despite the discouraging discourses by the leadership of both parties. In summary, the results of surveys demonstrate that neither sensitive issues nor discouraging discourses from both sides don't have substantial influence on Turkish people who have already made its choice towards the Western civilization which was introduced by Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Turkey, 92 years ago.

Conclusion:

Turkey's strategic geography created joint interests between Turkey and the EU. But, both parties failed to develop the joint interests to build a common future.

⁸⁸ Çarkoğlu, 'Societal perceptions' pg. 36-37.

⁸⁹ Verda Özer, 'Turkish people are afraid and want the West', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 24 January 2015 <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-people-are-afraid-and-want-the-west.aspx?pageID=449&nID=77360&NewsCatID=466> (accessed:25.01.2015)

Back to 1990s, Turkey's perception was an indebted country with high inflation, high public deficit, mediocre growth performance, having fragile economy but a strong army. The salient point of Turkey's perception was, a "security" provider of Europe. The irony is that yesterday's enemies of Western Europe, Warsaw Pact's members, are today's EU members. Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952, whose contribution to collective defense was to line up its forces on the southern front against some thirty Soviet divisions to prevent the Warsaw Pact's countries from maximizing their forces on the western front during the Cold War is still waiting for the EU full membership. Conversely, today's Turkey is the 16th largest economy in the world.⁹⁰ Given the economic developments since 2000s, the economic dimension of the EU-Turkey relationship has fundamentally changed (see pg.19). Turkish EU Affairs Minister, Volkan Bozkır, has recently declared that Turkey has a better outlook than 22 European countries and Turkey is the second country that fits the Maastricht criteria, the other country is Germany.⁹¹

In December 1999, when Turkey became as a candidate State to join to the EU on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States, the EU and the Eurozone seemed to have stable conditions. Conversely, today's EU is struggling with economic and political fragmentation due to uncertainties after the Greek-related economic crises and the political cleavage between member countries. For example, the close relations between Hungary and Russia and divisiveness among the member states for a unified energy policy. Furthermore, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron's January 2013 speech presents the divergence between member states. Cameron referring to the wafer-thin democratic consent in Britain to the EU committed, should he win the general election in 2015, an in/out referendum would be put to the

⁹⁰ IMF Country Report No.13/364, Selected Issues Paper, December 2013, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13364.pdf (accessed:09.12.2014)

⁹¹ Şakir Tanrıver, 'EU affair minister: Turkey capable of closing all EU accession chapters in two years' *Today's Zaman*, 30 January 2015, http://www.todayszaman.com/diplomacy_eu-affairs-minister-turkey-capable-of-closing-all-eu-accession-chapters-in-two-years_371303.html (accessed:30.01.2015)

British people.⁹² Today's EU is also facing the existential challenges beyond the economic and political crisis. According to the economic and demographic indicators, the EU generates 1/4th of the global GDP, but only constitutes 7% of the global population. This proportion will drop to 5 percent by 2040 and the EU's total GDP will be reduced to half of its current level. China and India's total population is already 35% of the global population and each has annual growth rate between 7 and 10%.⁹³ This means that global balance of power will be inevitably changed by then. Consequently, the unavoidable choice for the EU is to think about its future not to be perished, probably its self re-invention under the light of the demographic and economic indicators.

On the other hand, by 2023 Turkey and Korea, among the OECD countries are expected to exhibit the strongest growth during the next decade at 4.4% and 4.3% per annum respectively, according to OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2014-2023. The forecast of the population is also in favor of Turkey, since Australia, Mexico and Turkey have the highest projected population growth rates among the OECD countries.⁹⁴ Consequently, it is time for Turkey to think about the conditions of its accession negotiations to the EU. Turkey should establish its potential membership negotiations with the EU on a prospective rather than retrospective basis. When we evaluate the EU's history, we notice that EU experienced copious institutional changes. These new rules were not present when the EU started negotiations with Turkey. The then debate on membership did not cover such future institutional changes. Hence, the new institutional changes raise questions about the legitimacy of the new accession conditions imposed on Turkey. Therefore, Turkey must be associated with the possible re-invention process of the EU as an 'equal'. Some

⁹² Tim Oliver, 'To be or not to be in Europe: is that a question? Britain's European question and an in-out referendum', *International Affairs*, Vol.91, No.1, January 2015, published by Wiley & Sons, pg.77.

⁹³ Pascal Fontaine, *Jean Monnet: actualite d'un batisseur de l'Europe unie*, cited by Özdem Sanberk, 'Turkey needs to decide where it sees itself in the future', pg.2. <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3845/turkey-needs-to-decide-where-it-sees-itself-in-the-future.html> (accessed:16.12.2014)

⁹⁴ OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2014-2023, *Macroeconomic and Policy Assumption*, pg.24-25. https://www.embrapa.br/documents/1024963/1025740/OECD-FAO_Agricultural_Outlook_2014-2023/20082926-0f88-4159-970a-2a1c65795c47 (accessed:02.03.2015)

alternative directions such as 'inside' and 'outside' membership⁹⁵ or 'two speed', 'three-or-four speed' Europe that aim an EU which has inside member states for all purposes, and outside members for some purposes seem to be far away to meet Turkey's expectations. It would not be plausible even to discuss them with the EU facing with the fallouts from the eurozone crisis, the cleavage in energy policy, the Euroscepticism in the UK, and the move from 'consensus' to 'dissension' over the European integration. Because, the EU's history demonstrates that the end destinations of these alternative directions may remain permanently different.⁹⁶ Turkey should be in the decision making process and make proposals to the EU with the perspectives of 21st century. Of course, it is at EU's discretion whether to listen to Turkey's ideas and recommendations on the prospective EU's re-invention formation.

Since 2005, Turkey benefited enormously from the EU and has experienced tangible benefits to its citizens daily life such as more democracy, the state of law, freedom of speech, human dignity, financial and economic credibility. Turkey's rising power status that provided high economic growth came from its harmony with EU values. Other alliances like 'Shanghai Five' expressed by the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,⁹⁷ during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Turkey on 1 December 2014 only distance Turkey from its path of a secular and pluralistic democracy. The remarks by the President of Turkey should be considered as a reflection of the EU countries' blockage of negotiating chapters for political reasons. There is no other country determined and persistent as Turkey whose motivation is to obtain the EU values and standards rather than money. Therefore, there is no serious alternative to Turkey's membership to the EU. But, any form of membership proposals other than the full membership would trigger mistrust and uncertainty in Turkey-EU relations. However, it cannot be ruled out that

⁹⁵ Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, 'The European Union and Turkey', *Survival*, Vol.41, No.1, Spring 1999, pg.52-54.

⁹⁶ Derviş, 'Turkey and Europe', pg.4.

⁹⁷ Semih İdiz, 'Does Europe's future really include Turkey?', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 3 February 2015, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/does-europes-future-really-include-turkey.aspx?pageID=449&nID=77784&NewsCatID=416> (accessed:17.02.2015)

Turkey may redefine its EU accession bid if the EU countries insist on its depreciation of full membership.

EU countries would also benefit enormously from Turkey's economic dynamism which will bring buoyancy to its sluggish economy. Furthermore Turkey's multicultural richness will be an asset to the Union, since the multiculturalism which was one of the keystones of the foundation ideology of the EU has failed.⁹⁸ The cultural xenophobia against Islam is now sweeping through Europe. Turkey in Europe would ensure that a religious fault line will not be developed in the vast area from Mediterranean to Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia and also will contribute to eliminate the Islamophobia in the West. The accession of Turkey to the EU would show the Muslim world that Europe is not an exclusively Christian club and is open to peoples of all religions and cultures. This would be an opportunity to build trust between Christian and Muslim world. Turkey, the only pluralist democracy in the Moslem world will be the hope of its southern neighbours for their democratic and more prosperous future.

Recent developments in energy sector proved that pipelines can become tools of political leverage of both peace and conflict. Turkey, with its historically close ties to the West and the East has the potential to shape the balance in favor of stability. Therefore, Turkey with its dynamic economy and its geostrategic location should be in Europe for the well-being of both parties and their neighbourhood. I want to conclude this paper assuming the similar philosophy of Jean Monnet, that the interdependency of the countries is reigning in our global village.

⁹⁸ George Friedman, 'Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism', *Geopolitical Weekly-Stratfor-global intelligence*, 19 October 2010, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/european-union-nationalism-and-crisis-europe#axzz3Py0MBfTv> (accessed:26.01.2015)

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