Georg W. Oesterdiekhoff
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Oesterdiekhoff G.W., Russia’s domestic and international politics. No explanation without the cognitive-developmental approach, “Polish Journal of Political Science”, 2023, Vol. 9, Issue 4, pp. 4–27, DOI: 10.58183/pjps.04012023.
ABSTRACT
Russia’s war on Ukraine is not a failure by accident but reflects the mentality and stance of the Kremlin and greater parts of the Russian people. Russia’s international politics pursue imperial dreams, conducted by the most brutal methods. Obviously, the political consciousness of Russians has not progressed to the rates and standards that shape the minds and behavior of politicians and the electorate in the most advanced nations of our time. It is argued that political science must consider research conducted by the cognitive-developmental approach. Contemporary nations operate on differently developed stages of mind and cognition with far-reaching effects on moral reasoning, social understanding, and humanitarian standards. There is evidence that a weaker development of the fourth stage of human cognition, the stage of formal operations, accounts for backwardness concerning the process of civilization. This seems to be the main cause of the chasm between the “Russian World” and the “Free World”.
Keywords: developmental stages, civilization process, political consciousness, international politics, democracy, autocracy, moral values, humanism
Introduction
Since February 2022, social scientists, politicians, journalists, and the public have increasingly realized that the differences between Russia on one side and Western nations on the other, concerning culture, politics, and mentality, are much greater than previously assumed. Even a few weeks before the war, only a small number of the 2,000 experts visiting the Munich Security Conference expected Russia to attack Ukraine, while the majority assumed Russia would only try to blackmail the West and Ukraine to receive some guarantees and concessions. Western observers believed that the Russian Federation would adhere to common norms and standards concerning international treaties, territorial integrity, warfare, and humanism, at least to the extent that it would be hindered from starting a brutal war against a nation with which it had maintained many connections in terms of language, culture, and family ties. Though many experts and observers continued to cling to their naïve illusions throughout the year 2022, some others recognized that the war might evidence the huge cultural gulf between Russia and the West, a cultural chasm that has existed for generations and centuries but was overlooked for a long time. The war shed new light on understanding Russia, its society, culture, politics, and people, both past and contemporary.
The tremendous differences are evident concerning domestic and international politics, the economy and judiciary, culture and mass media, family life, and morals. They seem to touch every aspect of life, refuting the assumption that the use of modern media, the rise of higher education, international contacts, and participation in globalization might prompt and unify the standards of politics and morals on a worldwide scale, at least concerning the comparison between Russia and the West. It is now obvious that Russia has not shared the advancements in political culture, morals, and humanism to the extent that Western nations, including, for example, Japan and South Korea, have accomplished over the past generations. Russia has not successfully progressed to the heights identifiable in the most advanced nations of our time.
Many experts may agree on the existence of this cultural chasm as outlined in the previous sentences.[1] However, the cultural gap may be much deeper than most critics of contemporary Russia even believe. I am going to argue that the cultural gap can be described in terms of developmental stages as known and elaborated by professional developmental psychology. This kind of research and theory is almost unknown among most political scientists, historians, sociologists, journalists, and politicians. Even the harshest critics of Russia, seeing it as a backbencher concerning modernization and progress, understanding it as Stalinist or partially even as medieval, usually have not the slightest idea of the possibility and necessity to apply developmental psychology to scrutinize Russia specifically and cultural differences between nations generally.
In several essays, E. Fein and A. Wagner have described Russian politics in terms of psychological stage theory, using theories of adult development.[2] Adult development describes stage developments unfolding and discernible among adults within a given society or between adults of different societies. This approach illuminates the backwardness of contemporary Russia in a fresh and astonishing way, dwarfing the common political science studies related to Russia by showing their limited precision and their insufficient or almost entirely missing explanatory power.
This article goes beyond that as it erases the boundaries between developmental psychology and adult development theories. Theories of adult development actually do not bridge the gap to child development; it remains unclear how adult development follows the stages children go through. More precisely, theories of adult development sometimes describe around ten stages, maintaining that there are some adults in modern societies operating on stages two or three of ten possible ones.[3] Then they encounter the problem of connecting these assumptions with the fact that there are prior stages to consider, those emerging in children and teenagers. When modern adults might stay on stage three of ten possible ones, where did they stay when they were 6 or 14 years of age?
Therefore, my approach is solely based on the most common stage theory known in developmental psychology, the theory of stage development according to Jean Piaget. It describes four main stages, covering the development from neonate over child and adolescent to adult phases.[4] My approach, called the structural-genetic theory program, is developed as a general theory of history and outlines the history of human development from archaic to modern societies, including the history of culture, politics, law, religion, sciences, philosophy, arts, and morals.[5]
Archaic or ancient humans share stages two and sometimes stage three with modern children but do not develop stage four, which is a stage that only adolescents and adults in modern societies reach. The evolution of stage four – the stage of formal operations – originated late in history, typically in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries, and did not become widespread among the general population until the 20th century. Stage four has evolved incrementally from generation to generation over the past centuries. It has reached its highest levels within the most advanced nations of today, while developing and threshold countries lag behind in this development. While the most advanced nations of today operate predominantly at the highest level of formal operations, people in threshold countries are somewhat behind, and those living in traditional regions within developing nations often do not reach the fourth stage at all. These uneven stage developments across world society account for uneven developments in politics, morals, and humanism.[6]
The structural-genetic theory program attributes autocracy, lack of human rights, corruption and criminality, maltreatment of women and children, brutal punishment laws, and superstition to the lack or weak development of the fourth stage, while a strong development of that stage is linked to democracy, civil rights, humanism, rationality, and enlightenment.[7] Therefore, it is claimed that the comparative cultural backwardness of contemporary Russia must be explained in terms of developmental psychology; that is, it is rooted in comparably weaker developments of the fourth stage in the minds of its people.
Overall, Piagetian stage theory provides a sharper and deeper foundation for the phenomena mentioned than adult development theories, with foundations that are much more precise and consistent. There is no gap between child and adult development; rather, adult development is continuously connected to child development. We only need one stage theory, not two.
Civilization theory and Piagetian psychology
There has been a forerunner of the structural-genetic theory program. The civilization theory of Norbert Elias[8] shares many assumptions, including the description that humankind went through psychogenetic stages from childhood to adulthood. Elias compares ancient or medieval adults to children, seeing adults of modern societies as the only ones to have surmounted children’s stages. He describes medieval humans as shaped by narrowness of mind, inability to overlook complex relations, cognitive egocentrism, low thresholds of shame and embarrassment, low forms of conscience, as well as strong and wild passions, especially concerning sexuality and aggression. According to Elias, they have a strong Id and a weak Super-Ego, allowing the I to follow his drives and passions. Modern adults overcome the child’s psyche and are therefore more civilized. The history of civilization, the transition from medieval to modern times, is rooted in this psychogenetic development of humankind. Elias recognized that non-European nations have been following this path during the 20th century.[9] According to this theory, Russians can be categorized as backbenchers concerning the civilization process.
Piagetian theory and Piagetian Cross-Cultural Psychology can provide evidence for what Elias had already described, using better data and theoretical models than Elias had available. All humans worldwide develop the sensorimotor and preoperational stages similarly, but divergences between ethnicities emerge thereafter. The preoperational stage is the modal stage of archaic or premodern adults, explaining primarily archaic mind, behavior, and culture. Some individuals also develop the concrete operational stage, albeit partially and often limited to specific issues and tasks. However, they never reach the formal operational stage, the fourth and final stage.[10]
The preoperational stage typically corresponds to children between their second and tenth year, while the concrete operational stage covers developments between the sixth and twelfth year of age. The formal operational stage gradually unfolds between the twelfth and twenty-fifth year of age. This implies that archaic or premodern humans usually remain on stages comparable to those of children between their third and tenth year, most commonly between their fourth and seventh year. Archaic humans may differ in life experience and knowledge from preschool children, but not in terms of their psychological stage structures. Moreover, for every phenomenon developmental psychology describes in children, empirical research has also found it to be a main feature of archaic adults. The commonalities regarding stage structures are comprehensive and complete, leaving no room for differences. Modern adults, however, are distributed across developmental ages between 10 and 25. While some modern adults remain at substage A of formal operations (10-15 years of age), others progress to substage B (from 15 years onwards).[11]
Children and archaic adults share the same patterns concerning numbers, logic, physics, social affairs, political understanding, morals, religious phenomena, and worldview, right across the whole spectrum of mind, consciousness, and world understanding. Both groups similarly believe in ghosts and sorcerers, magic and oracles, and share animistic understandings of nature and movements. Both groups adhere to a law-and-order justice system and regard laws as holy and unchangeable entities. Both groups harbor religious feelings towards natural phenomena and perceive the cosmos as a sort of deity in itself. Both groups exhibit the same attitudes towards myths and fairy tales and employ the same categories of causality, chance, and probability. Both groups support autocracy and reject democracy. The commonalities even extend to small details such as the understanding of shadows or the ignorance of syllogisms.[12]
Against this background, it is possible to reconstruct the history of culture, sciences, philosophy, religion, politics, law, morals, and arts in terms of developmental stages.[13] The preoperational stage carries and defines the historically early stages of these branches of culture, regardless of where and when in world history, and the higher stages carry their trajectories through later times. The modern structures of these branches mentioned are mainly nothing else but manifestations of the formal operational stage. Overall, modern industrial society is simply a manifestation of the fourth stage. As stage theory provides the deepest description of the psychogenesis of humankind, the structural-genetic theory program delivers the most fundamental description of the history of the branches because it directly refers to this description to the core structures of the four stages respectively.[14]
Developmental psychology and political studies
Stage theory and political behavior in world politics
Psychological stages have significantly shaped the evolution of political institutions and political thought.[15] They not only account for the existence of autocracy or democracy but also for the level of brutality and criminality concerning political behavior, as well as for the values and moral standards shaping political conduct. Politicians governing developing nations have tended more towards brutal and criminal behavior than politicians ruling the most advanced nations of our time. Political institutions and legal frameworks do not solely account for that difference, as most political studies suggest or imply. Psychological stages cause these differences as they influence both institutions and the mentality of people. Nations at lower stages have no problem accepting violent rulers; they are loyal to dictators and tolerate their extreme methods. Only nations at higher stages reject both autocracy and the violent and absurd methods of politicians alike. However, political sciences have not yet recognized the necessity of applying developmental psychology to the study of political phenomena. Yet, I have yet published several book chapters and articles to outline the link between political sciences and stage theory.[16]
For example, the former president of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte won presidential elections due to his official statements he, as mayor of Davao, had killed drug users and dealers with his own gun on regular controls he had done through his city with his motorbike. He won the election campaign because the nation wanted to have a strong man capable of solving problems by the most brutal methods. Then staying in power, hundreds of private persons and police officers alike received 300 USD for every assassination of both addicts and dealers. More than 10,000 persons were killed anywhere in the streets or their homes without any supervision or judicial procedures. More, the Philippines had no special drug problem though, at least less than many other nations.[17] It is apparent that such phenomena could never happen in the most advanced nations of today and even not in advanced developing nations such as Brazil or Argentina.
Prince Johnson murdered Liberia’s president Samuel Doe in September 1990 and made a detailed two-hours-long film of the slow and brutal torture and killing of Doe. The video was the biggest attraction in Liberia and was widely cast in West Africa over the years. It did not endanger Johnson’s presidency but ran in bars and shops from morning to night, entertaining the appetite of some nations at best.[18] Again, such things could never happen in Brazil or Argentina. It is impossible to imagine Angela Merkel sitting on a motorbike hunting addicts with her gun or even Donald Trump casting videos showing the torture of “sleepy Joe”.
Even people with the most limited knowledge of developmental psychology should immediately grasp that only stage theory can explain these great differences in political behavior. There are huge differences in this regard between contemporary nations, whether political sciences and journalism can address or envisage this or not. These pieces of information are the best precondition to understanding the necessity to apply stage theory to political studies, to the ignorance of our intellectual and political elite, and to Russia.
Stage theory as explanatory model to the evolution of democracy
Developmental psychology does not only explain daily political behavior and political mentality. It also explains whether a nation prefers autocracy or democracy. The structural-genetic theory program has outlined that it is not social structures or power constellations that account for autocracy/democracy but stage developments concerning a nation’s political consciousness.[19] Jean Piaget provided the decisive data to develop this new theory of political systems. He evidenced that roughly by the age of ten, children see rules and laws as unchangeable and holy, made by God or the elderly. They believe that people are not allowed to make rules and to govern society on their own, by applying democratic customs and procedures. Teenagers, however, surpass this idea of divine and autocratic government and establish ideas and customs of democratic leadership. Accordingly, stage theory accounts for the existence of both autocracy and democracy.[20] Subsequent research has confirmed Piaget’s study time and again. Teenagers have a better understanding of liberty rights, tolerance of dissident opinions, and democratic procedures, while children focus on the privileges of rulers and adhere to strict principles of obedience.[21]
Not until 2013 did an encompassing study with about 100 pages exist to provide evidence that humankind went through the same stages of political systems and ideas as those outlined by developmental psychology, akin to those found among children. It is now sufficiently and coherently worked out that stage theory is able to explain the rise of democracy.[22] The increasing rise of formal operations during the time 1750 to 1950 is the main cause of the continuous rise of liberty rights, the rule of law, and democracy, first in the West, and later in other regions of the world. The era of Enlightenment worked out the ideas of liberalism, while the era of revolution at the end of the 18th century and the era of modernization during the following centuries put the liberal ideas into practice and created the institutions of democracy. The emergence of the stage of formal operations has propelled the entire process of civilization, manifest in political systems, political consciousness, moral standards in political behavior, and political values. The decline of violence, corruption, mafia connections, and warfare mentality is a consequence of psychogenetic advancements. This late description or discovery is astonishing insofar as Piaget himself in his early study made many remarks suggesting parallels to history, while, for example, decades later Radding[23] also made some related formulations, being by no means the only author with regard to this. However, it was the structural-genetic theory program that consistently and fundamentally developed the new theory.[24]
The political system in Russia
Russia transformed from a monarchy to a communist dictatorship in 1917, which immediately destroyed the small democratic movement that appeared in the summer of 1917. Democracy existed in Russia only during the last decade of the last century, while since 1999, with Putin in power, Russia slowly turned into autocracy again, holding democratic institutions only as a mere façade. Already in the year 2000, the new government took over greater parts of mass media to control public opinion in favor of the Kremlin. By 2008, the Kremlin was said to control 90% of mass media.[25] The new government placed former KGB agents into central positions of state and administration with a clear intention that the secret service should dominate the whole state and society. In fact, with Putin, the former KGB took over power in Russia and removed both the new democratic elites and the Yeltsin “family” from influential positions. By 2006, 78% of the Russian state elite had a background in the “services”.[26] From scratch, these people aimed to abolish liberalism, democracy, and the rule of law. Liberty rights were curtailed, and there was nobody anymore to enjoy legal protection against prosecution or attacks by agents or officials. The division of jurisprudence, legislation, and government slowly dissolved.[27]
The new power elite took over the economic empires built by the Oligarchs of the 1990s and thousands of enterprises, thus dominating whole branches such as media, energy, construction, and finance. They forced former entrepreneurs to resign and hand over their property, or simply killed them when they refused to comply. It was sheer brutal force that made the grand robbery feasible. Alternatively, they used the justice system and police to accuse any businessmen to acquire their property. In particular, the accusation of tax evasion provided a convenient pretext for expropriation.
It was common for true Mafia organizations to kill entrepreneurs, take over their property, and share their conquest with either local state officials or even with the Kremlin. Alternatively, state officials took over enterprises, sometimes with the help of Mafiosi. Coalitions involving the Kremlin, administration, police, and Mafia became widespread.[28] Robbery, based on such coalitions, did not only concern enterprises but also extended to private houses or apartments. Violence decided over business success and ownership, whether referring to enterprises or residences.
The Kremlin dominates at the top of the corrupt system. When gangsters or service agents want to secure their robbery or even guarantee it, they must share with the Kremlin. This way, the Kremlin receives its share from all parts of the economy throughout the country. Secret services or the Kremlin control 70% of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product.[29] It is practically a feudal state where the Kremlin approves ownership in exchange for shares or contributions.[30] Thereby, it is possible that in case of missing loyalty or missing shares, the Kremlin expropriates owners to take over the property on its own or by giving it to other persons or groups. The Kremlin allows or withdraws ownership from any conglomerates, enterprises, or businessmen for various reasons. It is maintained that there is no transfer of capital over 50 million USD in Russia without the personal permission of Putin himself.[31] Therefore, he could accumulate more than 200 billion USD for his fortune and build his own “Versailles” close to Sochi.
The slow transformation from democracy to autocracy accelerated since the invasion of 24 February. Since that time, every trace of opposition has vanished, and strict loyalty and obedience are requested from any citizen in the state. The question arises: why did the Russian people accept that transformation? Why did they allow gangsters to overtake office and the economy? Why did they endure their slavery and loss of rights? According to the new theory of political systems presented above, the ultimate cause of the existence of autocracy is the weak development of the adolescent stage of formal operations. Dictators can only rule when greater parts of a nation support them, accept them, and are loyal to them. Without the support and wish of the people, dictators cannot keep their power and rulership. The existence of autocracies depends on the political consciousness of greater parts of the nation. In fact, psychological stages account for dictatorship.
Without knowledge of the structural-genetic theory program, authors studying Russia have recognized that most Russians, even at the beginning of Putin’s rulership, were in favor of autocracy and saw it as the best method to rule the country, to recover both the economy and Russia’s greatness in world politics.[32] They disrespected democracy and liberty rights as Western propaganda and as accountable to the chaos of the 1990s. The Russian people have elected Putin and his party time and again during the past two decades, especially people living in the countryside and the provinces. State propaganda has its share, but educated people fully staying on the fourth stage would neither swallow this propaganda nor back the whole system generally. “A majority of people deliberately accepted the new system that cemented the way of government prevailing in Russia since the time of the czars.”[33] The deep connection between the political consciousness of people on the one hand and the actual political system on the other hand completely matches the expectations of the psychological stage theory mentioned above. The structural-genetic theory program claims to be able to explain the primitive and uncivilized political system of Russia.
Theories of adult development and the political system of Russia
Elke Fein and Anastasija Wagner are among those who have applied theories of psychological development to the study of Russian society. They use, as mentioned above, theories of adult development to understand contemporary Russia. They apply, among others, the stage theory of social forms and political behavior outlined by Stephen Chilton.[34] The lowest first stage (“punishment and obedience”), expressed by physical compulsion, threats, seizure by force, and extortion, is manifest in pecking orders, slavery, and prisons. The second stage (“individual instrumental purpose and exchange”), is expressed by barter, trading, bribery, deterrence by revenge, prebend, curses, exhibits in feudal systems, patronage systems, and hostages. The third stage (“mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships and conformity”), expressed by friendship and romantic love, is to be found in client systems, social patronage, and corporatism. Stage four (“social system and conscience maintenance”), based on mutual support of the moral system, manifests in a modern army, bureaucracy, the tyranny of majority rule, and absolutism. Stage five (“prior rights and social contract or utility”) includes mutual respect, rational debate, fair competition, and scientific testing, and materializes in democracies and the preservation of civil rights and liberties. Finally, stage six (“universal ethical principles”) is based on mutual care and undistorted communicative action and is still Utopia.
According to Fein, Russian society after 1990 until today displays a mixture of stage 2 and stage 3, based on patron-client relations, clientelism, barter, or blat. [35] Therefore, democracy and rule of law, tolerance and civil rights could not function in Russia because the political consciousness of the people is too weakly developed. Institutions can function only on that level of developmental complexity people have attained in their minds. “Unless the institution’s structure is preserved by people at the appropriate stage, the institution will regress to less developed forms.”[36] The Russian political elite and electorate could not adopt the democratic institutions and practices introduced by B. Yeltsin and thus the new formal institutions came to be devaluated in favor of clientelism, patronage, and brutal violence.[37]
Thus, there is no great gulf between the political system of the USSR and that of contemporary Russia, at least measured by some criteria. The Soviet regime was ruled by “truth” and “dogma”. It was an ideological dictatorship, based on clientelism and patronage, thus exhibiting levels 2 and 3 according to Chilton. Stalinism was created by the Georgian clan culture.[38]
The political consciousness of the Russians did not advance and remained blockaded on earlier stages, those stages that already prevailed in the USSR, and could not compete with the advancements taking place in the West, especially between 1970 and today. “Modern and postmodern values and logics have neither become the dominant structures of public reasoning nor of political action on a larger scale. Sustainable post-conventional action logics, for example, would also include post-materialist and other post-conventional values, such as critical self-reflection, putting higher weight on good relationships and inner growth as compared to material goods, increasing feelings of empathy, tolerance, and respect for other cultures, social and political minorities and even the rights and dignity of political opponents.”[39]
Fein also resorts to the stage theory of Susanne Cook-Greuter.[40] Stage 0 (pro-social) is followed by stage 1 (symbiotic) and stage 2 (impulsive). Stage 2/3 (self-protective) is based on minimal self-description and characterizes many Russians including Putin. Stage 3 (conformist/rule-oriented) is followed by stage 3/4 (self-conscious) and stage 4 (conscientious), then stage 5 (autonomous) and stage 6 (unitary). I do not comment on Cook-Greuter’s stage theory here. Fein earmarks an early stage such as 2/3 as a modal stage of many Russians, and this shows that Fein sees the Russians as tremendously backward in terms of personality development and political consciousness. Self-protective persons (stage 2/3) “see the world only from the perspective of their own needs and wants. They are as yet incapable of insight into themselves or others in a psychological sense. This is why they are generally wary of others’ intentions and assume the worst. Everything to them is a war of wills, and life a zero-sum game. Their ‘I win, you lose’ mentality inevitably causes friction and hurt feelings wherever they go, especially with others at more conventional stages. In turn, others experience self-protective people often as manipulative and exploitative, because in their perspective, the only way one can get what one wants is by controlling others and protecting oneself.”[41] According to that research, self-protective individuals do not feel responsible for the failure they cause because they do not understand the connection between action and consequences. “Others are to blame, never oneself.”[42]
Wagner and Fein researched the behavior of Putin by using several databases, especially by analyzing his speeches, articles written about him, and other sources. The data were coded and interpreted by the stage theory of Cook-Greuter. They found Putin’s mind and behavior matching to stage 2 with 24% of his actions and statements, stage 2/3 with 46%, stage 3 with 25%, and stage 3/4 with 5% of them.[43] Thus Putin’s personality is dominated by the self-protective stage. “This structure does not show empathy with others, and often does not view them as equal others with legitimate, potentially differing perspectives on things. Instead, it perceives all outside actors and events through an egocentric, somewhat narcissist lens, primarily asking: ‘how does it affect me?’ and ‘what’s in it for me?’… And due to a lack of more differentiated coping strategies, they consequently try to control, hunt or eliminate them by all means. If there are no enemies, they invent or create them.”[44]
Fein shows that this attitude characterizes both the treatment of other nations and their past. Russian foreign politics sees the ambitions and problems of other nations in an astonishing way only through its lenses. For example, Russia cannot see that the Eastern European nations’ hurry for membership in NATO or other alliances originated from its own conduct against these nations. Russia caused the problems but is incapable of connecting its own mistakes with the unpleasant results and therefore always blames others.[45]
The same attitude is identifiable concerning the interpretation of the own past. Russia addressed its past seriously only during the Yeltsin era, with “Memorial” that researched the crimes of the Stalin era, and with historians to scrutinize Stalin’s responsibility for the outburst of war.[46] After wards, with the beginning of the Putin era, the open and critical confrontation with the past radically declined and was finally abolished. Stalin, the USSR, Russia’s role in the war, and the whole past were glorified and whitewashed, and any form of criticism of the own past was prosecuted and criminalized. “I claim that self-protective logics of reasoning and action have come to function as a strategy to avoid a more differentiated confrontation with the after-effects of these dislocations and with the Soviet past in general, at least during the past ten years.”[47] Countries at higher psychological stages, being capable of self-reflexive operations, do not whitewash own mistakes and ignore them but would accept them as facts. “Even psychological lay people would probably agree that self-reflexive efforts to confront past crimes and traumas constitute a more complex, more differentiated and thus more developed way of dealing with a criminal and traumatizing past than trying to whitewash, repress, or relativize it, for example by setting it off against the ‘positive sides of history’ or by denying or avoiding questions of responsibility.”[48]
Since Putin took office as president, Russia’s rating on Transparency International’s Corruption Scale has dropped from rank 82 in 2000 to 136 in 2014 (www.transparency.org). While in Western societies, during the past centuries, models of cognition and social conduct have developed from concrete, interpersonal logics to more abstract and formal logics, Russian society preserved concrete-personal relations as the dominant form of society, thus continuing traditional relations such as patronage, clientelism, and corruption. Corruption belongs to everyday practices in traditional society and is seen as a problem only when society attains the mode of preserving abstract rules and impersonal functionalities.
Premodern peoples usually stay on moral stages 1 or 2, only small percentages of a premodern population reach stage 3.[49] These three stages manifest moral reasoning bound to concrete personal relationships only. They ignore any moral considerations referring to society, abstract rules, or general principles. Only stage 4 refers to abstract bodies such as the state and society, that is, principles and institutions outside the range of personal interrelationships. Therefore, the problem of corruption can only be recognized in stage 4. This stage was nonexistent in imperial Russia and seems to be missing or only very weakly developed in contemporary Russia. Corruption can only be defeated when people attain stage 4 at a modal stage, otherwise, citizens see no problem in preferring those who pay the most or to whom they are personally connected. Corruption is visible as a problem only when rule-oriented cultures of reasoning (at least stage 4) and their respective action logics emerge.[50] “Historians have described society in late tsarist Russia as a society of physical presence or as a gift giving society, in which the efficiency of power depended on the quality and stability of personal networks. The latter, in turn, were built and stabilized through practices of exchanging material and immaterial goods against loyalty, personal service, or obedience. Patron-client relationships were universal, unquestioned phenomena structuring the whole society, including its social, economic, and political institutions. At the same time, typical elements of modern statehood, such as impersonal institutions, the rule of law, and professional work ethics based on personal skills, formal qualifications, and specialized knowledge were nonexistent.”[51]
Clerks were not appointed based on their qualifications but rather on their personal relationships with patrons. Offices were distributed as rewards for loyal behavior to the aristocrat, ultimately to the Czar. There was no spirit of lawfulness and strict obedience to rules, as Weber had described as a prerequisite of modern bureaucracy. Higher education and professional training were lacking in 19th-century Russia. While Germany had already implemented a three-stage school system and required two state examinations as a condition to join state service, Russia did not introduce compulsory school education until 1917 and demanded from clerks only the ability to read and write, without any specific skills being necessary. “Most officers served exclusively because of the honor or of earning a certain rank or medal, without really taking an interest in the files or in the essence of the matter. They signaled anything that came to them by the chambers.”[52]
Though higher qualifications and abstract rules played a more significant role during the Soviet regime, it is quite obvious that patron-client relations, clan structures, and blat relations (personal networks used to obtain goods and circumvent formal procedures) dominated Soviet society throughout the last century. “The Russian mentality is oriented toward personalizing one’s contacts… In Russia, formalities never meant more than personal relations. It is a country which Tis governed by mores rather than laws.”[53]
his stage of consciousness has persisted in Russia until today. Concrete personal relations and moral stages below stage 4 continue to shape contemporary Russian mentality. “Many observers therefore continue to think of corruption and the direct exchange of services based on relations of mutual trust as the true organizational principle of Russian society.”[54] Russia is a patrimonial and neo-feudal state. Most archaic social relations persist, including clan structures, Mafia structures, and secret service networks that undermine the market economy, rule of law, and democracy. “In this sense, it is not accurate to say that impersonal systems in today´s Russia are ‘defect’. Rather, they have never fully developed in the first place due to a lack of sufficiently complex reasoning structures able to sustain them as a dominant culture… So even though a general developmental progress of cognition and culture can be analyzed here, post-Communist Russia still does not meet the modernity standards set by Weber. This is due to a missing systematic-stage political culture, which neither the Soviet nor the post-Soviet Russian government was interested in fostering. This also explains the difficulty of modern type (systematic-level) democratic institutions to take root in Russia.”[55]
Social affairs and morals in contemporary Russia
When Russians have developed the fourth stage of formal operations in a weaker way than people of the most advanced nations have done, as the previous analysis clearly evidences, then Russian society must manifest lower stages of personality development, social norms, and morals throughout. I want to document this with some short descriptions of the role of violence in society, the role of street fights, the impact of domestic violence, the situation in prisons, alcoholism, and the treatment of handicapped persons. These different phenomena emerge from a lower stage of personality development and moral consciousness than most advanced nations have reached during the past generations. Resorting to insights and concepts of N. Elias, it is quite apparent that Russian society is less civilized than some other nations are nowadays.
The enormous readiness of the Russian people to exert cruel violence currently manifests in its war on Ukraine. While some politicians such as Gerhart Baum adamantly deny any difference between Russian aggressiveness and that of other nations in wartime, not only the American Institute for the Study of War but also other observers maintain the special aggressiveness and cruelty of the Russian army not only today but also in former times.[56] Irpin reflects the normal way of Russian warfare. “What happens in Ukraine over the last three months is an orgy of epic, unbounded violence. Mass executions and bestial torture, assassinations of civilians, just so, just for boredom, for fun, with rapes and murders of parents before their children’s eyes and conversely, with violence against women and girls between 8 and 80 years of age.”[57] Jeffrey Hawn maintained that the Russian army, quite different from Western armies, has not developed an institutional culture to minimize losses among civilians; there are no protective mechanisms against unjustified violence in place. The main targets of the Russian attacks are apartment blocks where thousands of normal people live. Destruction of whole cities, as already practiced in Syria, to take civilians’ all means to survive, is the normal Russian way of warfare. Waiting for the winter to destroy power stations and heating facilities to hope for the death of thousands of civilians in their cold homes is a normal strategy in the eyes of the Russian military. “Russia has presented to the whole world its senseless Russian anger, its sinister barbarism, his criminal mentality, cruelty, violence and its contempt of human dignity and human life, both that of Ukrainians and its own soldiers.”[58]
Deadly and bloody gladiator fights in arenas before thousands of spectators belonged to the most influential entertainment opportunities of ancient times.[59] This culture of violence has vanished due to rising psychological stages shaping morals and emotions. Residual forms of that may exist in current boxing matches, while in Russia, harder forms of entertainment fighting have survived, com bats that would be impossible to stage in Western Europe. The custom is called Strelka championship (mixed-martial-arts combats) conducted across Russia. Everybody in the streets is allowed to participate in the combat, without any preparation and exercise. The organizer asks bystanders to enter the ring and join, giving them joke names and money when they win. Those who fight bravely and in an entertaining way become famous across the country. The fighters are simply amateurs who fight each other without any rules.[60]
This culture of violence penetrates personal and family relations alike. Russian statistics document 50,000 crimes in 2015 where violence in private homes was involved, with 36,000 of them referring to violence against women. According to UN statistics, 14,000 women in Russia are annually killed by their relatives, especially by their husbands. 40% of all crimes involving violence take place in private homes and families, with two-thirds of severe bodily injuries and premeditated assassinations being committed within the family. Annually, 600,000 women are beaten in Russia. Since March 2017, a new law passed by the Duma aims to remove all attacks that do not cause lasting bodily damage from penalty consequences. Those who cause only moderate injuries are not prosecuted by law but must pay for regulatory offenses only.[61] Though the US population is more than double in size, only 1,800 women are killed in the USA. The ratio in this regard between the USA and Russia thus amounts to almost 1:20, despite the USA exhibiting much more violence than European nations. For example, 122 women were killed in Germany in 2018.[62]
Domestic violence is frequently accompanied by alcohol. According to Russian police, 80% to 95% of culprits commit domestic violence due to alcohol abuse. Every fifth Russian dies from alcohol abuse, according to WHO statistics. Alcohol causes more than 50% of deaths in age groups between 15 and 54 years, with men at 59% and women at 33%. Alcohol intoxications, liver cirrhosis, injuries, and homicides under alcohol impact are among the specific causes leading to death.[63] Alcohol abuse is typical for many developing nations and was also a significant problem in Europe generations ago but has decreased over time as a consequence of education and greater consciousness. In Africa, alcohol abuse has played a significant part until yesterday or even today, with greater parts of whole village populations being drunk daily. It can be maintained that there exists a link between the civilization process and alcohol consumption.
Russia manifests its brutal behavior against human beings also in its detention policy. In March 2021, 480,000 people were imprisoned in Russia. Only the United States have higher rates of imprisonment than Russia. The chance of being imprisoned is significant, as judicial courts convict most defendants. If persons are charged, they have little chance of getting rid of accusations and avoiding conviction to go to jail. While European nations pay an average of 68.30 € for every prisoner per day, Russia has the lowest cost at 2.40 € per prisoner per day.
The Russian detention system does not aim for the resocialization of individuals but for their breaking. Common practices include sleep deprivation, total bans on speaking, torture, beatings, rape, and electroshocks. Some prisoners are subjected to staying in frost or uncomfortable body positions for hours. The cells are overcrowded, and the staff exercises power without much control.[64]
Similar tendencies are found in the treatment of persons with disabilities. Nearly 10% of people living in Russia suffer from disabilities, though these 14 million people are hardly seen in public. It is widely avoided to hint at their mere existence as persons with disabilities are not the subject of official discussion. Since Soviet times, most people have shared negative attitudes toward persons with disabilities; they are seen as people with low worth. Parts of the population even wanted them to be eliminated. Though Western NGOs have done a lot to improve the situation of persons with disabilities in Russia, public transportation, offices, and the whole public space do not consider their needs. Elevators, ramps, sound signals, and Braille are widely missing to facilitate their mobility.[65]
Usually, they are removed from their families and brought to shelters for persons with disabilities. In Soviet times, families were not even allowed to raise their children with disabilities on their own. However, still, nowadays it is frequent that they spend their lives in shelters and not with their families. Time and again, they were tied to their beds, beaten, locked in their rooms, and completely socially ignored. Persons with disabilities are usually excluded from the education and job market. “There aren’t any institutions to employ mentally handicapped persons in a responsible way. When these persons have finished their school, then they have nothing to expect from the employment system.”[66]
War on Ukraine
Some weeks after the occupation of Crimea, I predicted Russia’s attempt at total conquest of Ukraine in the future. I wrote that the only possibility to rescue Ukraine from that fate would be the deployment of sufficient Western troops in the country.[67] Ukraine had no hostile feelings towards Russia by 2013. Ukraine’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law, and its desire to join the European Union, prompted Russia’s readiness to undermine Ukraine’s policies by brutal force.[68] Instead of maintaining friendly relations with Ukraine, Russia decided to subdue Ukraine through war. The result was a unified and patriotic Ukraine that will likely harbor animosity towards Russia for generations. The consequences of that policy include a hostile Ukraine, determined resistance from democratic nations worldwide, a decline in Russia’s power and influence in many parts of the world, a decrease in its GDP for many years, challenges in maintaining power in Russia, thousands of casualties in Ukraine and Russia, the devastation of Ukraine’s infrastructure, industry, and towns, and countless damages and injuries.
Only a tremendous weakness in formal operations, consciousness, rationality, and overview, including a corresponding lack of information and knowledge, can cause such failures. Only people who remain on lower stages of formal operations are inclined to disrespect the rights of other nations, believe that they have the right to decide what other nations should do, and whether they have the right to exist as independent nations or not, start wars to conquer foreign nations and subdue their populations, and sacrifice thousands of people for such criminal objectives. Only uncivilized and criminal individuals lead wars for imperial dreams, territorial expansion, and the restoration of former influences, resulting in losses not seen in Europe for many decades. Only individuals who remain on the lower stages of the civilization process disregard a multitude of international treaties, international law, and humanitarian standards. Incredibly, there are individuals who are inclined to devastate a so-called brother nation, thereby maintaining the non-existence of any difference between Russians and Ukrainians.
Observers rightly estimated that the war in Ukraine is not only “Putin’s war.” Large segments of the Russian population support imperial dreams regarding the restoration of the Russian Empire, with Ukraine seen as an indispensable part. These individuals accept that Russia has the right to determine its sphere of influence and Ukraine’s policies. They support wars when they lead to victory and an increase in power.[69] Even considering state propaganda, it is evident that only the weakness of formal operations – weakness in political consciousness and morals – can explain such an uncivilized stance.
Conclusions
It is apparent that the flawed policy of the West, namely the failure to contain Russia and prevent its invasion, stems from illusions regarding the level of civilization in Russian society. Due to the absence of education on Elias’ civilization theory and Oesterdiekhoff’s structural-genetic theory program, Western politicians and journalists simply overlooked the backwardness of Russian society in general and Russian policy specifically. They assumed that Russian politicians would share the political consciousness, moral stages, humanitarian standards, and values deeply rooted in the minds of politicians and people in the most advanced nations today. They could not even fathom the chasm that separates the “Russian World” from the “Free World.” The prevailing ideology of Cultural Relativism, which permeates the minds of the educated elite in the West, has fostered these illusions.
Of course, there are percentages of people in Russia who strongly oppose the Kremlin’s course and Russia’s backward stance. Those Russians who resist the Kremlin’s policy represent the better part of Russia and deserve the greatest respect. Mikhail Kasyanov and Irina Shcherbakova are part of the large group of Russians who embody the best of what Russia has to offer. They align with Ukrainians such as Ihor Terekhov, Dmytro Kuleba, and Volodymyr Zelensky, who exemplify advanced standards of political behavior and consciousness.
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[44] Ibidem, p. 215.
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[50] E. Fein, Cognition, cultural practices…, op. cit., p. 16.
[51] Ibidem, p. 5.
[52] S. Schattenberg, Die korrupte Provinz? Russische Beamte im 19. Jahrhundert, Campus Verlag 2008, pp. 113–115.
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[55] Ibidem, p. 16.
[56] J. Hoffmann, Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941-1945, Herbig 2003.
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[58] Ibidem, p. 7.
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[62] Ibidem.
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